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**A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN
KAZAKHSTAN AND ISRAEL: SCOPE OF TERRORISM THREAT
AND APPLICATION OF
COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGIES**

Abstract

This paper conducts a comparative analysis between Israel and Central Asia with a focus on the country of Kazakhstan in terms of sources and scope of the threat of terrorism, their specialized counterterrorist units and different counter-terrorism strategies ranging from the role of the community, media, financial and local legislative approaches. The paper concludes with the highlights stating that states should not only fight militarily the threat of terrorism, but rather with smart, flexible and comprehensible whole-government approaches. This includes effective law enforcement measures, toughened laws, reforming trust-building measures through neighborhood policies and developing a strong nationhood. While on the one hand Israel has been in a war-ridden conflicts since gaining its independence, Kazakhstan on the other hand as a post-soviet state has a bit differing and complex issues to deal with that concern problems related to building a post-soviet political identity and creating a stable and effective bridge between a unified political and comprehensive social response to the threat of terrorism.

Keywords: Terrorism; counter-terrorism; Israel; Kazakhstan; Central Asia.

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ҚАЗАҚСТАН МЕН ИЗРАИЛЬДІҢ САЛЫСТЫРМАЛЫ ТАЛДАУЫ: ТЕРРОИСТІК ҚАУІПТІҢ АУҚЫМЫ ЖӘНЕ ТЕРРОРИЗМГЕ ҚАРСЫ СТРАТЕГИЯЛАРЫ ҚОЛДАНУ

Аңдатпа

Бұл мақалада терроризм қаупінің қайнар көздері мен ауқымы, олардың мамандандырылған антитеррорлық бөлімшелері және қоғамдастықтың, бұқаралық ақпарат құралдарының рөлінен бастап әртүрлі терроризмге қарсы стратегиялар тұрғысынан Қазақстанға назар аудара отырып, Израиль мен Орталық Азия арасында салыстырмалы талдау жасалған, қаржылық және жергілікті заңнамалық тәсілдер. Газет мемлекеттер терроризм қаупімен тек әскери күрес жүргізіп қана қоймай, сонымен бірге ақылды, икемді және түсінікті бүкіл үкіметтік тәсілдермен күресу керек деген маңызды сәттерімен аяқтайды. Бұған тиімді құқық қолдану шаралары, қатал заңдар, көршілік саясаты арқылы сенім шараларын реформалау және күшті ұлт қалыптастыру кіреді. Израиль бір жағынан тәуелсіздік алғаннан бері соғыс жағдайында қақтығыстарда болса, екінші жағынан Қазақстан посткеңестік мемлекет ретінде посткеңестік құрылысқа қатысты проблемаларды шешуге қатысты әр түрлі және күрделі мәселелерге ие. саяси сәйкестілік және терроризм қаупіне бірыңғай саяси және жан-жақты әлеуметтік жауап беру арасында тұрақты және тиімді көпір құру.

Түйінді сөздер: Терроризм; терроризмге қарсы күрес; Израиль; Қазақстан; Орталық Азия.

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СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ КАЗАХСТНА И ИЗРАИЛЯ: МАСШТАБЫ ТЕРРОРИСТИЧЕСКОЙ УГРОЗЫ И ПРИМЕНЕНИЕ КОНТРТЕРРОРИСТИЧЕСКИХ СТРАТЕГИЙ

Аннотация

В данной статье проводится сравнительный анализ между Израилем и Центральной Азией с акцентом на Казахстан с точки зрения источников и масштабов угрозы терроризма, их специализированных антитеррористических подразделений и различных контртеррористических стратегий, начиная от роли сообщества, СМИ., финансовый и местный законодательный подходы. В конце статьи приводятся основные моменты, в которых говорится, что государствам следует не только бороться с угрозой терроризма в военном отношении, но и применять разумные, гибкие и понятные общегосударственные подходы. Это включает в себя эффективные правоохранительные меры, ужесточение законов, реформирование мер по укреплению доверия с помощью политики соседства и развитие сильной государственности. В то время как, с одной стороны, Израиль находится в охваченном войной конфликте с момента обретения независимости, Казахстан, с другой стороны, как постсоветское государство, имеет несколько разные и сложные вопросы, которые нужно решать, проблемы, связанные с построением постсоветского пространства.

политическая идентичность и создание стабильного и эффективного моста между единым политическим и всеобъемлющим социальным ответом на угрозу терроризма.

Ключевые слова: Терроризм; борьба с терроризмом; Израиль; Казахстан; Центральная Азия.

Introduction

The existence of terrorism in our contemporary time period all over the world does not just only threaten the very core idea of state's sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also as a phenomenon that defies the understanding of human morality and its morally permissible form of violence. Terrorism does not have one universal definition and often this ambiguity in finding a common consensus for definitional purposes creates problems for countries in pursuit to narrow down aspects of what 'terrorism' is and what does not constitute 'terrorism'. However, it can be understood in a broader sense as an "unlawful use of intentionally indiscriminate form of violence in order to generate terror and fear among masses of people with political aims at stake" [1].

Scholars have struggled also to debate on the necessity of its usage as a 'concept' in order to solidify and strengthen the legislative meaning of that particular type of act of violence. For instance, in situations dealing with identifying culprits, the act itself as well as how to categorize terrorist acts alongside other forms of acts of violence. States have their own counterterrorist policies and with the capabilities and capacities available and make the best use of their resources and funding's to withstand and prevent terrorism threats. The necessity to be able to defend and attack against terrorist threats has become for a lot of governments a national security priority while at the same time bringing issues of drainage of state's budget as well as ineffective measures in military or intelligence countermeasures. Nowadays, terrorism has evolved alongside the evolution of technology and the social media. Terrorism has become more difficult to trace while at the same time also gave state's the upper hand in applying the most sophisticated technological advancements when it comes down to countering terrorism activities.

In the context of Central Asia as a region consisting of former Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the revival of radical movements of Islam after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the beginning of 1990's has given concerns regarding the geopolitical stability of the region as well as overcoming challenges in the process of transformation of states from a secular republic towards a more religious oriented path [2]. The moral void of religion left by the collapse of communism has also challenged state's to find a 'golden middle' to balance out religious aspects with secular attributes in establishing their socio-political system of governance [2]. As a result, the region was vulnerable due to its period of radical political transition from a communist towards a post-soviet regime as well as being still a young, emerging and inexperienced region with newly independent states. For this comparative study, we will be looking at a Central Asian state of Kazakhstan as a comparison with Israel in terms of their scope of threat terrorism as well as how each of them has applied and still apply counter-terrorism strategies in different aspects.

The threat of Terrorism

There are debates over the Central Asian region whether radicalization and violent extremism of religious groups is in fact growing or if it is just an over exaggerated claim. But facing reality, Central Asia is a growing hub for extremism and radicalization, especially considering that it is close to the vicinity of countries like Afghanistan. This region is known for its prominent role of religion of Islam; where controlled exercised by the five governments create conditions for a 'repressed' presence of Islam. The promotion of secularism alongside a moderate form of 'traditional Islam' in most of the Central Asian states, makes the region vulnerable for the spread of radicalism and the emergence of several prominent terrorist organizations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami, Islamic Renaissance Party, Tablighi Jama'at as well as the well-known Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan [3].

With the recent return of children and mothers of Kazakh foreign fighters from Syria, the government of Kazakhstan showed that it was necessary to not let them be recruited as IS fighters, as it was the case with their male compatriots. In fact, it can be argued that this sign of solidarity will be used to ward off them from further recruitment and radicalization on the Syrian soil. However, much is still unsure for what “other” reasons entire families with kids had to go to Syria? These questions seem to be on the one hand clear for those who came back claiming that they have been ‘forced’ to go there, but other ulterior motives might still be hidden. Thus, leaving some critics to believe that the return of women and kids would lead to further getaway of Kazakh families into terrorist organizations, where unforeseen influx of women would again re-enter Kazakh soil and be left without legislative punishment.

The fact that Israel has always been under the threat of terrorism and military attacks since its establishment as a state back in 1948 with still nowadays many Arab states contesting it, the degree of the threat is morally accepted and at the same time a shared security problem for every citizen as it threatens the very core of its existence. With literally Israel’s ‘nation-in-arms’ it is no wonder that it feels threatened and encircled around its borders. Its longstanding history of external military battles and political conflicts has allowed them to establish their military doctrine of “*strategic defence, operational offence*” [4]. In other words, Israel considers the threat of terrorism as a number one national security priority. For Israel, the threat of terrorism can be linked historically far back before 1948 when the regional clashes between the Jews and Muslims began. Often these clashes had a political nature, especially if we look at who neighbors with Israel. With the emergence of Palestinian terrorism since the first intifada back in 1987 and the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu explaining the emergence of ‘*a new kind of terrorism*’ the scope and degree of terrorism threat has dramatically increased [5]. Since the year 2000, Palestinian violent terrorists have killed around 1321 people alone and between the years of 1989 up until 2008, no fewer than 250 suicide attacks have occurred [6] [7]. This shows at the one hand the extent of how terrorism is empirically existent in a far more violent form than in Central Asian states, but at the same time shows the inefficiency of Israeli counterterrorist measures.

While looking at it from a different angle, the perceived threat of terrorism within Central Asia can be claimed to be very low comparatively to Israel, as it is not the main issue for post-soviet states to be concerned with for now. Instead, socio-economic dilemmas and subjects of political issues are on the headlines. However, a relatively strong state apparatus present in Central Asia but rather with a big territory surrounded by China, Russia, Afghanistan and Iran, there is also the likelihood of Central Asia becoming a focal regional point for unforeseeable issues related to trade wars or territorial contestations of a political nature. This was especially laid out in the late 90’s with some scholars coining the term ‘*The New Great Game*’ [8], referring to the renewed geopolitical interests at the hearts of Central Asian region due to its natural resource wealth’s and geopolitically strategic point on the map. In this case, terrorism might hinder the importance of the region for the region to become an important geopolitical region. However, the opposite is also possible, where terrorism activity could instigate instability and security issues; making it in the long run a geopolitical region that can harbor terrorist safe haven.

Specialized Counterterrorist Units

Israel deals with terrorist organizations and their threats much more actively than most of the Central Asian states. First of all, their geographical situation have made them historically vulnerable for not just only terrorist attacks committed by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other terror groups, but also due to the conflicts that have been going on there since the establishment of the Israeli state back in 1948. Since then, the region has faced numerous regional large-scale battles such as the Six-Day War in 1967, Yom Kippur War in 1973 as well as the waves of Intifada attacks in the late 1980’s up to early 2000’s. With that said, there is a major difference between how Israel has been through interstate and intrastate wars and having experienced terrorist attacks compared to Central Asian states. In the context of the Central Asian region, interstate wars have been ‘bluntly’

said non-existent and therefore perceived and actual terrorist threat would only be coming from non-state groups. When looking at counterterrorism measures, Israel has different ways in coping with terrorist groups. What concerns domestic order, rule and control, Israel uses the so-called Special Police & Patrol Unit *Yamam* as well as *Yasam* that are specialized in hostage-rescue operations as well as in offensive operations against hostile targets [4]. This specialized unit also is called ‘*Unit for Counter-Terror Warfare*’ that takes direct command from the Ministry of Public Security as well as the Israeli Police force [4]. It emphasizes also heavily on the role as a watchdog within the so-called ‘community policing’ engagements, where support for minority communities of Arab citizens in cities of Israel is provided [4]. In some instances, allowing Arab citizens to be recruited into the Israeli Police Force [4]. Such direct commitments should de-escalate frictions within the ‘invisible’ Israeli soil among living Arabs and Israelis.

However, this specialized unit does not just function alone against terrorism. The installment of the concept of deterrence operations that focuses on “managing violence through measured retaliation”, which in other words mean to not retributively react upon terrorist threats, but rather punish and breach norms that would generate high costs for terroristic future attacks [9]. Such deterrence measures are then further subdivided into ‘flexible’ and ‘massive’ operations and have been already put to use in Operations Summer Rains and Autumn in Gaza Area 2006, Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 and few others that are all carried out by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) [9]. The IDF is in fact the military of Israel, comprising of the air, ground, naval, intelligence and cyber forces as well as special units operating under three branches: Anti-guerrilla warfare unit, clandestine units operating in hostile territory and last but not least undercover operations unit [4]. In regional skirmishes, IDF also takes into their responsibility the control of regions such as Damascus Gate or West Bank. For instance, near the Damascus Gate the usage of marksman units on roofs or unmanned drones or vehicles have been applied [4]. In case of the West Bank region, to deter suicide bombings of manned or unmanned vehicles, metal bollards or barbed fences have been reinstalled [4]. In some other instances, house demolitions, selective killing operations as well as deportation processes may be enforced [4]. Such covert operations also demonstrate that their counter-terrorist strategies go beyond their domestic territorial control and in comparison, to Central Asian region, involve close cooperative networks with the community. In other words, the people themselves serve indirectly in helping and “snitching out” suspected terrorists. However, understanding Israel’s geographical situation and its longstanding history of enmity with neighboring states, who have opposed and still oppose the official creation of the Israeli state back in 1948, it would rather be difficult to find a terrorist who does not belong to any of those two camps, as one man’s terrorists could also be another man’s freedom fighter if rephrased with a bit of twist here and there.

Each independent state in Central Asia has and must have counterterrorist units, especially considering the fact that radicalization of Islam is not a new phenomenon there. Central Asian leaders have numerously argued against the flow of political liberalization processes, allowing for religion to be revived in a new radical form and by that having a great influence already on the heavily Muslim populated Central Asian region. Despite this fear, Central Asian states like Kazakhstan cooperate regionally as well as internationally in antiterrorist processes through UN, SCO as well as within the CSTO [10]. Such multilateral and often bilateral partnerships have sometimes not enough legal binding force to incorporate states together, as often counterterrorism in terms of its importance in the national security matter, as a low-priority factor [10]. Thus, the source of the threat of terrorism would only be external, and not much internal, as strong state-apparatus control and tightened political control all over Central Asia leaves no space for any diversion at all [10]. Often, the indirect battle with terrorism can be more effective than financing just counterterrorist units due to financial burdens on it for maintenance reasons. Such an indirect approach can also be labeled as ‘soft’. One of the ways is to rewrite legislations on the persecution,

incarceration and execution of convicted terrorists. To give you an example, Uzbekistan had to take on a hardline road in their brutality to persecute and incarcerate ‘risky’ Islamic fundamentalists and would often step beyond their authority and ignore principles of human rights and the rule of law [11]. This has gone so far that even moderate Islamic believers became targets for persecution [11].

One more thing Central Asia is famous for is for its drug trade. Here the nexus of drug trafficking and terrorism can be explained through its source of funding and criminal activity of organized crimes. In such a case, organized crimes can turn their drug trade into businesses of human trafficking and recruitments of terrorists, apart from becoming financial intermediary for terrorists [12]. For instance, the drug trade route passing from Afghanistan throughout Kazakhstan can also end up in Russia and China and vice versa. In this context, Kazakhstan stands as a channel for drug trafficking routes from China and Russia towards other Central Asian states. With the existence of corruption and thus heavy money laundering in the Central Asia region, it would make the situation even more gloomy understanding that authorities are pumping money for counterterrorism measures while also not looking at the ‘heart of the root problem’ of poverty, crime and systematic corruption. Kazakhstan cooperates with multilaterally with states like China; especially what concerns the extradition of Uyghur terrorist suspects [13]. Apart from that, they also participate in counterterrorist drills with Russia or Uzbekistan in order to gain practical experience. However, the role of a specialized unit fighting against terrorism is not enough, as a most of the time a comprehensive approach will be used in the fight with the threat. Moreover, any country can form its own specialized unit that has adapted to the domestic environment where it is operating, but often this would not suffice as before the “battle” there is the immense work of analyzing, predicting and tracing of terrorist activities. It is like playing chess, where one must foresee and anticipate unforeseen situations; an often it takes valuable time, sufficient human and material resources as well as confidence mixed with experience.

Role of the Community & Media

The constant terrorist attacks and its reoccurrences also traumatizes the society at the community level. Thus, each individual is influenced by the fear to be victims and easy targets for terrorists. In case of Israel’s experience, terrorism has also bolstered the natural post-trauma effects and the government has actively engaged in preserving the standard of life with terrorism. This though did not of course mean that terrorism threats have become an acceptable norm in the society, but instead mean that adaptability of the society at the community and national level was necessary. In a poll conducted in the midpoint of the 2nd Intifada, only 9.4 percent of respondents claimed to have suffered from post-traumatic stress [14]. Of course, such numbers may not show the real aftereffects of how Israel’s society is effectively resilient to traumata’s, but may also depict the ‘readiness’ of the Israeli people not to give in. Through Israeli citizens being seen as ‘partners’ or ‘force-multiplier’ in times of the crisis, it also bolsters the restoration of the aftermath of a terrorist attack towards a “normalcy” without aggravating public discontent or public fortitude [4].

Being a war-ridden country, Israel has first of all much more experience in counter-terrorism strategies than the Central Asian states, but this does not mean that the same can be applied to its effectiveness. In some other instances, Israel also operates in a more aggressive way internally with those who are being considered as suspects of terrorist activity and would even go as far as to methods of interrogating them or giving them administrative detentions. Here of course often comes into play the moral dilemma of how far you can go to find out hideouts of terrorists or at least find out more valuable information for security reasons. The usage of data mining and hard-to-reach individual approach will also have an effect on de-marginalizing marginalized communities and

help them to be more pro-active, develop community relations, empower women to promote public awareness campaigns in the shared perception of the threat of terrorism [4]. This inter-communal and interfaith initiatives serve to bolster human security needs as well as promoting government support for certain political agenda. On the other side of the coin, the prominent role of religion in Central Asia also pushes governments to undertake dual strategy of co-optation and oppression of religion [15]. This is for instance administered in the case of Kazakhstan through enforced mandatory registration of religious associations or through regulations in setting parameters for mass informational streams of disclosing religious or theological discourses [15]. There is also a close watch out on the imams themselves, so that on a rotational basis they have to be kept under supervision while re-examination of their theological teachings is not violating parameters set by the government [15]. Of course, this does not mean that through repression the militancy or terrorism itself could be hunted down or entirely subjugated, but instead could incite hatred as well as underground movements against repressive government policies. Turning a blind eye to it could be fatal in the long run.

The mass media is also a tool to propagate the battle against terrorism. Often though this is not only done directly through ‘bragging’ about successful counter-terrorist covert operations, but also through unconscious transmission of closing down media outlets that could spur nationalistic or political digression. Often due to shutdown of liberal and critical voices in Kazakhstan, journalists have to pay the prices by not taking the professional risk to inform on their unofficial information’s provided [16]. To an extent, Kazakhstani journalists have to rely on courts allowing them to falsify reports if needed in order not to incite viewers or triggering them into something unexpected [16]. This so-called ‘informational war’ often is accompanied in post-soviet regimes through repression as well as manipulation, often to preserve status quo, reputation, honor and dignity of those who have a stake in place [16]. Otherwise, what is the role of the state in this case, if it cannot control the flow of mass media? Criticism and liberalist views on certain political issues could trigger communal strives as well as hypocritical pseudo non-state association to take advantage of that and gain political support. Thus, not just simply lowering the trust for the government but also creates channels for terrorist organizations to enter into discourse with the community. While on the other hand, repressive and strict media flow of information could hamper the truth and freedom of journalists to be not reporting false information or manipulating them. Terrorists use the media as a channel to diffuse and express fear and violence, making the media a source of ‘oxygen’ for terrorists to be recognized, seen, understood and accepted in its most violent form.

The dilemma of tracing terrorism funding

The tracing of financial channels for terrorists often pose difficulties for states due to its complexity, size as well as what concerns finding out traces and evidence for confirmation. Terrorist organizations often bypass through third parties, charitable organizations as well as through money laundering that ends up in offshore accounts of different individuals [17]. Though sometimes but not often, diplomatic channels are used as well as legal ways to obtain sources of financial support through sales of different goods and services like cars or consumer products [17]. However, organizations and individuals are not the only source of intermediary for funding of terrorism. In fact, states also play a role in there as without states big organizations and SME’s would not really function, especially in the context of Palestine and Hamas. All over the world states have cooperated together in fighting terrorist funding and have so tightened the control for financial intermediaries as well as established bilateral and multilateral agreements on the control of financial flows in and out of the countries. Israel has established a joint mechanism for

collaboration between the law enforcement and judiciary bodies as well as with the banking sector [4]. While on the one side the judiciary bodies work on implementing harsh penalties for terrorists and legally bind them to give them weight and importance, law enforcement bodies preserve everyday order and law in cities and rural areas [4]. Here, the banking sector has to comply with the authorities on anything that it asks for as provision of any necessary evidence of financial transactions that has occurred. International couriers like Western Union or MoneyGram are also kept on watchful eye [4].

The same techniques are likewise applied in Central Asia. State authorities have still been struggling to fight the existence of source of finance of drug trafficking as well as the nexus with criminal gangs that could be affiliated somehow with Muslim radicalization issues. For instance, Salafism as well as other forms of radical beliefs in Islam have heightened issues of interethnic problems and given concerns over the financial control of commercial banks and their transactions. However, as much as the state would want to control the financial flow of currencies and sources of funding, terrorists will always find other legal channels to fund their organizations. Kazakhstan being a member of Eurasian Group on Combatting Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, it monitors and controls the flow of money transfers and remittances coming from within and abroad [18]. With the cooperation of the KNB, the Committee for National Security, security services have intercepted 11 allegedly ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2017, where allegations went from courts sentencing convicts for promotion of extremism, involvement in recruitment processes as well as plotting of terrorist acts [18]. Furthermore, the government has already implemented the five-year state program since 2013 with the fight of religious extremism, where promotion of ‘traditional Islam’ has been undergone [18]. It wanted to reach out to the youth through social programs and economic opportunities, especially those already having gone through radicalization issues or offenses related to extremism [18]. Government also started to heavily censor *Facebook* as well as *Vkontakte* platforms in order to crack down on incitements of radicalized forms of messages or posts [18]. By these actions, the government has managed to silence radicalism and extremism, but this does not mean that these are the only platforms where it could be traced back. With that regard, it should indirectly have an effect on the youth to not be affiliated with any terrorist organizations or radical movements in their process to be recruited or fund them in any way.

All in all, Kazakhstan operates with a comprehensive legal framework in the fight against terrorism, particularly currently focusing on the foreign terrorist fighters from Syria [18]. With it, a two-pronged approach is undertaken that legally binds foreign fighters to be persecuted in the homeland and for some to be rehabilitated [18]. With law amendments to five legal codes in December 2016 additional provisions were made in the aspects of security and law enforcement bodies that allowed stricter procedures for conduct of visa control or residency permits as well as affecting the usage of communicative encryptions in social media platforms [19]. Despite the accusations and criticisms from the offices of democratic institutions and human rights from the OSCE concerning the application of vague definitions of terrorists and their offences, it bolstered the coordination between different agencies of law enforcement, judicial, border security and financial agencies [19]. This comprehensive approach would help also to strengthen the overall fight with terrorist activities and deter with preventive measures the aggravation of situations that could lead to acts of terrorism.

Conclusion

States should not only fight militarily with terrorism, but rather with smart, flexible and comprehensible measures that involve whole-government approaches. Effectively enforcing legal

and strict laws and norms would help to gain not just only trust and solidarity among the people, but also to build stronger state capacities of threat of 'terror' in the minds of the people. In this regard, it is crucial to win the "hearts and minds" of the people. Another emphasis could also be made on upholding and reforming trust-building measures through the so-called 'Neighborhood Policy' in getting closer to states like Afghanistan, in order to prevent the proliferation of safe haven territories for terrorists into other regions in Central Asia [4]. In Israel though, terrorism has far more deeply rooted problems that encompasses politics alongside its way, making it often difficult to counteract terrorism. There is a saying that "You can kill a person, but it will take ages to kill an ideology", which explains how difficult it is to change the minds of people. Central Asian states like Kazakhstan are passing through different periods of transition in their political as well as social aspects, especially considering the fact that the struggle to develop a strong 'nationhood' with a post-soviet political identity that tried to refocus its new path away from the Soviet legacy. Moreover, Kazakhstan still has to create a stable and effective bridge between a unified political and comprehensive social response while at the same time maintaining a serious sense of understanding for its vulnerability as an independent and developing state [20]. Fearing for its territorial and political integrity alongside problems in state building aspects threats like terrorism could also have been exaggerated in terms of its degree and scope of threat. But in the context of Central Asia, this should not be undermined and taken for granted. The same goes also for Israeli state, that considers inevitably terrorism as a national threat to their statehood's security and internal integrity. With its longstanding historical experiences in military battles with neighboring states and still to date ongoing conflicts in the regional outskirts of Israel have shown that war-ridden countries are affected with a totally different degree than Central Asian states. The extent of the waves of Intifada attacks on Israel have heightened the activities of terrorism since then, making the country vulnerable to terror organizations like Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Despite those atrocities, one must not forget the political discourse and debates over Israel's still contested existence as a state. Often that is overlooked when looking at terrorism only from one lens. With that in mind states must not always directly eliminate the threat but instead try to understand first the problem itself while at the same time preventing the problem to be accepted as a norm, which could be detrimental for the state, as terror should never be accepted and tolerated in any in its form.

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