WHO SETS THE AGENDA? ANALYZING ATTENTION DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND VIOLENT CRIME ISSUES IN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA OVER THE PERIOD OF 2008-2015

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been written by me in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information which have been used in the thesis.

This thesis has also not been submitted for any degree in any university previously.

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Mergen Dyussenov

December 1, 2018

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Abstract

The thesis puts the key question – who sets the agenda of two policy issues, economic diversification and violent crime, in Canada and Australia? This question remains critical in current scholarly debates. Among the major actors, *media* seems to exert predominant influence, though the *public* has grown in influence with emergence of internet. Finally, *academia* and *think tanks* are also found to exert agenda-setting influence for some issues, often socially controversial issues and those with scientific uncertainty. This research analyzes the contexts of Canada and Australia for two policy issues – *economic diversification* and *violent crime* – over the period from 2008 to 2015.

This research should contribute to agenda-setting theory in the internet era by defining the most vital actor(s) across the two countries based on longitudinal *dynamics* in attention. The methodology includes: using *think tanks*' web-sites to collect trends in the number of publications as a proxy for attention dynamics and conducting the content analysis of these pieces; use of Scopus and Web of Science to trace scholarly articles as a proxy of *academic* attention, and analyze content; use of *Nexis Lexis* and *Google Search* to trace *media* articles, with content analysis of articles; and use of Google search (filtered for blogs) [1] and www.blogsearchengine.org to trace comments of the wider public on e-blogs and relevant media articles related to the two issues, and content analysis of these comments to develop context-specific patterns. Finally, *LEGIS info* database in

[1] Google has recently disabled its Blog search engine, so now it offers instead Google news search that can be filtered by specifically selecting blogs. http://searchengineland.com/google-blog-search-now-within-google-news-search-202202

Canada and *Parliament of Australia Search Hansard* system in Australian context are employed in order to track *policy-making* activities, as measured through numbers of relevant bills and laws.

Chapter 1.Introduction

The present thesis revolves around the agenda-setting stage of the policy process. Defined as the first and most critical stage of the policy process (Howlett et al. 2009) that determines its subsequent stages (Peters 2015), agenda-setting contributes to a more nuanced understanding of media's role in society (Carragee et al. 1987, as cited in Rogers et al. 1993). Although this stage of the policy process generally involves a number of major actors, such as the public, interest groups and scholarly communities among others, it is largely media that appears to continue to play a predominantly vital role in setting policy agendas, as suggested by current debates in the field and literature review, although the public's role has become stronger since the emergence of online resources, e.g. internet, and their increasing use among scholars.

The current research attempts to clearly answer the key question of who sets the agenda of two policy issues, economic diversification and violent crime, as applied to Canadian and Australian contexts over the eight-year period from January 1, 2008 to December 31,2015 (Figure 1). The major actors analyzed include *think tanks*, and *scholars*, collectively constituting the expert community, *media*, as well as the *public* (as non-experts). The key reason for grouping the actors into these two categories is based on the large prevalence of non-experts, i.e. either media or the public, in setting policy agenda according to the literature review, while the role of expertise (as represented by scholars and think tank communities) remains unjustifiably ignored (see, for instance, Fuerstein 2008 with regard to the need to better empower epistemic actors in agenda-setting given the complexity of

governance). This research should contribute to existing theories: by using internet research tools and content analysis applied to the two policy issues in both nations, it seeks to identify: a) specifically the key actor(s) driving the agenda in this specific country context over the given time period, and b) generally identify relative prevalence of (non-)experts in agenda-setting.

Figure 1 An overview of key actors in agenda-setting[2]



The research questions this thesis attempts to answer include the following.

RQ 1: Who sets the agenda? To answer this mega-question, analyses will contrast experts versus non-experts: the former including *scholars* and *think tanks* for each of the two issues in Canadian and Australian context, and the latter including two distinct groups - *media*, and the *public* at large.

RQ 2: Is the agenda-setting influence *uni-*, *bi-*, or *multi-directional* for each of the two issues over the time from2008 to 2015? For instance, media might be found to set the agenda directly influencing the public (non-experts), i.e. uni-directional influence, or it may influence the public sentiments first, followed by

[2] Block arrows (⇓) indicate assumedly strong influence, while line arrows (→) denote weaker influence links

the public's bi-directional influence back to media through feedback loops (hence the public's medialized influence in agenda-setting, e.g. as in Neuman et al. 2014); it may also be multi-directional, provided that the public's medialized influence extends to think tank domains as reflected by relevant policy publications.

Furthermore, the research capitalizes on the inductive nature of the content analysis method (section 3.4 below) and analyzes some of the specific codes that should emerge in the research process, e.g. common and divergent patterns, as observed for each of the two issues.

The following research hypotheses are suggested:

1. Given the scientific uncertainty and technical complexity around the economic diversification issue, the public is expected to play a weaker role in setting the agenda for this issue, instead either academia or think tanks should play a stronger role. The role of media is expected to be intermediary, functioning as a framing channel through which influence signals are transmitted between the public, scholars and think tank communities, and policymakers.

2. Given a high level of public attention and sensitivity with regard to justice and crime issues generally, as suggested by opinion polls in Canada[3], either the public or media is expected to play a stronger role in driving the agenda for the issue of violent crime over the period. Scholars and think tanks, on the other hand, should play a moderate role, either largely responding to signals from the public or media, or exhibiting bi- or multi-directional (however still rather modest) influence back to the major actor(s).

[3] For instance, according to CBC surveys in 2015, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/vote-compass-canada-election-2015-issues-canadians-1.3222945

1.1 Contextual background on both issues across Canada and Australia

To begin with, the context related to economic diversification across both Canada and Australia largely combines low attention intensity shown by the non-experts, i.e. media and the public, as well as government agencies, and higher and more systematic attention, i.e. with more regular patterns, as exhibited by the expert community (both think tanks and academia in the Canadian setting and academia in Australian context), suggested first by Quantitative analysis and then further reinforced by the Descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes (sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 on Canada and 4.2.1, 4.2.2 on Australia; see also the summary in section 4.3). Among a range of industry sectors as related to economic diversification discourse, all actors unanimously tend to emphasize the primary resource sector, followed by advanced industries, then services (Table 8, section 4.3). The predominant focus on primary resources entails two policy implications. First, it reflects the context of energy-rich economy's dependence on primary resources; and secondly, the primary resource sector is perceived as the foundation for further economic diversification.

Next, with regard to the major types of economic diversification, the attention trends exhibited by key actors across both country contexts follow a clear pattern, i.e. non-experts (the public, media) and government tend to emphasize market diversification policy, while the experts (think tanks, academia) mainly focus on higher-quality and research-intense product and industrial dimensions of economic diversification policy (Table 9, section 4.3). Not only do the non-experts and government focus on the (less technical) market diversification, but it is worth

noting both media's and government's strong motivation to reflect preferences of the public, i.e. media's interest grounded in its ability to 'sell' digestible and somewhat sensational material to the mass reader while the government tends to develop policies based on the public preferences.

Second, with regards to the violent crime context across the both nations, attention intensity somewhat varies across the country cases. In Canadian context the government is found to show low intense but regularly recurring attention cycles (Fig. 42) thus demonstrating resilience against external pressure even more so than in the diversification case, while media, on the contrary, exhibits unsystematic attention trends initially downward with a sensation-driven spike in 2012 and then returning to the pre-shock level followed with steadily increasing trends. The public generally exhibits unsystematic attention intensity over the period, which resembles non-expert patterns. Furthermore, among the experts, academia also exhibits patterns similar to non-experts, with a spike around 2014 (section 5.3). Finally, it is think tanks that exhibit systematically growing trends, with two distinct spikes around 2010 and 2014 (Fig. 45).

The Australian context demonstrates a more coherent picture. All actors, except think tanks, largely exhibit increased attention toward the end of the period thus resembling non-expert patterns. This observation is then analyzed in detail at the content analysis stage (see section 5.2.3). Another interesting observation is possible correlation in patterns among Australian think tanks, media and government around 2014-2015 with a common theme being domestic and family violence cases. While media and government correlation may not appear surprising,

the correlation between government and think tanks is less obvious. This is because among think tanks a substantial part constitutes government-affiliated think tanks and research centers, while it is not the case in Canadian context (see section 5.2.2 for details). Furthermore, while quantitative analysis suggests the tentatively stronger role of think tanks in driving policy agenda on violent crime across both countries, this is then disproved at descriptive analysis stage (see section 5.3. for a summary). Media though generally appearing less robust vis-à-vis think tanks or the public, exhibits relatively greater prominence in the Australian setting than in Canadian context both with regard to violent crime and diversification contexts. Thus the nature of policy issues does not seem to have an impact on variation in media's intensity, though it is vital to note the (limited) tentativeness of this observation given small N of policy issues and country cases analyzed. Yet, the nature of issues influences interactions between government agencies and the public: the government is mostly referred to by other key actors in economic diversification context, while violent crime context emphasizes the public. The last prominent actor (though not an agenda setter) is the government: it exhibits systematic (i.e. as perceived by a range of actors, not just by a single actor) resilience specifically in Canadian context as applied to both policy issues. The Australian government, on the other hand, is found to express stronger preference for a partnership approach to strategically accommodating the agenda-setting interactions driven by the public in violent crime context and the private sector in economic diversification context (see Ch. 4 and 5 for detailed data analyses on diversification and violent crime, accordingly).

Finally, the contextual background description would be incomplete without an overview of the types of violent crime (please refer to Table 17 for a summary). First, Canadian context points to a correlation between media and public attention focused mainly on gun violence, while think tanks and academia correlate around murder and homicide policy sub-areas; government attention is left uncorrelated grounded in physical violence (which further reinforces the notion of government resilience against external pressure in actor-centric agenda-setting context). The Australian context suggests a correlation among government, media and the public mainly focused on domestic and family violence sub-areas (with physical violence being another important sub-issue within violent crime discourse), while think tanks pay greater attention to physical violence, and academia remains totally uncorrelated by attending more to alcohol violence and thus is often characterized as the 'Ivory tower'. To sum, this section seeks to provide a brief account of contextual overview without detailed analyses in terms of who, among the key actors, actually sets the policy agenda on economic diversification and violent crime across both country settings over the time period (i.e. 2008-2015), which is the predominant focus of Ch. 4 and 5, especially in sections 4.1.3 and 4.2.3 (detailed content analyses of diversification policy across Canada and Australia accordingly), sections 5.1.3 and 5.2.3 (content analyses of violent crime discourse across both countries), and sections 4.3 and 5.3 with regard to summaries of three-level analyses with regard to both policy issues.

Chapter 2. The Agenda-Setting Stage of the Policy Process

Public policy is a complex phenomenon. One of the popular approaches to analyzing public policy is to view it as a process or as a set of stages where policy issues tend to flow in some form of sequence from "inputs", i.e. problems, to "outputs", i.e. policy solutions (Howlett et al., 2009). This sequence of stages is often called the "policy cycle" (Werner and Wegrich, 2007). As outputs emerge, the policy cycle also embraces monitoring and evaluation activities. Its attention largely focuses on generic aspects of the policy process, not so much on concrete actors or institutions, or specific policy issues. Yet, most studies do not apply the entire policy cycle framework for their analyses, but instead focus on a specific stage of the process. As suggested by Howlett et al. (2009), the policy cycle model includes five stages: 1) agenda-setting, 2) policy formulation, 3) decision-making, 4) policy implementation, and 5) policy evaluation. The present research predominantly focuses on the agenda-setting stage.

Based on this model, agenda-setting is defined as the process in which policy issues (problems) arrive to the attention of government leaders. It is the first and most critical policy cycle stage that deals with the way policy issues emerge competing for government's attention. This stage largely pre-determines the whole subsequent stages of the policy cycle and their outcomes (Howlett et al., 2009; Peters 2015). An agenda can be defined as the set of issues that government bodies will take action on (Cobb and Elder, 1972). Agenda-setting can be viewed as the "list of subjects" that government officials pay attention to, while their attention is

greater to some issues than to the others (Kingdon, 1984: 3-4). Thus the lack of guaranteed inclusion of a certain issue into political agenda is a function of the speed at which the issue moves onto/off the agenda (Peters, 2015). Placing a policy issue on agenda might seem rather simple, but in reality this is likely to entail significant mobilization of political resources. Such an "issue attention cycle" is the reflection of the unpredictability of public opinion, but also pressure exerted upon the government, which itself possesses limited time and other resources (Downs, 1972). Since there are other events taking place concurrently in the economy and society that can attract the attention of media and/or government bodies, a given issue is unlikely to remain on political agenda for long. Policymaking at the agenda-setting stage indicates the need for recognition of a policy issue. Such recognition means that a social problem needs to be clearly identified, and the need for government intervention is stated (Werner and Wegrich, 2007).

2.1 Literature review: key actors in agenda-setting

A major theme in agenda-setting is *the role of key players* in driving policy agenda, with the question posed: who sets the agenda? (see Table 1 below). Identifying the key actors in agenda-setting is one of the most central questions in modern public policy analysis (Rochefort and Donnelly 2013). As Daugbjerg and Pedersen (2004) note regarding agenda-setting, the nature of actors that initiate discussions of policy issues is a major force driving an issue from informal to the formal, i.e. institutional, agenda (as cited in Howlett et al., 2009). Neuman et al. (2014) specifically address the question of who sets the agenda in the digital age, and find that ties between media and the public often can be *bi-directional*.

Numerous sources still generally emphasize the stronger role of *media* over the *public* (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Wood and Peake 1998 etc. as shown in Table 1). Specifically, Soroka et al. 2013 emphasize the critical role of media in policymaking, which can be expressed through *framing*, or as a *critical conduit* between the public and elected politicians, assisting the public in conveying its messages to the government.

Others emphasize the predominance of the *public*. For example, Margetts et al. 2016 note citizens empowered by social media tools to drive their collective agenda; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2013's observation that when an issue gets into macro-political agenda, two factors – public opinion and party competition – become vital in driving policy change. Wlezien and Soroka 2016 refer to *active voters* as the type of public that matters most; Stocking 2015 links the emergence of internet to the growing role of the public vs. media in agenda-setting; Bonafont and Palau 2011 refer to the role of *citizens* in driving policy change etc. Furthermore, scholars increasingly recognize the role of netizens, i.e. the online public, or as "active cyber citizens" (as in Denham 2010, p.315) in driving their own agenda. Netizens and bloggers are viewed as independent agenda setters able to influence media, and by extension the public agenda and policy initiatives (Cooper 2006, as in Denham 2010). Netizens can react by offering comments to media articles and possibly affecting the following reporting of an issue (Denham 2010), thus showing a *bi-directional* influence.

A number of scholars suggest a strong role of *academia and think tanks* in agenda-setting, e.g. see Zimmerman 2016 on the role of think tanks in security

policies and Shaw et al. 2014 for healthcare; Ekayani et al. 2016 on the scholars' role in driving forestry issues in Indonesia, Nisbet and Huge 2006 note scholars drive biotechnology issues in the US; Mintrom and Williams (2013) group US-based think tanks as "*watch dogs*" and "*idea brokers*" (p. 6), depending on their political stances; Timmermans and Scholten 2006 on the scholars' role in shaping immigration and reproductive technology issues in Netherlands; and Fuerstein (2008) raising the need to strengthen the role of epistemic knowledge to bolster governance decisions. Yet, some scholars further suggest the importance of other actors in setting agenda – international organizations in Kazakhstan (Mukhtarova et al. 2013); social media in Italy (Ceron et al. 2015); advocacy groups in the US and Eastern Europe (Copeland, Hasell and Bimber 2016; Bartlett and Pagliarello 2016); EU Commission (Littoz-Monnet 2012); and political and public officials, both across the developing world e.g. Mukhtarova et al. (2013) on the role of president in setting anti-corruption agenda in Kazakhstan, and Benney (2015) on Chinese government's promoting social stability; and various nations, both developed and developing nations (Wu et al. 2010; Wanta and Kalyango 2007; Wanta and Foote 1994).

Table 1 A summary of key players in agenda-setting

Key Players	Corresponding author(s)	Jurisdiction
Media (non-experts)	McCombs and Shaw 1972, Iyengar and Simon 1993; Wood and Peake 1998; Roberts et al. 2002; Kiousis 2005; Son and Weaver 2006; Tan and Weaver 2009, 2010; Dunaway et al. 2010; Dursun-Ozkanca 2011, 2014; Muddiman et al. 2014; Weaver and Choi 2014; Vergeer and Franses 2015; Sevenans and Vliegenthart 2016; Brosius and	US (10), UK (2), Netherlands (2), Belgium (1), Germany (1); EU (1); Malaysia (1)

	Kepplinger 1990; Desmet et al. 2015; Mustapha and Wok 2015; Soroka et al. 2013	
The wider public (non-experts)	Margetts et al. 2016; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2013;Lax and Phillips 2011; Wlezien and Soroka 2016; Delshad 2012; Majone 2010; Mukhtarova et al. 2013; Schucher and Bondes 2015; Luo 2014; Knecht and Weatherford 2006; Bonafont and Palau 2011; Stocking 2015; Brosius and Kepplinger 1990	US (5), EU (1), Spain (1), Germany (1), Canada (1) China (2)
Scholars and think tanks (experts)	Zimmerman 2016; Shaw et al. 2014;Ekayani et al. 2016; Stewart 2014;Nisbetand Huge 2006; Norris 2011; Timmermans and Scholten 2006; Mintrom and Williams 2013; Fuerstein 2008	US, Indonesia, Canada, Italy, Spain, Netherlands
Advocacy (interest) groups	Copeland, Hasell and Bimber 2016; Delshad 2012; Bartlett and Pagliarello 2016	US (2), West Balkan states
Social media	Ceron et al. 2015	Italy
EU Commission	Littoz-Monnet 2012	EU
International organizations;	Mukhtarova et al. 2013	Kazakhstan
Political parties/public officials	Mukhtarova et al. 2013; Benney 2015; Wu et al. 2010; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2013;Wanta and Kalyango 2007; Wanta and Foote 1994	Kazakhstan, China, France, African nations

Source: The author's own analytics

As Table 1 suggests, two key players – *media* and the *public* – tend to dominate agenda-setting across various jurisdictions generally, followed by a moderate role of *academia* and *think tanks*, and weaker roles of interest groups, international organizations, social media, and policymakers. As Weaver and Choi (2014) summarize recent findings in agenda-building, there are five influencing factors for media agenda: news sources, other media, journalistic norms, unexpected events, and media audiences. Thus, three of the five factors are still

media-related, the fifth factor relating to the public, and the other one relating to events.

Apart from analyzing key actors that set the policy agenda in specific contexts, it is also important to look at (often multiple) directions of agenda-setting influence they exert. For instance, Copeland, Hasell and Bimber (2016) with regard to same-sex marriage (SSM) issues in the US context, find that while generally media organizations tend to influence the public, the latter shows longer attention persistence to the issue than media. As news media attention on the SSM issue largely waned in Twitter within four weeks, the public continued to discuss the issue over seven weeks. While at the beginning, "a mutually reinforcing, *multidirectional* agenda-setting dynamic occurred among the public itself, news organizations, and advocacy groups…" (p. 3800), media organizations eventually shifted their attention, along with some members of the public. The rest of the public continued to discuss the issue well after it disappeared from media attention radars. Internet enabled platforms seem to offer opportunities to the public to continue their discussions even after media attention wanes. In another piece, Neuman et al. (2014) pose the central question of *who sets the agenda in the digital era* by analyzing attention trends of traditional and social media for 29 issues in 2012, and found agenda-setting showing *complex* and *dynamic interactions*. Particularly, social media in contrast to traditional media devotes more time on socially sensitive issues, e.g. birth control, abortion and SSM, and public order issues, e.g. drugs and gun use, while it appears to spend less time discussing more technically complex issues such as economics and government policies.

Interestingly, blogs and discussion boards' attention trends appear to precede traditional media attention spikes. Thus, in answering the key question, the authors suggest the possibility of "mutual and reciprocal causality" (p. 210).

To summarize, the ongoing debates in agenda-setting literature *prima facie* suggest the importance of identifying key actors that set policy agenda in specific contexts. Although media continues to exert predominant agenda-setting influence, the public has grown in its power to set agendas especially in the internet era (Margetts et al. 2016, Stocking 2015). Furthermore, another group of actors – academia and think tanks – can also demonstrate agenda-setting influence especially regarding technically complex issues depending on context, e.g. forestry issues in Indonesia (Ekayani et al. 2016), immigration in Netherlands (Timmermans and Scholten 2006) etc.; as well as issues that involve scientific uncertainty, e.g. climate change (Stewart 2014), or biotechnology issues (Nisbet and Huge 2006). Furthermore, as analyses of Copeland, Hasell and Bimber (2016) and Neuman et al. (2014) suggest, it is important to look into agenda-setting influence through the prism of two-way and/or multiple directions. Thus who sets the agenda in a given jurisdiction on specific policy issues remains an interesting research question to explore.

2.1.1 Review of agenda-setting publications in Australia and Canada

To conduct the review, first, the author compared and contrasted Web of Science and Scopus databases. The search for Australia-related publications on agenda-setting over the period 2009 – 2017 returns 24 results by using Web of Science, and 35 by Scopus. The search for Canada context agenda-setting

publications over the same period returns 31 results by Web of Science and 28 by Scopus. These search-generated articles are further filtered for relevance, which leads to the final selection of 30 publications in Australia and 27 in Canadian context for analyses, while three publications focus both on Canada and Australia (thus, the total number of distinct published articles is 54, see Appendix 1 for details). The total numbers of publications for both nations per year over the period are outlined in Table 2 below.

Table 2 Australia and Canada agenda-setting publications, 2009-2016/17

Year	Canada	Australia	Total
2016/17*	6	4*	10
2015	3	4	7
2014	4	5	9
2013	2	6	8
2012	1	4	5
2011	2	3	5
2010	3	1	4
2009	6	3	9
Total	**27**	**30**	

*This includes 2 Australia-related articles published in 2017 as of February 20, 2017.

Source: The author's own analytics

As Table 2 suggests, agenda-setting research across Canada and Australia has recently gained increasing scholarly attention, i.e. since 2013 (with 8 published articles in both nations' contexts) all through 2016/17 (with 10 relevant

publications, including 2 published over the first two months of 2017). A brief search, i.e. without filtering for relevance, of agenda-setting publications over an earlier period from 2001 to 2008 returns the following results: Web of Science produces the total of 20 pieces related to Canada (including 4 in 2008[4]) and 4 related to Australia (including 1 in 2008) over the 8-year span; and Scopus offers the total of 22 published articles on Canadian context over the period (including 5[5] in 2008) and 11 on Australian context (including 2 in 2008).

The publications collected over the 2009-2016 period for both nations can be divided into the following major policy areas analyzed[6]: Australia-related published articles tend to analyze health policy issues (11 pieces, including 3 on mental health, and 1 on obesity), climate change and environment (6 publications, including 2 on carbon pricing), mining (2), infrastructure development (2), and education, water, traffic safety and migration policies (1 publication each); while Canadian context publications encompass health policy (total 8, including 2 on mental health, and 1 on obesity), climate change and environment (5), elections (2), monetary policy (2), and forestry, water, food, infrastructure development, education, terrorism (9/11), internet gambling, and municipal policy (with 1 publication for each policy issue).

[4] Further analysis suggests that one of the four 2008 articles identified by Web of Science is not much relevant to agenda-setting but to the decision-making stage of policy processes in Canadian context.
[5] Again, when filtered for relevance, the number of relevant articles in 2008 is 4 related to Canadian context.
[6] The total numbers of policy areas may not match the number of publications for each country since some papers do not explicitly focus on any policy area but instead analyze the role of institutions, a range of actors etc.

Regarding the methods employed, Canada-based publications use the following major categories[7]: content analysis – 12 publications (including 8 with qualitative and 4 quantitative analysis), discourse analysis (6), case study (4), interviews (4), statistical analysis (3), surveys (3), and experiment design (1). The Australia-related articles incorporate the following key research methods: content analysis – 14 pieces (with 8 qualitative and 6 quantitative content analyses), discourse analysis (6), case study analysis (5), interviews (5), historical analysis (4), surveys (3), statistical analysis (3), and network analysis (1).

Apart from the major research methods used, many of the analyzed articles emphasize the roles of a specific actor (sets of actors) in driving policy agenda (Table 3). Both nations demonstrate the relatively prevalent role *media* plays in agenda-setting, more so in Australian context (e.g. Maeder et al. 2016, Lee 2015 etc. in Canadian context; Baker et al. 2017, Wei et al. 2015, Mazur 2009 etc.). The wider *public* (including NGOs and citizens) appears to exert certain power, more so in Canadian context. Yet, another potentially strong actor, especially in the case of Australia, is the club of *academia* and *think tank* communities (e.g. Dykeman and Williams 2014, Walker and Rubenson 2014 in Canadian context; and Baker et al. 2017, Shannon and Smith 2015, Laws et al. 2013 etc. in the Australian case). These observations are generally in line with an overall overview of agenda-setting publications in Section 2.1 (Table 1).

[7] The total number of methods may be greater than the number of publications, since some papers use a combination of research methods, e.g. a case study and interview and/or survey etc.

Table 3 An overview of agenda-setting publications related to the contexts of Canada and Australia over the period 2009 – 2016/17

Key Players	Corresponding Authors	Jurisdiction
Media (8 publications)	Maeder et al. 2016, Lee 2015, Walker and Rubenson 2014, Hoffbauer and Ramos 2014, Ahchong and Dodds 2012, Sutcliffe et al. 2009, Mazur 2009, Ries et al. 2011	Canada
The public [including NGOs and civil society] (7)	Raso and Neubauer 2016, Watson 2015, Hoffbauer and Ramos 2014, Kirchhoff et al. 2010, Contandriopoulos and Bilodeau 2009, Young and McCarthy 2009, Rex and Jackson 2009	
Academia and think tanks (4)	Lee 2015, Dykeman and Williams 2014, Walker and Rubenson 2014, Ahchong and Dodds 2012	
Advocacy groups (4)	Hopkins 2016, Dykeman and Williams 2014, Embrett and Randall 2014, Walker and Rubenson	
Government and political parties (4)	Margulis 2015, Hoffbauer and Ramos 2014, Howlett et al. 2010, Ries et al. 2011	
Policymakers	Keskitalo et al. 2016	
The private sector	Keskitalo et al. 2016	
International law and international orgs	Bernesteinand Naples 2015, Momani 2010	
Media (12 publications)	Baker et al. 2017, Wei et al. 2015, Shannon and Smith 2015, Lankester et al. 2015, Prokofieva and Clark 2014, Eagleman et al. 2014, Sgro 2014, Dixon et al. 2014, Wilkinson and Thelwall 2012, Lancaster et al. 2011, Hinchcliff et al. 2011, Mazur 2009	Australia
Academia and think tanks (8)	Baker et al. 2017, Whiteford et al. 2016, Shannon and Smith 2015, Laws et al. 2013, Crowley 2013, McEvoy et al. 2013, Lewis 2012, Hinchcliff et al. 2011	
The public [including NGOs and civil society] (7)	Walsh et al. 2017, Anker 2016, Watson 2015, McKnight and Hobbs 2013, Marsh 2013, Lewis 2012, Battam and Johnson 2009	
Government and political parties (4)	Baker et al. 2017, Shannon and Smith 2015, Marsh 2013, Crowley 2013	
Advocacy groups (5)	Whiteford et al. 2016, McKnight and Hobbs 2013, Crowley 2013, Hinchcliff et al. 2011, Battams and Baum 2010	
The private sector	McKnight and Hobbs 2013	

International law	Bernestein and Naples 2015	

Source: The author's own analytics

To summarize, agenda-setting studies not only remain important in the academic contexts of both Canada and Australia, but these have relatively intensified in terms of the number of relevant publications since 2009, and especially around 2013-2014 (Table 2). In terms of the research methods employed, both nations demonstrate relatively high use of content analysis vis-à-vis other methods. In particular, content analysis is present in 12 Canadian-context publications (44% of the total number), and 14 publications related to Australia (47% of all publications).

2.2 An overview of agenda-setting theories

As the definitions of agenda-setting in Section 2 above suggest, the agenda-setting process is the most crucial stage of the policy process (Howlett et al. 2009; Peters 2015) that involves issues competing for selected policymaking attention; on which the government will take action (Cobb and Elder 1972); and government's attention is higher to some issues than others (Kingdon 1984), due to its limited time and resources that can be spent on attending to policy issues (Downs 1972). Finally, agenda-setting recognizes a vital power within the policy process, i.e. the ability to place certain items onto policy agenda, while keeping the rest of issues off the table (Mayo 2011). Such a detailed definition and interpretation raises a number of important points. First, it is the notion of conflicts, or the scope of conflict among various stakeholders, in shaping and defining an issue (or issues) that should be included into policy agenda (Schattschneider 1960). Second, it

suggests the need to specifically relate to issue characteristics such as significance for society and temporal relevance (Cobb and Elder 1983). A closely related notion is Kingdon's (1984) three streams theory, suggesting that an issue is more likely to gain prominence on agenda if it is coupled by at least two of the three streams: *problems*, *politics* and *policy* streams. In their earlier work (1972) Cobb and Elder describe two types of agenda – *systemic* [issues defined as vital by political communities], and *institutional*, or formal, agenda that includes items explicitly selected for consideration by government. This theory based on Schattschneider (1960), views conflict within groups as a dynamic process. The third vital notion is the importance of tracking *attention cycles* to a certain issue, an ability to understand actors driving it into agenda, such as the public or media (Downs 1972).

It is worth noting that three related notions - Schattschneider's (1960) policy contestation, Kingdon's (1984) three streams and Cobb and Elder's (1972) group contestation as a dynamic process - are largely grounded on the assumption of actors interacting in a conflict and hostile environment that aggressively pursue their own agenda in a zero-sum context. An alternative framework, though not exclusively related to the agenda-setting stage of the process, is offered by Sabatier (1988) who developed the advocacy coalition framework which assumes that some actors may cooperate by forming coalitions to jointly pursue their policy goals and better protect themselves against external pressures from other actors or coalitions. Though undeniably Sabatier's (1988) ACF is a step forward as it provides room for individual actors to cooperate, it remains to be built around the notion of group (as contrasted to individual) conflict-driven policy contestation. This comparative

account points to a vital gap within agenda-setting theories. Thus it is interesting to explore whether agenda-setting interactions among key actors necessarily always proceed in a zero-sum contested environment.

The question of under what conditions (i.e. when and by what actors) and how certain issues emerge on political agenda has been of high interest in academia. However, most of the above described theories of agenda-setting still fail to answer this central question with sufficient precision. Schattschneider's (1960) notion of conflict can only operationalize visible forms of political contestation between stakeholders and groups, while hidden conflict is largely ignored and which might indeed turn out to be more profound than the visible side of it. Similarly, Cobb and Elder's (1983) notion of social significance suffers from a lack of clarity: not only is it challenging to specify the definition of and operationalize the notion of "significance", but "society" is also a complex phenomenon, consisting of various groups (by income, ethnic composition, gender, age etc.). Furthermore, what seems "significant" today to an individual may not be viewed so tomorrow. Cobb and Elder's earlier theory (1972) on systemic agenda also fails to include specific measurement methods, thus suffering from lack of operationalization (Loveridge 1973).Furthermore, Cobb and Elder's exclusive focus on interest group conflict assumes that other factors are ignored, such as the role of media (ibid.). Lastly, Kingdon's (1984) three streams theory can be also hard to operationalize. Even if all three streams are coupled, it still remains uncertain whether/when an issue reaches agenda prominence. Finally, what exactly a "stream" includes remains incomplete (Howlett et al. 2013).

Next, as literature review (Section 2.1) suggests, a major current debate is regarding the identification of the role of *major actors* (e.g. who sets the agenda in the digital era?) in setting policy agenda for specific issues, with a focus on bi- and multi-directional ways of agenda-setting influence. Initially, in an attempt to answer the question of who sets the agenda, McCombs and Shaw (1972) developed their agenda-setting theory that posits the strong role of media (including editors, news staff and broadcasters) in setting political agenda. The essence of media's ability to shape agenda can be expressed by borrowing Bernard Cohen's (1963) quote: "the press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about" (as cited in Dearing and Rogers 1996, p. 2). However, since early theories primarily looked into one-way direction of influence in agenda-setting, the current scholarship recognizes the importance of context specificity, and the need to analyze multiple directions and reciprocal causality patterns.

Chapter 3. Research Methodology

The central question is what actors set the policy agenda for specific issues, which needs to be empirically established in terms of contrasting the roles of scholars and think tanks (collectively referred to as "experts"), media, as well as the wider online public (non-experts) across two issues – economic diversification and violent crime – in the contexts of Canada and Australia over the period of 2008 – 2015. The rationale for selecting this time span is driven both by relatively high internet penetration rates in Canada and Australia, i.e. around 75% and higher since 2008 in the Canadian case (Table 4a), with more than 70% Internet penetration in Australia (Table 4b), and by relatively high scholarly attention to agenda-setting across these two nations since around 2009 (as Table 2 above suggests).

Table 4a Internet penetration levels in Canada, 2005-2016

Year	Internet Users**	Penetration (% of Pop)	Total Population	Non-Users (Internetless)	1Y User Change	1Y User Change	Population Change
2016*	**32,120,519**	88.5 %	36,286,378	4,165,859	1.8 %	559,167	0.96 %
2015*	**31,561,351**	87.8 %	35,939,927	4,378,576	1.8 %	557,266	0.99 %
2014	**31,004,085**	87.1 %	35,587,793	4,583,708	2.6 %	776,220	1.01 %
2013	**30,227,865**	85.8 %	35,230,612	5,002,747	4.4 %	1,287,300	1.04 %
2012	**28,940,565**	83 %	34,868,151	5,927,586	1.1 %	305,644	1.07 %
2011	**28,634,921**	83 %	34,499,905	5,864,984	4.5 %	1,231,604	1.1 %
2010	**27,403,317**	80.3 %	34,126,173	6,722,856	1.1 %	304,830	1.12 %
2009	**27,098,487**	80.3 %	33,746,559	6,648,072	5.9 %	1,508,870	1.15 %
2008	**25,589,617**	76.7 %	33,363,256	7,773,639	6 %	1,446,592	1.16 %
2007	**24,143,025**	73.2 %	32,982,275	8,839,250	2.3 %	532,346	1.14 %
2006	**23,610,680**	72.4 %	32,611,436	9,000,756	2.1 %	495,791	1.1 %
2005	**23,114,888**	71.7 %	32,256,333	9,141,445	9.8 %	2,062,680	1.06 %

Source: Internetlivestats.com (2016a)

Table 4b Internet penetration levels in Australia, 2005-2016

Year	Internet Users**	Penetration (% of Pop)	Total Population	Non-Users (Internetless)	1Y User Change	1Y User Change	Population Change
2016*	**20,679,490**	85.1 %	24,309,330	3,629,840	1.7 %	350,522	1.42 %
2015*	**20,328,968**	84.8 %	23,968,973	3,640,005	1.8 %	353,906	1.47 %
2014	**19,975,062**	84.6 %	23,622,353	3,647,291	3.4 %	660,576	1.51 %
2013	**19,314,486**	83 %	23,270,465	3,955,979	6.7 %	1,214,500	1.57 %
2012	**18,099,986**	79 %	22,911,375	4,811,389	1 %	181,575	1.64 %
2011	**17,918,412**	79.5 %	22,542,371	4,623,959	6.4 %	1,074,636	1.71 %
2010	**16,843,776**	76 %	22,162,863	5,319,087	4.2 %	679,039	1.8 %
2009	**16,164,737**	74.3 %	21,770,690	5,605,953	5.5 %	848,609	1.87 %
2008	**15,316,128**	71.7 %	21,370,348	6,054,220	5.1 %	748,332	1.88 %
2007	**14,567,797**	69.5 %	20,975,949	6,408,152	7.1 %	967,686	1.79 %
2006	**13,600,110**	66 %	20,606,228	7,006,118	6.5 %	827,313	1.64 %
2005	**12,772,798**	63 %	20,274,282	7,501,484	5.1 %	616,601	1.45 %

Source: Internetlivestats.com (2016a)

To trace attention dynamics of the public, both the content of e-blogs and readers' comments to relevant media and think tank publications will be analyzed with the time span from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2015. The two sources of e-blogs are www.blogsearchengine.org and Google search (filtered for blogs). To collect and analyze mentions related to "economic diversification", the following Google commands will be employed:

- "*econ** *diversif** AND *Canada*" in English, and "diversif* *économique* AND *Canada*" in French will be employed, thus capturing online mentions among both English and French-speaking parts of population related to economic, or economy, diversification, or diversified economy, in the context of Canada over the eight-year time period.

- "*econ* diversif** AND *Australia*" in English will be employed, thus capturing online mentions related to economic, or economy, diversification, or diversified economy, in the context of Australia over the time span.

On mentions for "violent crime", the following commands are used:

- the command "*violent crime** AND *Canada*" in English, and "*crime violent* AND *Canada*" in French will be employed, which should capture blog-generated mentions of the issue within the umbrella of justice in Canada among both language groups over the time. Translation duplicates will be noted and reconciled, accordingly.

- similarly, the command "*violent crime** AND *Australia*" in English will be used to generate relevant mentions in Australian context over the time span.

Next, *Lexis Nexis* will be employed to trace media publications for the two issues across two nations. It is a comprehensive database that offers adequate possibilities for searching a wide range of information coming from 45,000 sources (Lexis Nexis 2016), including media publications by source type, e.g. newspapers (see Figure 2 below). For instance, the search for news publications on "violent crime" in Australia for the period from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2015 by using the following command ["violent crime" AND Australia], returns 138 results with the "headline and lead" function, while the search for "economic diversification" in Canada returns 100 media pieces.

Figure 2 Lexis Nexis Interface



Source: http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/ap/academic/

With regard to collecting data on think tanks, their respective web-sites are selected for analysis. First, the list of Canadian think tanks is composed. Among the major sources that list Canadian think tanks[8], the information presented by McGill appears the most comprehensive, listing 60 think tanks (McGill Career Planning Service 2016). Among the 60 think tanks, some that are found to possess relevant publications and/or expert opinion pieces include Atlantic Institute for Market Studies[9] (for instance, with 3 publications on economic diversification and 5 on violent crime), C.D. Howe Institute[10] (65 pieces on economic diversification unfiltered for the time period and relevance yet), Canada's Ecofiscal Commission[11] (3 on economic diversification) etc. This preliminary analysis suggests that there

[8]http://www.hillwatch.com/pprc/think_tanks.aspx
http://guides.library.ualberta.ca/think-tanks/canadian-a-c
https://www.mcgill.ca/caps/files/caps/guide_canadianthinktanks.pdf
[9]http://www.aims.ca/
[10]https://www.cdhowe.org/
[11]https://ecofiscal.ca/

should be a greater number of relevant think tank publications to be identified as a result of further search.

Scopus and *Web of Science* databases are employed to generate numbers of academic publications on each of the two policy issues over eight years (see Section 3.3 below on the rationale for selection). Any repetitive or duplicated pieces across both databases will be filtered, accordingly. These datasets serve as a *proxy for scholarly attention*[12] to the two issues. For instance, to generate mentions on "violent crime" in 2008-2015, the following command is used: "violent AND crime AND Canada" (Figure 3), which returns 75 results, while a similar search for Australia results in 64 documented publications over the period, unfiltered for relevance yet. Regarding economic diversification in Australia, the following command is employed: "economic OR economy AND diversification AND Australia", with Scopus search returning 75 results, unfiltered for relevance. Similar commands are used for Web of Science.

Figure 3 Scopus interface



[12] It should be noted that given the nature of academic research, most sources tend to cite other academic articles and books rather than refer to other actors e.g. media. Still, due to triangulation of actors with a range of actors involved, this should not pose a critical issue for this research.

Source: Scopus (2017)

Last (but not least), to trace policymakers' attention trends in the context of two nations, *LEGIS info* parliamentary legal database is employed for Canada (Parliament of Canada, 2016), and Search Hansard Parliamentary document database for Australian context (Parliament of Australia, 2017) as the major sources of legislative activity with the time span from January 1, 2008 through December 31, 2015. The purpose is to generate data on the number of each of the two policy-related bills adopted over the period. The data collected serve as a *proxy for government's attention* to the issues, which will be aggregated to observe its relation to the trends of public and media attention, as well as think tanks and academia attention trends.

Once data are collected, these will be used, first of all, to assess the agenda-setting influence of experts versus non-experts as measured in terms of temporal sequence of attention dynamics. Second, attention dynamics of each actor will be analyzed to see which of the key actors precede the attention of the rest in terms of temporal sequence. This analytical part is based on quantitative analysis with the goal to measure the number of mentions by each actor over the time span. At the third stage, qualitative content analysis will be employed to generate a set of nodes as suggested by the inductive nature of NVivo. As suggested by Dyussenov (2017), some of the nodes may include common themes such as definitions of policy issues, the industries in which actors pursue policy (or suggest the need thereof), causal links and effects, key actors (i.e. what actors are found to influence a specific actor, such as *media* employing a definition first developed by *academia*, or using a

reference to an academic study to present their story to wider audience), and policy recommendations. Given the inductive nature of NVivo content analysis, specific nodes and codes may differ depending on how analysis evolves.

To cite another relevant example of using (Internet-based) content analysis to assess an impact of one actor on another, Cottiero et al. (2015) in light of the conflict in Ukraine analyze the content of a *government*-controlled TV show in Russia and assess its impact on the online *public*. They first identify key frames as employed by Kremlin through a state-run TV program as related to the conflict (ibid). Second, the power of Kremlin's public agenda-setting impact based on use of frames is assessed (ibid). This is done by collecting data based on search results of Yandex and Google, two most popular search engines in Russia as a proxy for public salience toward the issue, i.e. Ukraine crisis (Cottiero et al. 2015). Their findings show government's mediatized influence on the public, as measured by online searches of netizens; the Internet then provides new terms and concepts the Kremlin could not develop, hence demonstrating agenda-setting influence in a continuous loop (ibid).Indeed, Russian political leaders cannot always clearly define concepts that would influence the public, thus the government can effectively take advantage of (online) crowd-sourcing by using the net as a source of new ideas (ibid).

3.1 Country and Policy Issue Selection

The literature review raises a number of important points. First, most agenda-setting studies tend to analyze the US context (e.g. McCombs and Shaw 1972, Roberts et al. 2002) and some the EU generally, or specific member states

(e.g. Margetts et al. 2016, Sevenans and Vliegenthart 2016 etc.), while much of developing nations, as well as some of developed states, remain largely ignored. Second, since the thesis relies on using online research tools, i.e. the Google search engine for tracing blog content and *Nexis Lexis* for media publications, an important criterion is a relatively high internet penetration rate in a given nation (Internetlivestats.com 2016a), as an effort to ensure an adequate level of objective representation of population online and to address the issue of digital divide (Section 3.3). Thus, both Canada and Australia appear to be good examples to explore. First, these nations remain significantly less investigated analytically vis-à-vis other developed nations, such as the US and UK[13]. Second, their internet penetration rates have been more than 70% since 2008 (Tables 4a, 4b), with around 85-90% as of 2015, compared to the comparable level in the US (88%), 92% in the UK, 86% in France, and 85% in Korea (Internetlivestats.com 2016a).

While it would be desirable to include some developing nations into research, the persistent issue of digital divide still remains (see Section 3.3 below for details). Since the research involves internet methods for collecting and analyzing data, nations with relatively high internet penetration rates should be selected [see, for instance, Ripberger 2011 on digital divide in the US around 2009-2010 when the internet penetration rate was 71%, according to Internetlivestats.com (2016a)].

[13] Scopus search for agenda-setting publications over 2009-2015 suggests 103 pieces in US context, 43 in UK, 23 (English only pieces) for Germany, while Canadian and Australian cases show 21 and 28, accordingly.

Furthermore, the most common approach in social science research is adopting the most similar system design (Przeworski and Teune, 1970), specifically two-party system nations of the Anglo-Saxon world are good cases as these possess common economic, political and socio-cultural traits, making it easier to control for any differences that might be found in analyses. In his work, Ragin (1987) well describes the merits of comparative research methods based on a case-centered approach as distinct from quantitative research: the ability to capture complex patterns of phenomena driven by multiple causes; reflect comparability of countries, their cultural and geographical context. "Comparative social science… has a long tradition of qualitative work that is stronger and richer than its quantitative counterpart" (Ragin 1987, p. viii). Scholars tend to limit analyses to country cases that are "as similar on as many theoretically relevant variables as possible" (Ragin 1987, p.47). Similarly, George and Bennett (2005) note that the most widely known method in comparative research design is "controlled comparison", grounded on the notion of contrasting "most similar" cases comparable in all respects except a single (independent) variable that can plausibly explain variation in outcomes of the dependent variable (p.81). Furthermore, the use of qualitative software provides better analytical transparency creating an "audit trail" to see how specific findings had been acquired (Byrne and Ragin 2009, p.6). As King et al. 1994 note, qualitative research is based on depth analysis of historical materials, rather than what Ragin (1987) refers to as to simply eliminating "perplexing elements" of causal complexity typical of statistical analysis (p.32).

On the other hand, the most similar system design possesses certain weaknesses. These include: its limited ability to compare large N of cases and thus generalizability of findings (Ragin 1987; Anckar 2008), and selection bias (George and Bennett 2005). To address the issue of a smaller number of cases (i.e. one or few, as in King et al. 1994) and limited generalization, George and Bennett (2005) suggest testing contingent generalizations, depending on cultural context, timing, and geography. It is possible to test cases beyond the defined scope to see if conditions can be extended. As George and Bennett conclude, case study findings can be used to "incrementally refine… contingent generalizations", either by broadening or narrowing their scope or introducing new types and subtypes through the inclusion of additional variables" (p.124). Generalization can be improved by using qualitative software, e.g. NVivo, being modeled on code-based rather than case-based approaches to analysis. This contributes to the issue of generalization by identifying ties and processes across various contexts (Byrne and Ragin 2009). Finally, regarding the presence of selection bias,(George and Bennett 2005), it is important to provide a careful procedure for selecting cases. For this research, two country cases – Canada and Australia – are selected, first driven by the most similar systems design – Westminster systems combined with democratic governments, large territory, energy rich (hence the relevance of economic diversification), and secondly, driven by adequate access to the internet.

When selecting the time span for analysis, two polarizing methodology issues merit consideration. On one hand, digital divide issues (e.g. Ripberger 2011, Dunleavy et al. 2006, Margetts et al. 2016) restrict a time frame to a more recent

span, i.e. since around 2012-2013, when the internet penetration rate in Australia was 79-83%, as in Table 4b above. On the other hand, as suggested by Sabatier (1988) at the time when Internet had not been used in research yet, analyzing policy change and subsystems require a decade or so. Thus, the 8-year span from 2009 to 2015 is selected: it is closer to a decade, yet largely avoids the issue of digital divide. The year 2016 is excluded due to potential noise that stems from two political events: new government in Canada elected in late 2015 under Prime Minister Trudeau and the election of Trump as US President in 2016.

Two policy issues are selected for analyses – economic diversification, and violent crime. *Economic diversification* is relevant for two primary reasons. First, economy generally is the most important issue according to public opinion polls in 2015 in Canada (CBC News 2015) and Australia (Roy Morgan Research, 2015). Second, both nations are resource-rich, with certain reliance on natural resources to boost their economies (see Figures 4 and 5 below). *Mining and petroleum extraction* constitutes 8% of Canada's GDP as of 2016, being the third largest industry (InvestorsFriend 2016). Furthermore, as outlined in Figure 5, the mining services and production sector within Australian economy constitutes 7.2% of its annual industry volumes in 2010-2011, and combined with agriculture, forestry and fishing these extracting industries form 9.6% in 2010-2011 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012).

Figure 4 Canada's economic diversity, 2014 (top 7 sector components)



Source: Canadian Northern Economic Development 2016

Figure 5 Value of goods and services in Australian industry, 2012

ANZSIC Division(b)	2006–07 $m	2007–08 $m	2008–09 $m	2009–10 $m	2010–11 $m
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	23 139	24 743	29 109	28 764	31 383
Mining	86 446	88 193	90 507	96 105	95 512
Manufacturing	108 703	113 062	106 363	107 707	107 845
Electricity, gas, water and waste services	26 798	26 866	27 894	28 623	28 922
Construction	86 469	92 516	95 292	95 804	101 868
Wholesale trade	51 168	52 692	53 379	55 128	54 794
Retail trade	54 551	57 154	57 179	58 258	59 092
Accommodation and food services	31 381	31 288	30 152	29 474	29 941
Transport, postal and warehousing	61 288	64 635	63 885	65 392	67 720
Information media and telecommunications	38 472	40 867	41 336	41 823	42 367
Financial and insurance services	115 172	124 241	123 627	125 399	127 984
Rental, hiring and real estate services(c)	26 488	25 613	26 782	27 260	26 736
Professional, scientific and technical services	69 488	71 666	74 736	81 043	86 604
Administrative and support services	31 059	32 758	30 714	30 246	32 254
Public administration and safety	60 302	60 621	64 090	64 117	65 266
Education and training	52 890	53 996	55 596	57 546	58 821
Health care and social assistance	62 097	65 193	68 807	72 627	74 307
Arts and recreation services	9 906	10 135	10 907	10 911	11 172
Other services	22 955	23 384	23 808	23 548	22 671
Ownership of dwellings	94 980	97 449	100 330	103 271	105 895
Gross domestic product(d)	**1 201 563**	**1 246 899**	**1 263 934**	**1 293 380**	**1 320 057**

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012

Next, it is important to describe the rationale for choosing *violent crime* (as a sub-issue of justice and general crime) to analyze. The level of public perception of violent crime has recently grown in both Canadian (Roberts, 2004) and Australian (Weatherburn, 2016; Davis and Dossetor, 2010) contexts. Although Canadians are generally more positive than negative in terms of confidence in the justice system (46% versus 32%), this is not a high positive balance, with a significant minority feeling insecure about crime (Roberts, 2004).In 1991-2001 actual crime rates in Canada declined (Wallace, 2004). However, in 2002 only one Canadian in 10 believed the rates had indeed declined, while a third believed the rates had grown (Ipsos-Reid, 2002). Another widely held perception is that the government lacks interest in justice system reform, instead merely reacting to signals from other key actors such as media (Correctional Service Canada, 2015). Yet, the Canadian public rejects media's strong role in shaping their attitudes to crime, believing instead that growing violent crime is real, not due to media (Department of Justice, 2015). Similarly, Australian context shows mismatch between public perception and actual crime rates. As Weatherburn (2016) notes, Senate candidate for Queensland in her recent speech stressed the increasing public insecurity toward crime and street safety, although with regard to violent crime specifically research suggests that in the last 15 years murder rates decreased from 1.6 per 100,000 in 2000 to 1.0 per 100,000 in 2014; assault rates declined from 3.1% of Australians aged over 15 in 2008-09 to 2.1% by 2014, according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (as cited in Weatherburn, 2016). The actual number of crimes reported was lower in 2007 than 1998 in the violent crime categories of

homicide and robbery (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008, as cited in Davis and Dosseter, 2010). As in the Canadian case, media seems to exert certain influence shaping public (mis-) perception of violent crime in Australia. As Justice Action (2016) notes, crime, justice and media have long been intertwined, because crime serves as a fertile ground for media publications, with 35% of news produced on a daily basis, and media ideas and narratives have an impact on public opinion.

To summarize, both nations present interesting cases to explore. First, with abundant natural resources and thus relying on mining industries for economic development, Canada and Australia should further economic diversification to ensure longer-term sustainability. Second, both demonstrate a striking mismatch between public perception of violent crime and actual rates, fueled by media and politicians. It is thus relevant to analyze who actually sets the agenda for these two policy issues.

3.2 The Research Questions (RQs), Hypotheses, and Variables

This thesis will attempt to answer the following research questions.

RQ 1: Who sets the agenda? To answer this mega-question, analyses will contrast experts versus non-experts: the former including *scholars* and *think tanks* for each of the two issues in Canadian and Australian contexts, and the latter including two distinct groups - *media*, and the *public* at large.

RQ 2: Is the agenda-setting influence *uni-*, *bi-*, or *multi-directional* for each of the two issues over the period from2008 to 2015? For instance, media might be found to set agenda directly influencing the public (non-experts), i.e. uni-directional influence, or it may influence the public sentiments first, followed by

the public's bi-directional influence back to media through feedback loops (hence the public's medialized influence in agenda-setting, e.g. as in Neuman et al. 2014); it may also be multi-directional, provided that the public's medialized influence extends to think tank domains as reflected by relevant policy publications and/or opinion pieces.

Furthermore, the research will capitalize on the inductive nature of the content analysis methodology (see Section 3.4 below) and analyze some of the specific codes that should emerge in the research process, e.g. common and divergent patterns, as observed for each of the two issues analyzed.

The following research hypotheses are suggested:

H1. Given the highly technical nature of and scientific complexity around economic diversification, both the public and media in both countries are expected to play a weaker role in setting the agenda for this issue, instead either academia or think tanks should play a stronger role. The role of media is expected to be intermediary, serving as a framing channel through which signals are exchanged between the public, scholars and think tanks, and policymakers.

H2. Given to the lower technicality and complexity of violent crime in terms of public perceptiveness, it is the public and media that are expected to play a predominantly stronger role in driving the agenda for this issue across both jurisdictions. Scholars and think tanks should play a moderate role, either responding to signals from the public or media, or exhibiting bi- or multi-directional (however still rather modest) influence back to the major actor(s).Thus, the key variables employed throughout the research are as follow:

- Regarding H1, independent variables include the degree of technicality of the issue, and the following actors – academia, and think tanks – acting as agenda-setters. The dependent variables include the following: attention dynamics, as well as the following actors – media, the public, and government – whose agendas are expected to be shaped by the two independent actors

- Regarding H2, independent variables are the degree of technicality of the issue, and the following actors – media and the public. The dependent variables are attention dynamics for each actor, as well as the following actors – academia, think tanks, and the government – whose agenda are expected to be shaped by the agenda-setters.

Finally, the following units of analysis are utilized for the present research: "online article", or "e-document" identified in the process of using the Google search engine to track media attention; "e-blog post, or comment" to track the public's attention online; and "publication" or "abstract, or summary" to track academia and think tanks' attention for each of the policy issues analyzed. It should be noted here that the use of these units of analysis is not novel. For instance, Murray (1991) analyzed *e-documents* used for person-to-person (online network) interactions, and developed cognitive and context-specific strategies to write personal computer documents in a study of an IBM manager and his staff (as cited in December 1996). To cite more recent examples, Schafer, Ivanova and Schmidt (2014) track news coverage of climate change issues across Australia, Germany, and India by using *news articles* as a unit of analysis. Similarly, Lorcher and Neverla (2015) analyze climate change attention dynamics of online German news

media by using *news samples* derived from "Spiegel.de" and "Welt.de", as well as *readers' comments* (both on news websites and e-blogs) as units of analysis. Furthermore, Anderson, Brossard and Scheufele (2012) track the attention cycle of (online and print) media coverage of an academic publication on the lethal case of Chinese workers resulted from lung damage and exposure to nano-particles, in which they find that while traditional print media produces negligible mentions of the event, online media devotes greater attention measured in terms of news coverage. The article also suggests that online media may follow its own attention cycle vis-à-vis print media with regard to controversial events driven by academia. This also raises an important implication for the present research, i.e. regarding the possible use of academic publications as a unit of analysis, in this case for tracing academic attention over time.

3.3 Rationale for using Google, Blog Search, Scopus, and Web of Science

As mentioned earlier, the two sources of e-blogs as the proxy for tracing public attention are www.blogsearchengine.org and Google search (filtered for blogs). The former is chosen with the purpose of triangulating data retrieved from Google (blog) search. According to its website, it is offered as the "ultimate source for searching blogs online" (Blog Search Engine 2016). It also appears first in the Google list of blog engines as a result of searching for "blog search engine". The other blog search engine employed is the Google search engine itself, as filtered for blogs. While Google search possessed 65% share of total worldwide search volume as of December 2012, in 2016 its share increased to 78% (Internetlivestats.com 2016b).

Apart from remaining the most popular search engine, there are numerous academic sources that use Google search, and related tools such as Google Insights, for scholarly research. Ripberger (2011) developed a new indicator on public attention based on using Internet search tools. The vast volumes of real-time information and data on the Internet may serve as a *close proxy* about how mass communication and the public interact in political systems. In particular, the Google search engine is found to be a valid indicator of *public attentiveness*. Lee, Lee and Choi (2016), using Google-search queries, empirically establish that internet research data reflect attitudes of users, with a positive relationship between suicide rates and past orientation. McCallum and Bury (2013), using Google Insights and Google Trends as a *proxy for public attention to* 19 environment issues over 2001-2009, find general decline of public interest to these issues, except climate change. As Cacciatore et al. (2012) conclude, the (online) search engine now serves as the "most useful" and "*easily accessible*" source (p. 1043), allowing access both to traditional media content, and online media.

To summarize, the rationale for using Google search as a research tool appears well validated by existing literature, highlighting its use as a proxy to measure public attention, easy access to wide (online) population without borders, and relative flexibility in terms of time span. It is also important to raise certain limitations. As Ripberger (2011) notes at that time i.e. around 2010 in US context, regarding representation of internet users, these are more likely to be *young, white, well educated, and wealthy individuals*. The primary concern, therefore, is about minority population, the elderly, poor, and uneducated who are more likely to be

systematically underrepresented when using this tool, leading to potentially biased findings and data. The persistent importance of *digital divide* is also noted by others (e.g., Dunleavy et al. 2006, Margetts and Dunleavy 2002, Margetts et al. 2016). Margetts and Dunleavy (2002) noting slow penetration of e-communication systems into UK civil service, analyzed the obstacles in developing e-government, and identified cultural barriers that lie at the heart of resistance to new systems. They offered ways to overcome these, e.g. incentives for change to civil servants, and providing citizen benefits to encourage an uptake of e-government services. Dunleavy et al. (2006) observed that while NPM was popular in 1980s-1990s, by mid-2000s it had stalled, and the post-NPM regime is based on *digital-era governance*, entailing the digitalization of administrative processes. Margetts et al. 2016, note that even in today's world digital inequality still remains, with *wealth, education, and parental socialization* being vital factors (also Ripberger 2011). Since the focus of the book is studying collective action in the internet era, this assumes predominant attention falling onto (online) social media users, i.e. economically privileged. Such a focus is justified by the goal to define trends in modern collective action "in the context of still-rising Internet penetration…" (Margetts et al. 2016, p. 216).

Adopting a similar approach, the major aim of this thesis is to trace trends in online attention to relevant issues by experts (think tanks and scholars), non-experts (public at large and media), and the government, with an implicitly assumed focus on online users, i.e. netizens, in Canada and Australia. Internet penetration rates in Canada remain high at nearly 88% as of 2015 vis-à-vis 83% in 2012 (as in

Table 2 above), while Australia demonstrates similar penetration levels e.g. 85% in 2015 and nearly 80% in 2012.Thus the issue of digital divide increasingly becomes less relevant.

Regarding the selection of Scopus, it appears the most comprehensive online repository of scholarly publications that includes quality data and comprehensive content along with analytic tools that allow a researcher to track, analyze and visualize research. It is viewed as a repository of "interdisciplinary content that covers the research spectrum" (Elsevier 2016). Scopus includes some 21,500 peer-reviewed journals, and also articles in publication (ibid). While other academic databases, e.g. Web of Science and Google Scholar also exist, Scopus contains more than 20,000 publications vis-à-vis Web of Science, for instance, with 13,000 pieces (University of Washington Health Sciences Library 2016). Falagas et al. (2008) referring to medical databases, note that Google Scholar suffers from inconsistent accuracy, inadequate and less often updated citations. Scopus offers 20% more coverage vis-à-vis Web of Science, although is limited to recent articles, i.e. published since 1995. Overall, Scopus seems the most comprehensive depository, with a wide range of social science articles. Thus, to triangulate academic publication data, both Scopus and Web of Science databases will be employed for collecting the data.

Finally, briefly regarding the selection of *LEGIS info* and *Search Hansard Legislation Register* systems to track policymaking activities, these are the largest official databases in Canadian and Australian contexts, respectively. Established as a result of collaboration of Canadian Senate, House of Commons and the Library

of Parliament, *LEGIS info* serves as a comprehensive research tool for relevant law details in parliament (Parliament of Canada 2016). Information is available for each bill and contains details on the passage of each bill through the Senate and House of Commons, full text and summaries, votes, major speeches, dates and other details on coming into force data, and press-releases (ibid). The Australian Legislation Register, run by the Office of Parliamentary Counsel under the umbrella of the Legislation Act 2003, is a comprehensive whole-of-government web-site for legislation and related files and bills in force, which contains full texts and lifecycles of laws (Parliament of Australia, 2017).

3.4 The Content Analysis Method

Content analysis applies both to qualitative and quantitative research settings (Roller and Lavrakas 2015). This method is chosen for research given the (online) textual nature of cases on economic diversification and violent crime, and also as suggested by literature review in Section 2.1.1. It is the ability to extrapolate meaning and draw inferences that is the cornerstone of content analysis as a valid research method (Krippendorf, 2013). As a research method, content analysis allows making accurate and replicable inferences based on textual content. Specifically, NVivo software will be employed for analyzing textual information[14]. CAQDAS packages offer the availability of semi-automated tools, e.g. word frequency, text search, and coding (Hughes and Silver 2011). These tools can be combined to derive specific text-based concepts and define the cases where these concepts are used. Furthermore, it allows focusing on the words captured at all

[14] Apart from NVivo's strengths and weaknesses, this software was used as part of class PP6701 Research Methods I

stages of analysis to ensure that new emerging ideas can be contrasted with the language used (ibid). However, there are a number of drawbacks. Semi-automated tools do not allow much of human control and flexibility (Sinkovics and Alfoldi 2012). Neuendorf (2002, p.40) puts bluntly: "the notion of the completely automatic content analysis via computer is a chimera… The human contribution to content analysis is still paramount" (as cited in Macnamara 2011). Automated content analysis tends to make arbitrary links between words and phrases, thus presenting limitations in terms of capturing subtleties (Macnamara 2011). However, CAQDAS can still serve as a repository for coded data and prove powerful for analytical and reporting purposes (ibid).

Thus, it seems well justified to combine the use of automated content analysis for analytical purposes along with the human-controlled, i.e. manual, approach for sampling relevant (Google-generated) content. As adopted from Macnamara (2011), typical sampling methods for media content analysis include the following:

- *Systematic random*, i.e. every n^{th} unit out of the total number of articles/mentions defined as a result of online search;
- *Purposive,* i.e. selecting all mentions out of specific (target) media, while excluding articles form less important sources;
- *Quota,* selectively including part of articles from each of several areas;
- *Stratified composite samples* by random selection of articles/mentions from certain days/weeks over the period analyzed.

The qualitative content analysis method recognizes the complexity of the social world and supports the notion of multiple categories potentially applicable to a single context (Roller and Lavrakas, 2015). Generally, content analysis can be divided into two areas: quantitative and qualitative content analysis (Figure 5). Although the present research involves numbers, i.e. mentions of specific issues online, it largely relies on *qualitative analyses* based on explorative investigation of actors, and processes.

Figure 5 Two major uses of content analysis



Source: reproduced from Roller and Lavrakas (2015)

Qualitative content analysis is defined as the "systematic reduction… of content, analyzed with special attention on the context in which the data were created, to identify themes and extract meaningful interpretations" (Roller and Lavrakas 2015, p. 230). The present research will focus on online news articles, blog content, reader comments to media and think tank publications, website content as defined by Google search (e.g. Wikipedia, NGOs etc.), policy-related bills and laws, academic publications and summaries/abstracts. Furthermore, qualitative content analysis often involves coding the *manifest content*, e.g. content that is immediately apparent, and *latent content*, e.g. not immediately clear, beneath the surface and context specific. The two phases that form the content analysis process are: 1. *Data generation*, where defined content is coded to generate relevant

data; and 2. *Data analysis*, including the grouping and interpretation of collected data (Figure 6).

Figure 6 Phases and steps in qualitative content analysis



Source: reproduced from Roller and Lavrakas (2015)

For conducting qualitative content analysis research, an *inductive* strategy will be employed, e.g. scientific discoveries and further hypotheses are primarily based on the researcher's analysis of data – online texts, digital news, blogs, graphs etc. While quantitative researchers tend to develop their coding at early stages of the research process, qualitative content analysis researchers revisit their content to improve their own understanding of research progress, thus modifying their codes at the data collection stage, not only at the beginning stage of research (Roller and Lavrakas 2015).

Chapter 4. Data Analysis on Economic Diversification

This chapter seeks to incorporate three levels of analyses – the 'litmus test' quantitative analysis, the descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes, and the content (semantic) analysis of specific codes related to the 'key actors' node – in order to promptly answer the central question of the thesis, i.e. who sets the policy agenda as related to economic diversification policy across Canada and Australia in 2008-2015. Both commonalities and divergences among the two country contexts are compared and contrasted. As mentioned earlier (i.e. in Ch. 3), due to the technical nature of the issue, it is largely the expert community, i.e. either academia or think tanks, that are expected to drive the policy agenda. Analysis-driven observations should be compared against those of violent crime as applied to two country cases.

4.1 Economic diversification in Canadian context

4.1.1 Quantitative analysis

The Government

The search for documented mentions, e.g. bills and online publications, related to Canadian government activities on economic diversification over the span of 2008-2015 encompasses the following sources:

- Canadian Parliament database *LegisInfo*, search "economic diversification" in both Title and Content. The search produced the total of 12 bills, of which four were selected into the final sample based on substance of content, i.e. with at least two mentions of the issue, and relevance.

- all Government agencies with www.Canada.ca domain by using Google search:

"economic diversification" OR "diversif* econom* AND Canada" site:canada.ca, time span [2008-2015]. The search produced 42 documented Google files, of which 21 files were finally selected for further analysis.

Thus, the total sample size for content analysis is 25 documented mentions on economic diversification. This includes 4 documented mentions in 2015, 7 in 2014, 3 in 2013, 3 in 2012, 3 in 2011, 2 in 2010, 2 in 2009, and 1 in 2008 (Figure 7). As Figure 7 demonstrates, the Canadian government remained somewhat inattentive to the issue of economic diversification throughout 2008-2013, followed by a spike around 2014, and then showing a downward trend again by 2015. More specific analyses of Canadian government's key messages and narratives are presented in the subsection on Qualitative content analyses below.

Figure 7 Trends in Canadian government activity on economic diversification



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

Media

The combined search (i.e. both *Google search* and *LexisNexis*) for documented articles of major national media outlets has led to the final selection of 66 articles. In the process of selecting media articles it was found that nearly all

Google-generated media articles[15] were also included in *LexisNexis* database. The most plausible explanation for this is because the search was grounded for major nation-wide media outlets, including National Post, Globe and Mail, Calgary Herald, Toronto Star, Edmonton Journal etc.[16]

The search command employed is the following:

- "Economic diversification OR diversif* econom* AND Canada" which would encompass all relevant pieces related to economic diversification, diversified economy, diversify the economy etc. The total number of *Google* articles over the period is 110, while *LexisNexis* produces 387 articles, and 68 unclassified articles, thus the total 455 sources were screened to further select articles for analysis.

The final sample of 66 media articles includes 27 documented in 2015, followed by 5 in 2014, 7 in 2013, 8 in 2012, 5 in 2011, 6 in 2010, 4 in 2009 and 4 in 2008 (see Figure 8 below). As data suggest, Canadian media remained dormant throughout much of the time span, with a spike in attention in 2015, i.e. from 5 documented articles in 2014 to 27 in 2015.

Figure 8 Trends in Canadian media activity on economic diversification



[15] There were only 3 Google-unique articles vs. 63 generated by LexisNexis included into the final sample.

[16]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_newspapers_in_Canada_by_circulation

Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

The Public

The search for public sentiments encompasses the following sources: *Google*-generated blog pieces, i.e. short articles (4 documented sources), *LexisNexis*-generated media articles with public comments posted (12), and opinion articles (2). Due to the short nature of most comments posted online, for quantitative analysis readers' comments are analyzed as a separate unit of analyses vis-à-vis media articles.

Thus, over the time span of 2008-2015, the total of 18 blog pieces, media articles (with comments) and opinion articles have been selected for analysis. These include 10 articles in 2015, followed by 2 in 2014, 3 in 2013, 0 in 2012, 2 in 2011, 0 in 2010, 1 in 2009, and 0 in 2008 (Figure 9 below). The data reveal two interesting observations. First, the public remained somewhat dormant throughout 2008-2014, with a spike in attention around 2015. Second, generally over the time span the public's attention has increased gradually although largely remained relatively low except the spike in 2015.

Figure 9 Trends in Canadian (online) public activity on economic diversification



Note: *Blue – media articles, opinion pieces and blogs; Red – readers' comments*.

Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

With regard to reader comments on economic diversification, in total 37 comments have been identified both for media articles and blogs. These include 21 comments posted in 2015 (a spike), 3 in 2014, 9 in 2013, none in 2012, 2 in 2011, none in 2010, 2 in 2009, and none in 2008.

Figure 9 demonstrates that the higher media and blog activity, the more intense the number of comments posted online. However, it is impossible to conclude whether media and blogging actually cause or drive higher levels of commenting online or it may be the other way around, i.e. higher intensity of comments causing higher media attention. Alternatively, the public may also set government agenda by using media as the platform; in other words, the public attentiveness may cause fluctuations in (mediatized) government attention. This should become clear once qualitative content analysis is employed to observe specific interactions.

Academia

The search for academic publications related to economic diversification in Canadian context was carried out by using Web of Science and Scopus. The total sample size over the time span selected for analysis is 30. This includes 2 publications in 2015, followed by 3 in 2014, 3 in 2013, 5 in 2012, and 2 in 2011, then a spike of 8 academic articles in 2010, followed by 4 in 2009 and 3 in 2008.

The trends for Canada-related academic articles published in 2008-2015 are presented in Figure 10 below. As the plotted data suggest, the peak of academic focus on the issue related to economic diversification policy in Canada is 2010.

Academic attention then gradually wanes, with a smaller peak (5 publications) in 2012.

Figure 10 Trends in Canadian academic publications on economic diversification



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

Think tanks

The search for relevant publications from the websites of Canada-based think tanks results in the selection of 47 publications over the time span. These include 7 think tank publications in 2015, 9 in 2014, 7 in 2013, 4 in 2012, 8 in 2011, 3 in 2010, 5 in 2009, and 4 publications in 2008.

The generated results are plotted in Figure 11 below. As the trends demonstrate, there are 2 distinct spikes in attention among the think tank community in relation to economic diversification issues – first, in 2011 (with 8 documented publications), and then in 2014 (9 publications) – the difference between the spikes being negligible. Furthermore, with ups and downs, attention trends generally increase over the span.

Figure 11 Trends in Canadian think tank publications on economic diversification



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

Finally, it is worth comparing the trends of academia with think tanks. Both expert actors show clear spikes, though with somewhat diverging directions. Academia first demonstrates a clear attention spike around 2010, followed by its second (more moderate) spike around 2012, and then followed by declining interest to the issue for the rest of the time span Thus academia precedes the attention of other actors to economic diversification and might be in the position to set the policy agenda. On the other hand, think tanks also seem well positioned to set the agenda since this actor demonstrates rather regular ups and downs, if not complete cycles of attention. Though it also appears to resemble non-experts in the sense of gradually increasing trends, it nonetheless shows its own distinct cycles of attention. Thus qualitative content analysis that follows should confirm whether it is the think tank community or academia that actually set the policy agenda, since the quantitative analysis fails to clearly differentiate between these two actors in terms of their agenda-setting capacity.

4.1.2 The descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes

Canadian-based media, when referring to economic diversification policy development over the 2008 – 2015 time span, first of all, demonstrates certain attention as measured by the number of explicit references to specific actors (Appendix 2a), e.g. the government (33 mentions), followed by academia (19) and the private sector (13), while other actors appear to receive less media attention. Second, some of the key sectors and industries in which economic diversification should be pursued include the primary resource extraction sector (total – 40 references), including the "mining and other primary resource" industry (27) and "agriculture and aquaculture" (13), while an emphasis on "advanced industries" (total – 39), which include technology (16), green energy and renewable sources (10), the processing sector (8) and knowledge-based economy (5), also remain highly pronounced; the service sectors including transportation and tourism, on the other hand receive less attention (24 references in total). Third, with regard to the major types of economic diversification, media's attention remains focused on pursuing market diversification (11 references) and industrial diversification, e.g. away from oil and gas dependency (9 references) vs. diversifying within the energy sector (6) and product diversification (1). Next, in terms of producing cause and effect links, media suggests 8 references to causes and 4 diversification effects. These are roughly comparable to 6 and 3 references suggested by the public, accordingly, as in Appendix 3a, and 6 and 0 by the government agencies, as in Appendix 4a. The experts, on the contrary, demonstrate higher intensity with regard to suggested causes and effects: (11, 10) by academia, as in Appendix 5a, and (11,

12) by think tanks, as shown in Appendix 6a. This suggests that it is largely the expert community that appears to pay more sustained and systematic attention to the policy issue of economic diversification vis-à-vis the non-experts and government. The content analysis of the 'key actors' node below should confirm whether this is a plausible observation.

Among the experts, academia suggests the following key actors as related to economic diversification: their academic fellows (with 20 references), followed by the public (16) and the government (15), as in Appendix 5a. Second, with regard to the major industries, these can be grouped into three broad categories: primary resource extraction sectors (total 26) – mining (13) and agriculture (13) industries; advanced industrial sectors (total 15) – technology e.g. ICT and software (6), bio-energy and processing (3), renewable and green energy (5) and boosting the knowledge sector (1); and the service sector (14). Thus, while media attention largely focuses on developing primary resource extraction and advanced industries, academia's attention is more concentrated around primary resources, i.e. mining and agriculture industries, with less priority given to boosting high-technology and service sectors. This might be due to academia's attention being focused on diversifying away from mining (e.g. oil and gas) dependency either by pursuing industrial or product diversification strategies. Third, regarding types of diversification, academia emphasizes the need to push product diversification (11), followed by market diversification (8), diversifying within the energy sector (6), and industrial diversification (5). This is different from media, which places higher priority on boosting market diversification, followed by industrial diversification.

The other part of experts – the think tank community – suggests the following key actors: the government (33 references), the private sector (26), followed by the public (17). It is worth noting that both media and think tanks, but not academia, refer more frequently to government agencies than to other actors, e.g. the public. It is not yet clear whether these references actually suggest the government's stronger role in driving diversification agenda or whether some refer to criticism regarding the government's less than desirable performance. The semantics analysis of NVivo codes related to the 'key actors' node below should test this proposition. Second, the major industries emphasized by think tanks predominantly include the primary resource extraction sector (total 54) – mining (38) and agriculture (16) industries – followed by the advanced industrial sector (total 28) – technology (10), knowledge (9), and green and renewable energy (9) industries – and the service sector (total 24). Thus, similarly to academia, the Canadian think tank community tends to give more attention to the primary resource sector vis-à-vis advanced industries and the service sector. Third, the major types of diversification are market diversification (37), followed by product (18) and industrial diversification (12), while diversification within the energy sector (8) receives moderate attention. This slightly differs from trends demonstrated by academia, which seems to emphasize product diversification higher than market diversification.

The Canadian online public, i.e. so-called netizens, first refer to the following key actors in their web-based discussions: the government agencies (24 mentions), followed by the role of the public (13), academia (7), and the private

sector (6), while the role of media appears insignificant at least explicitly (2 mentions), as in Appendix 3a. Second, the key industries and sectors include primary resource extraction (total 23) – mining and other primary resources (19 references) and agriculture (4) – followed by advanced industries (15), e.g. high technology (6) and green energy (6), while public attention to the service sector (6 in total) and "other", i.e. manufacturing (5) remains less significant. Finally, with regard to the major types of economic diversification, the online public more frequently refers to market diversification (11 mentions), followed by industrial diversification (9), while diversification within the energy sector receives less attention (4 references). It is worth noting here that not only does the Canadian public seem focused on market and industrial types of diversification, but more importantly, its attention is rather selective, leaving product diversification aside entirely and only moderately referring to diversification within the energy sector. It could be that the area of diversification policy is not so much of public interest but instead is the purview of policy and academic experts.

Last, but not least, the Canadian government refers to the following actors in its discourse on economic diversification policy: its own government agencies (mostly when making references to certain policies adopted, legislation amendments, earlier reforms etc.) – with 28 documented mentions, – followed by the public and NGOs (7 references), while other actors receive negligible attention, i.e. the private sector – 3 references, and academia – 1 reference (Appendix 4a). This observation produced by NVivo descriptive analysis, i.e. the government's highly selective reference to its own agencies with little appreciation of other key

actors especially the public and the expert communities, further reinforces the observation (see the analysis of comparative resilience of Canadian vs. Australian governments in Section 4.2.2) with regards to Canadian government's resilience against agenda-setting pressure from external actors, including the public. Second, the government highlights the following key industries and sectors in its discourse: the advanced industrial sector (total – 19 references), including technology (8), knowledge and research (8), and green energy and renewable sources (3), closely followed by primary resource extraction (total – 18 references), including mining (10) and agriculture (8) industries, and the service sector (total – 13 references) including tourism (8) and entertainment (2) industries, while other industries receive less attention, i.e. manufacturing (8). Third, the following major types of economic diversification policy are emphasized in Canadian government's discourse: market diversification (10 references), followed by product (5) and industrial diversification (5). It is worth noting certain correlation between the Canadian (online) public and government agencies in terms of attention to the types of economic diversification – both actors explicitly refer to only three types of diversification with market diversification being most predominant (11 references by the public vs. 10 by the government). Both actors demonstrate limited attention to the issue. Yet it is also interesting to observe certain differences in their attention spans: while the public also emphasizes the importance of pursuing industrial diversification (9 references), the Canadian government seems to give somewhat lower priority to this (with 5 references to both industrial and product diversification). This could be explained by the government's vivid realization of

costs and challenges embedded in implementing (high-quality) industrial diversification policy measures vis-à-vis, plausibly more appealing, market diversification of existing industries especially in the context of close proximity to the US. It is further interesting to note the government's lack of emphasis on diversification within the energy sector, which again supports the earlier observation with regard to Canadian government's higher resilience toward external pressure, e.g. from the mining industrial groups.

To summarize, nearly all actors (except academia) mainly point to the government as the key actor. The second key actor is academia (with academia pointing to itself as the primary key actor and media suggesting that academia is the second key actor), while the third key actor is the public (with the public and academia pointing to it as the second key actor). Furthermore, with regard to the 'Causes and effects' node, it is largely academia and think tanks that show greater systematic attention than other actors. Thus the major agenda-setting interactions as applied to economic diversification in Canadian context should unfold predominantly among the government and academia, while the public and think tanks might serve as (slightly) less robust actors. Next, regarding the key industrial sectors, nearly all actors unanimously point to the need to pursue diversification agenda in the context of primary resource industries, and though the government slightly emphasizes advanced industries (19) over primary resources (18), the difference is negligible. Finally, with regard to types of economic diversification, nearly all actors point to market diversification, except academia that stresses the need to focus on product diversification (11) instead, though its attention to market

diversification remains significant (8). The next section below should look into the 'key actors' node to develop a comprehensive picture of agenda-setting interactions and identify the key actor(s) that actually sets the policy agenda on economic diversification in Canadian context.

4.1.3 The content analysis of the 'key actors' node

Media

As NVivo-generated transcripts suggest, media-produced references are coded with regard to the economic diversification issue in Canadian context[17]. First, as the descriptive analysis of nodes suggests above, Canadian-based media discourse predominantly points to the government (33 references) and academia (19) in terms of the number of references. Second, the semantic content analysis of specific media codes with regard to the two key actors is carried out.

Regarding the Canadian government agencies, media references can be categorized into the following three groups: negative references that criticize the government and its organizations for their inability to effectively pursue the policy agenda on economic diversification (18 references), generally positive references that emphasize a stronger role of the government (11 references), followed by what can be referred to as neutral references (4), defined as those with plain description of government-led diversification projects, i.e. in Reference 29 where the

[17] Due to a large size of NVivo transcripts, these are stored on the Researchgate.net platform available here: https://www.researchgate.net/project/PhD-thesis-1348. Specifically, the file titled "NVivo transcripts, key actors – Media" contains codes which represent media's references to a range of key actors, e.g. Canada-based media with regard to the government and academia, as in Part a) Diversification, CAN.

government announces a contribution of $3.7 million to support a local airport infrastructure project (without any specific assessment), and as those references that contain somewhat opposing assessments, e.g. in Reference 7 where media points to the benign intention of the newly elected Notley's NDP government to develop capacity across refinery and petrochemical industries and yet describing all these efforts as driven by the 'diversification mantra'. Negative media assessments generally point to inefficiencies of costs incurred by government organizations (i.e. References 25 and 32 suggest that government loans for diversification are often not paid back, Reference 4 strongly recommends the public to "keep an eye on your wallets, folks", concluding that efficient diversification policy is not defined by government decrees but rather in "an unpredictable, messy way…" involving research units, the private sector and technological firms, and References 12, 27 and 28 similarly point to subsidy cost inefficiency; Reference 9 describes the NDP government as a "grand industrial machine" and downplays its effort to intervene in diversification agenda processes, while References 10 and 16 refer to government failure in developing sound diversification policies, and References 11 and 20 similarly point to the failure of the Heritage Fund to diversify the Alberta economy due to the actions of government appointees. On the other side, positive references to the government efforts to develop economic diversification reflect on "bold steps" in minimizing the economic dependence on oil through investments in infrastructure projects and pushing new export pipelines thus by "showing equal care for the energy economy, not displace it" (as in Reference 2, and also Reference 18); furthermore, government-led diversification

efforts appear to show value in 'low-hanging fruit' industries e.g. agriculture and energy such as liquefied natural gas and renewable energy (References 1, 8, 13, 14), and driving asbestos production and export policy (References 21 and 26) till the Tory government stopped financing diversification initiatives within the asbestos economy in 2012 as a result of international pressure (Reference 22). The overall breakdown of positive versus negative assessments is in Figure 12 below.

Figure 12 Media semantic assessment of government activities on diversification in Canada



Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

In overall, it is quite interesting to note media's rather negative assessments with regard to government-led diversification policy. This may appear surprising at first glance, especially taking into account the descriptive analysis of nodes (with multiple key actors referring to the government in the context of diversification). However, as the quantitative analysis initially suggests (as in Figure 6), the Canada-based government agencies remain generally inattentive to the policy issue of economic diversification throughout the time span, thus unlikely to set the agenda. Thus, these two sub-parts, i.e. quantitative and semantic content analyses, triangulate to effectively conclude that the government is largely not in the position to set the agenda on diversification as applied to Canadian context. On the contrary,

while media discourse suggests the government's limited ability to lead diversification policy in contexts of basic industries (e.g. agriculture, energy and asbestos mining) and infrastructure projects, Canadian government agencies appear unable to effectively set the policy agenda on economic diversification in general at least with regards to the 'key actors' node, specifically due to the perceived inefficiency of subsidized expenditure and the failure of government-led policies.

Next, the 19 references to the role of academia as produced by media discourse on economic diversification can be categorized into the following groups: general references that point to a stronger role played by academia and its contribution to pushing the policy agenda on economic diversification (14 references), and instances of academic and research evidence employed to disprove some of the inaccurate government policy statements (5 references), as in Figure 13 below. Both groups of references suggest the robustness of academia in setting diversification policy agenda. As a final note, none of the references point to negative assessment toward (the otherwise weaker role of) academia or its inability to set policy agendas on economic diversification in the Canadian context. Thus it is academia that effectively appears to set the policy agenda on diversification in Canadian context, with regard to the 'key actors' node.

Figure 13 Media semantic assessment of academia on diversification in Canada



Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

The Public

As identified earlier (as in Appendix 3a), the two key actors with the larger number of public perception references are the Canadian government organizations and the public. Thus the next step here is to conduct semantic content analysis of specific codes related to these actors.

Regarding the public references to the government, these (the total of 24) can be divided into the following three categories: negative sentiment references (17), positive sentiments (4 references #6, 17, 23, 24), and neutral references (3 references #2, 12, 13), as in Figure 14.

Figure 14 Public semantic assessment of government activities on diversification in Canada



Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

The negative sentiments are emphasized inter alia in the following instances: Reference 1 links increased regional unemployment in Alberta among oil industry employees with the incompetency of NDP[18] and Liberal governments, while Reference 4 specifies the NDP's way to frame the economic diversification issue as through raising the taxes due to the challenges associated with replacing the mining sector with new industries, and Reference 5 bluntly links the NDP success at recent elections with its slogan "all their eggs in one basket", which suggests the party had never been serious about pursuing economic diversification in the sense of moving away from dependency on mining. Then, at the federal level Reference 7 suggests that Harper premiership, by supporting the tar sands and energy industries, did nothing but raised the currency and thus slowed down exports and economic diversification processes. Reference 8 runs parallels between Canada's tar sands policy of "putting all eggs in one basket" with characteristics of an underdeveloped nation, e.g. soy beans in Argentina and gold mining in Peru.

The positive sentiment references include Reference 6, where despite the challenges linked to economic diversification optimism is expressed with a suggestion (for the incumbent government) to support the private sector (entrepreneurs) and applied research as drivers of the commercialization process, while targeted programs would improve the capacity to grow further. Next, Reference 17 suggests that Alberta Premier Redford's decision to invest in economic diversification of the region is well-grounded, though Reference 16 points to certain flaws in her rationale, e.g. the economy cannot be assumed to be

[18] New Democratic Party

diversified in short term and that would require substantially more investments than what has been committed. Then, Reference 23 shows certain support for Harper government efforts to stimulate diversification by reducing public service and promoting small government agenda; and finally, Reference 24 broadly mentions Canada's diverse economy and the government that plays a major role in healthcare and service (e.g. transportation and utility) sectors.

Specifically regarding agenda-setting interactions, Reference 6 (as mentioned above) suggests the major role of the private sector (entrepreneurs) and academic research as drivers of government-led economic diversification policy, yet Reference 7 vividly reminds us of the continuing agenda-setting influence of tar sands and energy industries; closely related Reference 9 points to the continuing agenda-setting influence of mining and energy industries and academia (e.g. University of Alberta) on Alberta provincial government, while it suggests economic diversification should be pursued instead by a range of actors such as researchers, media and entertainment (e.g. artists, writers and film-makers), and private non-mainstream businesses; Reference 13 expresses an agreement with an economics professor from University of Calgary, who notes that the real issue is Alberta's historic reliance on resource extraction, while a focus should be directed toward diversifying the provincial economy to mitigate longer-term risks. Next, Reference 14 suggests the public being susceptible to media narratives; and finally, Reference 21 suggests that contrary to common sense, Harper undertook policy measures aimed at reducing the taxes imposed on the largest (most profitable)

corporations that rely on commodities to develop their operational bases. These can be summarized in Figure 15.

Figure 15 Public perceptions toward the government on diversification in Canada



Note:As perceived by the public, it is the energy industry, academia and the private sector, including big corporations (to a greater degree), and media (to a lesser degree) that drive policy agenda on economic diversification and exert agenda-setting influence on the government.

Source: The author's own analysis.

Next, with regards to public references to itself (the total of 13 references), these can be broadly divided into positive sentiments, i.e. those suggesting the public's (potentially) robust role in driving policy agenda – 4 references; negative sentiments, i.e. those that point to the public being manipulated by other actors such as media and political figures – 4 references, while the remainder is either neutral or unclassified (Figure 16).

Figure 16 Public semantics toward itself (the public) on diversification in Canada



Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

First, regarding positive sentiments (4 in total), these include Reference 1 that suggests the public should continue to push the agenda on diversifying Canada energy markets away from overdependence on the US so that to prevent the government from further boosting the budget deficit, while Reference 4 points to Alberta-based young people and aboriginal communities who are yet underrepresented (on the advisory group for Alberta Premier) but should be involved as they would better represent a range of non-mining industry actors, e.g. Alberta Federation of Labor and Calgary YMCA (NGOs), Health Sciences Association (academia and research experts), and Maclab Enterprises and GE Canada (the private sector and industry). Next, Reference 7 points to the manifestation of public opinion, which suggests that weaker demand for mining resources in China would have negative effects on Canadian economy (although it is further refined as lower prices for oil and gas would also open an opportunity to pursue the economic diversification agenda), and finally Reference 8 points to the need to promote a public dialogue on energy policy to contribute to diversification of Canada's energy exports, as this policy issue is viewed to be of national interest as opposed to narrow private interest and thus the issue should remain under the scope of public interest. To summarize this part, the public should not be only

viewed as the platform through which other actors exert agenda-setting influences on the government (as in Figure 15), but it can also effectively manifest itself as a (potentially) robust actor provided it can mobilize its resources and systematically focus on pursuing the policy agenda. However, it remains actually limited in its ability to lead the policy agenda not only due to its current mobilization inability but also due to its own perception, i.e. only 4 positive sentiments out of 13 in total, or 30.7%.

The negative sentiments (4 in total) are presented in the references that follow. First, Reference 3 suggests the NDP's ability to relatively easily manipulate public perceptions, particularly that it is ostensibly simple to diversify the economy as it won the Alberta elections with their "all their eggs in one basket" slogan. Second, somewhat similarly Reference 9 points to media's effect on public minds as the local public now wonders whether Alberta is indeed becoming more like a "banana republic" as it continuously suffers from budget deficits possibly in excess of $10 billion. Third, Reference 13 raises the negativity related to the public's irresponsible attitude to recklessly burning oil for its daily needs while giving little thought for future generations. Thus, considering the public's susceptibility to agenda-setting influence by other actors (references 3 and 9), it is not surprising that as Alberta Premier Redford was pushing for diversification agenda in 2013 she was criticized for ignoring the public message, i.e. responsible fiscal management (as in Reference 11). In other words, had the public been able to mobilize and present itself as a more robust and independent actor, politicians would be more

likely attuned to what the public has to say on policy issues such as economic diversification. The agenda-setting interactions are summarized in Figure 17 below.

Figure 17 Public perceptions toward itself (P-2-P) on diversification in Canada



Note:the public is presented both as the platform and as an independent actor that can potentially set the policy agenda on diversification in Canadian context. The government may occasionally 'reject' public messages, and further can shape public perceptions; another actor that can shape public minds is media (though to a lesser degree) plausibly due to the technical nature of the issue. The actual agenda-setting power remains with academia, the industry and the private sector.

Source: The author's own analysis.

The Government

As the descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes (and as in Appendix 4a) suggests, the two actors that generate the larger numbers of references in the context of Canada-based economic diversification are Canadian government agencies (28 references) and the public (7 references)[19].

[19] For the complete content of NVivo transcripts for the government please follow the link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327551782_NVivo_transcripts_Key_Actors_-_GOV

First, with regard to government-to-government (G-2-G) references, it is worth noting that all 28 references point to the positive semantics related to government activities and contributions to promoting the economic diversification policy agenda, e.g. Reference 1 says that the purpose of Western Economic Diversification (WED) Act is to "lead and coordinate the efforts of the Government" and to develop cooperation with Western Canada provinces, business, NGOs and other organizations with the ultimate goal of diversifying Western Canada's economy, while Reference 7 suggests that the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) was established to provide opportunities conducive to economic growth in Atlantic Canada provinces; Reference 8 points to the role of the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency (CanNor) in building sustainable and dynamic economic diversification through funding programs that involve Northern residents and Aboriginal communities, etc.

However, more importantly, it is worth looking into specific agenda-setting interactions unfolding with regard to economic diversification. First, the role of the private sector is emphasized (10 references). References 1 (developing cooperation between WED and the business segment), 7 (with ACOA providing extensive assistance to business in becoming more competitive by capitalizing the strengths of Atlantic Canada provinces), 10 (The Economic Diversification Agency for the Regions of Quebec promoting start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises and NGOs on both domestic and international markets), 11 (with the Federal Economic Development Agency for Southern Ontario [FedDev Ontario] cooperating with communities, businesses and NGOs to promote the region's

economic interests), 12 (again FedDev Ontario through the Southern Ontario Prosperity Initiatives focusing on business growth, innovation and productivity for the local manufacturing industry), as well as references 14 (with RAD Technologies Inc. selected for government funding), 15 (with B.C. government boosting ties with Chinese partners while region-based manufacturing and tech firms acting as drivers of such international economic development), 17 (2014 Ontario budget allocates $25 MLN over three years to support aboriginal business and communities), 22 (Regional Development Agencies [RDAs] providing grants to NGOs and businesses across the regions to push technology and product diversification), and Reference 26, where the tripartite involvement of Canada's federal government, Ontario, and the US government seeks to assist the restructuring of Chrysler and GM car manufacturers by financing loans.

Yet, another actor frequently emphasized in government discourse is the public (with 10 references in total), specifically NGOs and aboriginal communities. NGOs are referred to in 5 references (#1, 10, 11, 22, and 23, with various government agencies providing financial assistance to NGO-led projects), and another 4 references (#8, 17, 18, 24) prominently feature aboriginal communities as recipients of funds to develop business projects, while a single reference (#7) emphasizes cooperation with local communities (apart from aboriginal).

The third key actor is academia and researchers, whose role is highlighted in 5 references. Particularly, Reference 4, where the Canadian government establishes the Consolidated Revenue Fund as a channel for funding up to $51 MLN to foster science and technology projects as part of economic diversification

agenda; Reference 9, where CanNor budget for 2013 allocates $5.6 MLN over 4 years to fund Yukon College Center for Northern Innovation in Mining; then in Reference 19, Minister for WED Michelle Rempel announces the funding of $5.5 MLN to support a new cyclotron and medical isotope project; in Reference 27 WED funds the purchase of research and processing equipment for the Canadian Malting Barley Technical Centre; and finally Reference 28 where the federal government supports the B.C. Institute of Technology by funding skills and knowledge for students. To summarize this part, the private sector and the public (NGOs and aboriginal communities) feature as key actors pushing their government agenda (at least with regard to funding and subsidies secured), while academia appears less pronounced within government discourse on economic diversification (Figure 18). Furthermore, the key actors do not seem to dominate entirely but rather cooperate with the government.

Figure 18 Key actors within government-to-government discourse on



Note: As perceived by the government, it is the private sector and the public (to a greater degree), and academia (to a lesser degree) that drive policy agenda on

economic diversification. The government has effectively established cooperation with these actors through its key agencies, e.g. WED, CanNor etc.

Source: The author's own analysis.

Next, with regard to government references to the public (7 references), all point to the positive semantics as related to the public. It is also worth stressing a small N issue: indeed, while the public is referred to in G-2-G references, these predominantly tend to emphasize the leading role of the government as the coordinator and provider of funds. Nevertheless, the public contributes to government discourse on economic diversification (though to a lesser extent), e.g. as relates to the formation process of the Thompson Economic Diversification Working Group (TEDWG 2013, as in references 6 and 7). Specifically, the TEDWG process is viewed to be the best practical case of capacity building for Canada's northern communities with significant numbers of aboriginal residents in order to more effectively engage local stakeholders in building longer-term sustainable communities (ibid). The TEDWG was formed with inputs from not only government agencies, but predominantly NGO and service organizations and the broader (northern) community (ibid, as in Reference 7).

Academia

To begin with, as found in the descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes, academia is the only key actor within the academia discourse, thus this content analysis of specific codes looks into a single actor. As mentioned earlier in the descriptive analysis section, the total number of references to academia (A-2-A references) is 20. One way of classifying the references is by grouping these into

specific policy areas analyzed. These include mining, forestry and other resource sectors (4 references, #7, 13, 15, 17), followed by agriculture policy sub-issues (3 references, #1, 10, 15), tourism (3 references, #6, 14, 15), then climate change and mitigation (2 references, #2, 11), energy security (2 references, #3, 16), bio-fuels (2 references, #1, 18), and renewable energy (2 references, #8, 9). Two aspects are worth noting here: first, despite the academia-driven rhetoric on the need to analyze economic diversification policy processes, its discourse significantly revolves around *primary resource* use and extraction (12 references out of 20 in total), including mining and forestry (4 references), agriculture-related issues (3 references), tourism (3 references) and primary energy security policy (2 references), while a focus on more advanced and processed industries encompasses 4 references (2 for bio-fuels and renewable energy policy each), as in Figure 19 below. The second aspect is with regard to energy-related discourse (6 references in total, i.e. energy security, bio-fuels and renewables), 4 references point to advanced energy sub-sectors, i.e. bio-fuels and renewable energy sources. This may suggest a promising direction with regard to propelling meaningful discourse on economic diversification in Canadian context, i.e. by primarily focusing on the (broadly) energy industry as an engine for diversification, although the reader should always keep in mind a small N issue, and thus further research is needed to reinforce this tentative observation.

Figure 19 The breakdown of Canadian-based academic attention by primary vs. advanced areas



Note: despite the ongoing academia-led discourse on the need to address economic diversification policy issues, its major focus remains on primary resource use (12 references), while an emerging focus on advanced sectors broadly remains within the energy industry (4 references out of 20 in total).

Source: The author's own analysis

The other way to categorize the academia-led references (A-2-A) is with regard to key actors, both to itself and others, e.g. government agencies, the private sector and industry, to possibly develop a picture of plausible agenda-setting interactions as related to economic diversification discourse in the Canadian setting. These include the public – 9 references (#2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17); government agencies (federal, provincial and local) – 8 references (#2, 7, 11, 13, 14, 18-20); and the private sector – 7 references (#5, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 19). It is worth noting that generally the references suggest the prevailing role of academia in setting the policy agenda on diversification, while the role of other actors appears rather passive, i.e. presented as dependent variables. Particularly, references 2 and 11 point to academic studies that focus on the effects of climate change both on local municipal government organizations (2) and local communities (both 2 and 11); in Reference 3, it is suggested that the Canadian public's functionality is itself a function of diverse energy (security) inputs as identified by academic research;

Reference 5 points to an academic survey focused on a subgroup of private sector units (i.e. firms) as related to diversification activities; according to Reference 6, contrary to earlier studies, this study finds that local residents can be ready to accept diversification opportunities through protected-area tourism; in Reference 13 academia further criticizes Western Canada's policy for its one-size-fits-all approach to addressing regional diversification based on investments aimed at developing targeted industries, whereas it should have paid more attention to specific (more complex) locational rather than sectoral inter-provincial factors; Reference 18 where academia criticizes federal and provincial governments for inefficient policy intervention through subsidies and mandates aimed at bio-fuel production which barely had an effect on rural economic diversification but came at taxpayer cost, with the cost of ethanol production 10 times higher than its level prior to government intervention; and finally Reference 20 where academia assesses key trade policy development options and specifically recommends the government to pursue market diversification away from US dependency toward some of the developing nations with significant youth population and a rising economy, e.g. India, while further cooperation with the EU and Japan is not viewed as beneficial. Furthermore, a few references point to a potential cooperation between academia and other actors, i.e. Reference 9 where Manitoba presents opportunities for local firms, world-class research and skilled workforces to pursue economic growth agenda; Reference 10 where Saskatchewan presents invaluable opportunities both for farmers and academia to continue to bring innovative ideas as related to agriculture and develop technologies aimed at further crop product

diversification; Reference 14 that points to the need for close cooperation between academia, local community leaders, and governments to push the policy agenda on tourism and recreation as part of a diversification strategy in the context of rural Canada; and Reference 17 regarding non-timber forest product development, where the Northern Forest Diversification Centre based in Manitoba, which ended its operation in 2006, resulted in closer cooperation between local communities, business units, and academia, i.e. University College of the North. Based on the above, Figure 20 summarizes the essence of agenda-setting interactions in Canadian context.

Figure 20 Key actor interactions in Canada-based (A-2-A) economic diversification context



Note: Canadian-based academia, as perceived by itself (A-2-A), sets government and public policy agenda on economic diversification (and to a less degree affecting the private sector), while viewing the private sector as its partner.

Source: The author's own analysis

Think tanks

First, the think tank references to government agencies (TT-2-G, 24 in total) can be categorized along the major policy areas (or sub-issues) emphasized within economic diversification discourse as applied to Canadian context. These include mining (e.g. oil and gas) and energy policy (10 references, #1, 3-5, 7, 10, 12, 15, 16, 19, and #23 with the need to pursue diversification centered around mining and energy resources), agriculture (3 references, i.e. #8, 19, 22), forestry (2 references, i.e. #2, 6), the need to move away from mining to manufacturing (3 references, #7, 9, 18) and to renewable energy (4 references, #5, 7, 14, 20), R&D (including education services) and technology (5 references, i.e. #11, 17, 18, 19, 20). In other words, economic diversification discourse led by Canada-based think tanks largely revolves around the *primary industrial sector* (i.e. mining, and to a less degree agriculture and forestry, with 15 references combined), while the need to move to higher-value *advanced industries* (i.e. research, technology, and renewable energy, with 9 references) is less emphasized, and manufacturing being least pronounced (largely related to the other category). Yet it is important to note there appears to be a plausible policy path to pursue economic diversification agenda, i.e. based on a transformation of the energy industry away from primary oil and mining toward renewable energy sources and technology.

Next, these references can be divided into the key actors, with the most important being government agencies. These can be assessed in terms of positive versus negative and neutral (or mixed) sentiments as emphasized in think tank

discourse. The relative majority of these (TT-2-G) references appear to include rather positive sentiments which are reflected in the following references (12 in total, i.e. #4 where the government should partner with the private sector to introduce new bitumen and oil sands investment projects, #6 where the government is praised for its regulations to preserve forestry to future generations, #7 where government and business leaders understand the importance of diversification toward emerging markets, along with pursuing product and industrial diversification, #9 where Manitoba's rural development suggests the government's partnership with non-state actors [specifically aboriginal and other local communities within multi-level governance] in the context of knowledge-driven systems and the need to move away from oil to manufacturing, #11 with introduction of broadband internet technology in the context of government and citizen intercommunications, #12 where the government partners with the private sector in pursuing regional diversification across West Canadian provinces, etc.). Yet, negative assessments of government activities are quite significant (8 references, i.e. #1 where Alberta government is criticized for failure to diversify the provincial economy, #2 where British Columbia's interest in market diversification of non-processed raw materials away from US dependency toward China is viewed as an unsophisticated approach while product diversification agenda should be pursued and similarly #10 where the federal government is criticized for adopting export market diversification of oil as a top agenda item while ignoring climate impact, #5 where despite a need to move toward renewables, federal government policy remains based on coal fuel with limited room for wind, solar, and hydro

energy policy measures, #8 where the government put new rules on tobacco farming quotas effectively barring new entrants etc.). Last, neutral and mixed references to government policy measures (6 in total, i.e. #3 that outlines a scheme of driving forces behind Canadian oil industry development to 2030 with the government being only one of a range of actors that play a role, as in CERI, July 2014; see also Figure 21 below; #16 where Canada's Prime Minister raises the support for energy exports diversification [although references 2 and 10 emphasize negative sentiments to this policy measure]; #19 where in the context of India's Prime Minister Modi visit to Canada in 2015 Canada's key government officials stress the need to bolster market economic diversification toward Indian economy that sends mixed signals as sound investment projects faced challenges in their actual implementation; #20 where the government needs to carefully establish an effective framework for green energy agenda to allow the private sector to develop and yet avoid the temptation of exercising excessive influence in order to prevent unsurmountable bureaucratic procedures imposed on business and similarly #22 related to government and business relations in the agricultural industry; #21 where the government is advised to craft sound fiscal policy in support of the private sector by countering the cycles in the oil and gas sector which has not been always successful in the past.

Figure 21 Canadian Oil Pathways: Driving forces and the vision to 2030

Note: These driving forces should be viewed as key elements of the following actors: government (geopolitics, government policy); the private sector and industry (market access, demand and competition, environmental performance, technology, and crude oil supply), and the public (social license and aboriginal relationships). As this diagram suggests, government is only one, somewhat less emphasized, actor in the context of oil policy development to 2030, while the private sector appears to lead the policy agenda.

Source: Canadian Energy Research Institute (2014, July).

To summarize this part, think tank references to government agencies suggest that though the government enjoys significant emphases in Canadian think tank discourse on diversification policy in overall, this actor fails to receive unanimously positive sentiments, a vital element of perceived capacity to drive policy agenda. The summary of sentiment content analysis can be outlined in Figure 22. It is evident that the share of positive sentiments toward the government is 12/26 (or 46%). Furthermore, as Figure 21 above suggests with regard to oil development policy, it is largely the private sector and industry that appear to outweigh the government's influence in agenda-setting. This observation is triangulated with

positive sentiment (TT-2-G) references to government agencies where, as analyzed above, the role of the private sector features prominently.

Figure 22 Think tank semantics toward government agencies on diversification in Canada



Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

Next, with regard to think tank references to the Canada-based private sector (TT-2-PS, 26 in total), it is worth noting all references point to positive sentiments and thus appear to assign a robust and positive role to the private sector in driving economic diversification policy agenda. First, the references can be classified by policy area. The major areas, or sub-issues within economic diversification agenda, include R&D and other advanced sectors (e.g. aerospace, bio-medical industries, education, green technology and renewables) – 9 references, i.e. #1, 2, 6, 9, 13, 14, 16, 25 and 26 with renewables taking 6 references i.e. the majority; the primary resource sector (e.g. mining, agriculture) – 16 references in total, including 11 references on mining (#3-5, 8, 10, 15, 16, 20, 21, 24 including #13 with ongoing efforts by oil and gas firms to move away from crude oil production toward renewable energy) and 5 on agriculture (#7, 17, 18, 22, 23). The summary of major policy areas can be outlined in Table 5. It is interesting to note significant part (though not the majority) of think tank discourse as related to the private sector focused on pursuing economic diversification in the advanced

industrial sector mainly on renewable energy production, though the think tank community (along with the private sector) apparently realize the continuing need to ground their diversification policy discourse around mining (e.g. crude oil, sands oil and natural gas) and, to a less extent, agriculture.

Table 5 Major policy areas within TT-2-PS discourse on diversification in Canadian context

Policy areas, or sub-issues, within the economic diversification umbrella			
Primary resource industries		Advanced industries	
Mining (e.g. oil and gas)	Agriculture	R&D, education, aerospace	Renewable energy
11 references	5 references	3 references	6 references

Source: The author's own analysis

Second, another way to group the references is according to the key actors emphasized in think tank discourse related to the private sector. Given the overall robustness of the private sector in driving the policy agenda on diversification as mentioned above, it is interesting to identify specific agenda-setting interactions vis-à-vis other actors. To begin with, 4 key references point to the private sector and industry setting the government policy agenda, i.e. #2 where the industry pushes federal government agenda on evolving bilateral cooperation with individual Asian states e.g. Japan, China, India into comprehensive trade and investment regional agreements in the context of China's greatly increased economic power in the region, #10 where business dominates the private sector and government partnership as government's proactive policy action is greatly described with private sector notions such as efficiency, profitability of

infrastructure projects and business acumen, #11 where government's ongoing process of downsizing the civil service provides greater space for the involvement of business and industry in setting government agendas, and #24 where the discourse on furthering economic diversification revolves centered around the natural resource base, viewed as Western Canada's core strength and with new products being originated in resource-based business activities, and thus the government is assigned the facilitator role by establishing a level playing field for all businesses and developing a vision for regional economic growth.

Next, references emphasize the private sector partnerships with other actors (4 references on partnerships with government agencies and 2 references with the public – one with NGOs and one with local communities). Private sector partnerships are emphasized mainly with regard to government agencies (i.e. #5 and 6 where both actors recognize the need to push the exports of primary and renewable energy, manufacturing and services to emerging economies, #16 with both the private sector and government cooperate in a push for renewable energy technology to Asian states, #17 with the need to strengthen collaboration between the private sector, government, NGOs and media in joint efforts to ensure imported food substitution with local foods in the context of agricultural development in Nova Scotia, but also with local communities as in Reference 9, where the private sector alone is not deemed capable of developing broadband internet infrastructure in remote provinces e.g. Nunavut). Finally, two references point to the private sector occasionally being rather a dependent variable, i.e. #7 where the government is deemed to have caused trouble to the tobacco manufacturing private sector as a

result of a lacking sound government strategic vision with the new Tobacco Transition Program (TPP) barring new entrants into the market despite their investments already committed into these projects, and #19 where it is suggested the government should carefully craft a framework conducive to the development of green energy business and enabling the industry to overcome current constraints, while the government should not intervene excessively to reduce bureaucratic procedures imposed on the private sector. The summary is in Figure 23.

Figure 23 Key actor interactions in Canada-based (TT-2-PS) economic diversification context



Note: As perceived by the Canada-based think tank community, the private sector tends to set government policy agenda on economic diversification, while the government (to a less degree) affects the private sector in terms of the amount of bureaucratic burden imposed on mostly new entrants or emerging industries (as opposed to well-established powerful sectors e.g. mining). The private sector further maintains stronger partnerships with government agencies and somewhat weaker links with the public.

Source: The author's own analysis

4.2 Economic diversification in Australian context

4.2.1 Quantitative analysis

The Government

The search for documented publications and bills related to Australian federal government activities with a focus on economic diversification over the span of 2008-2015 encompasses the following two major sources:

- *Search Hansard* Parliamentary document database, search "economic diversification" filtered for "Bills" (Parliament of Australia, 2017). The search produced the total of 48 bills introduced by all chambers and committees over the period of 2008-2015, of which 20 were selected into the final sample based on substance of content and relevance.

- all Government agencies with *www.gov.au* domain by using *Google search*: "economic diversification" OR "diversif* econom* AND Australia" site:gov.au, time span [2008-2015]. The search produced 197Google-generated files, of which 16 files were finally selected for further analysis. The reason for such a low level of selected Google files for analysis is twofold. First, a large part of files are not substantial, i.e. only marginally, of briefly, referring to economic diversification without much analytical substance, e.g. when a local political candidate proclaiming the general importance of pursuing diversification agenda in a region without providing much detail as to how exactly this should proceed. The second reason is Australia being a developed democracy and thus in the position of

assisting developing nations in building their own diversification bases. Thus, the Google search for "economic diversification" AND Australia also brings out numerous instances when Australian experts discuss diversification potential in another nation such as Saudi Arabia (Morley 2015).

Thus, the total sample size for content analysis is 36 documented mentions on economic diversification in Australian context. This includes 17 pieces in 2015, 6 in 2014, 2 in 2013, 3 in 2012, 4 in 2011, 1 in 2010, 1 in 2009, and 2 in 2008. As Figure 24 demonstrates, the Australian government, akin to its Canadian counterpart, remains largely inattentive to the issue, from 2008 to 2013, followed by a slight take-off in 2014 (with 6 mentions), and then a spike in attention by around 2015. The only significant difference is the spike in 2015 vis-à-vis the Canadian federal government, which produces its spike in attention to economic diversification policy in 2014 followed by a moderate downward trend by 2015. In essence, both governments increasingly pay attention to the issue at the end of the 2008-2015 time span.

Figure 24 Trends in Australian government activity on economic diversification



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

Media

The search for media mentions of economic diversification in Australian context initially encompassed both *Google* search and LexisNexis engines. Surprisingly however, *Google* failed to produce any relevant media references over the time span, despite numerous search results, i.e. around 110 overall mentions, as these largely include the following three categories of sources: international organizations – either assessing the progress Australia made with regard to its economic diversification policy referring to another nation context while citing Australia as a model; academic research pieces – either short pieces published on social media or longer articles stored in online repositories; various Australian government sources – at the local, state and federal levels – reflecting on economic diversification issues.

Next, the LexisNexis search produced the total of 488 news articles over the time span, which then led to the final selection of 71 articles for further analysis based on relevance and significance criteria. The search command is the following: "Economic diversification OR diversif* econom* AND Australia" capturing all relevant articles on economic diversification, diversified economy, diversify the economy etc. in Australia.

The final sample size of 71 media articles includes 20 documented sources in 2015, 14 in 2014, 7 in 2013, 7 in 2012, 6 in 2011, 6 in 2010, 6 in 2009, and 5 in 2008 (plotted in Figure below). Interestingly, both Australian and Canadian media largely remained inattentive to the issue related to economic diversification throughout the period, the difference being a more sudden spike from 2014 to 2015 in Canadian context while Australian media began increasing its attention in 2014

(to 14 documented sources from 7 in 2013) with a further spike in 2015 (20 sources). Still in overall, major media outlets across both nations began devoting their attention to economic diversification toward the end of the 2008-2015 time span. To this regard, they resemble the trends demonstrated by the federal governments over the same period.

Figure 25 Trends in Australian media activity on economic diversification



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

The Public

The search for public sentiments in Australian context includes the following sources: *Google*-generated blogs (1 source), *LexisNexis*-generated media articles with public comments posted (4), opinion articles (2), a blog (1), and a letter to the editor (1). As mentioned in the Canadian case, due to the short nature of most comments posted online, readers' comments are analyzed as a separate unit of analyses vis-à-vis media articles, opinion and blog pieces.

In 2008-2015, in total 8 media articles (with comments), a blog piece, and opinion articles have been selected for analysis. These include 6 documented

sources in 2015, none in 2014 and 2013, 1 in 2012, 1 in 2011, and none in 2010, 2009, and 2008 (Figure 26). A number of interesting observations emerge. First, the public remained largely inactive throughout 2008-2014, with a sudden spike in attention around 2015. This is remarkably different from the Canadian case, where the public's attention grew more gradually over the period. Furthermore, while the Canadian case demonstrates reasonable use of blogs (4 sources), the Australian case shows a negligible level (1). Instead, Australian public largely prefers posting comments on media articles.

Figure 26 Australian (online) public activity trends on economic diversification



Note: *Blue – media articles, opinion pieces and blogs; Red – readers' comments*.

Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

Next, the total number of readers' comments is 21, including 20 comments posted in 2015 (a sudden spike), none in 2014 and 2013, 1 in 2012, and none in 2011, 2010, 2009, and 2008. Again, as in the Canadian case, the higher level of media activity is correlated with more intense commenting online. Both Australian and Canadian netizens largely remain either dormant (Canada) or simply inactive (Australia) over the much of the period, i.e. 2008-2014, followed by a spike in attention by 2015, with a more sudden jump in the Australian case. Furthermore,

all three non-expert actors – the government, media, and the public across both Canada and Australia – demonstrate remarkably similar trends, with attention spikes occurring toward the end of the 2008-2015 time span i.e. around the years 2014 and 2015.

Academia

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 3, to search for academic publications, two databases were employed – *Scopus* and *Web of Science*. The combined search results in the final selection of the total of 40 academic articles on economic diversification in Australian context over the span of 2008-2015. These include 7 publications in 2015, 5 in 2014, 3 in 2013, 7 in 2012, 6 in 2011, 4 in 2010, 3 in 2009, and 5 in 2008 (plotted in Figure 27 below). These data point to interesting observations. First, Australian academia demonstrates two roughly equal spikes, first in 2011-2012 and then in 2015, while the Canadian counterparts produced a single spike around 2010. Second, Australian academia began paying increasing attention to the economic diversification issue in the middle of the time span (in 2011-2012), while Canadian scholars did so in the first half of the period (around 2010), followed by a weaker spike in 2012 (Figure 9). What is certainly common among across nations is academia's earlier focus on the issue vis-à-vis the non-experts and the government. As a final observation, Australian academia appears to show recurring spikes, including two visible spikes over the 2008-2015 span and a possibly invisible spike prior to 2008. This suggests that among the experts, at least academia perceives economic diversification as a policy issue of continuing importance in Australia.

Figure 27 Australian academic publication trends on economic diversification



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

Think tanks

The search for relevant publications from the websites of Australian think tanks results in the selection of 46 publications over the 2008-2015 period. These include 12 publications in 2015, 11 in 2014, 6 in 2013, 7 in 2012, 5 in 2011, 2 in 2010, none in 2009, and 3 as documented in 2008 (as in Figure 28 below).

Figure 28 Trends in Australian think tank publications on economic diversification



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

The Australian think tanks produce 2 spikes over the time span, first in 2012, and then a higher spike in 2014-2015. In overall, the think tank community

demonstrates a gradual increase of attention to the economic diversification issue, except in 2008-2009 and 2012-2013 with a slight decrease of attention.

Furthermore, it is worth comparing think tank trends with the trends of academia in Australia. While think tanks show gradually increasing attention trends over the time span which may suggest the growing importance of economic diversification as perceived by think tanks, academia shows recurring spikes perceiving the issue of continuing importance in Australian context. What is common among the two expert actors is their earlier growing focus on the issue vis-à-vis the non-experts and the government: academia first paid increasing attention in 2011 and think tanks did so around the year 2012, while the public, media, and the government only increasingly noted in 2014-2015, i.e. at the end of the time span. Furthermore, as academia appears to show a complete cycle, i.e. 2009-2013, it suggests Australian scholars follow their own institutional agenda vis-à-vis think tanks that appear to resemble trends of non-experts and the government. In other words, with regard to the issue of economic diversification in Australian context, it is academia that seems to set its own agenda among the expert community. Thus it remains to be seen whether qualitative content analyses reinforce this tentative "litmus test" assessment.

4.2.2 The descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes

Australia-based media, when referring to economic diversification policy development over the 2008 – 2015 time span, first of all, refer to the following key actors in its discourse: the government-related agencies (19 references), closely followed by the private sector (17), and academia (9), while other actors receive far less media attention, e.g. the public and think tanks (with 4 references each), international organizations (3), as in Appendix 2b. It is worth noting that similarly to the Canadian case, Australia-based media mostly refers to the government and the private sector in driving economic diversification policy. Yet, the Canadian case (as in Appendix 2a) also refers to the role of academia, which is not observed in the Australian case. The more detailed content analysis of specific NVivo codes related to the 'key actors' node below should clarify whether this suggests the government's stronger role in driving diversification policy or it may also point to certain criticism regarding the government's less than desirable performance in pushing diversification agenda in Australian context. Second, in terms of major industries, Australian media emphasizes primary resource extraction (total 57 references), including mining (33) and agriculture (24) industries, followed by so-called "other" industries (total 41), including manufacturing (24), defense and the military (12), and construction (5), the service sector (total 35 references), including tourism (18) and arts and culture (4) industries, and closely followed by the advanced industrial sector (total 34), including technology (13), green energy (11), and knowledge and research (10) industries. Third, with regard to the major types of economic diversification, these include market diversification (with 14 media references), followed by industrial diversification (9), and diversification within the

energy sector (6), while product diversification and diversifying single-industry towns receive far less media attention (with 2 references each). Finally, regarding cause and effect links, Australian media suggests 10 references to causes and 4 diversification effects. These are roughly comparable to 12 and 4 references produced by the government agencies, as in Appendix 4b, and significantly overweigh 0 and 3 references suggested by the public, as in Appendix 3b. The experts, furthermore, demonstrate yet higher intensity with regard to suggested causes and effects: (19, 19) by Australia-based academia, as in Appendix 5b, and (12, 11) by the think tank community, as shown in Appendix 6b.

With regards to the experts, Australian-based academia, first of all, emphasizes the following key actors in their discourse: its own academic fellows and counterparts (23 references), closely followed by the private sector (22), government agencies (20), and the public (13), as in Appendix 5b. It is worth noting that while the actors are generally similar to the Canadian case, the Australian case presents an interesting difference, i.e. higher emphasis of the private sector. The analysis of specific NVivo codes below should clarify whether this actually entails a stronger role attributed to the private sector or some mentions raise criticism toward the private sector's lobbying efforts, a lack of expertise to set the agenda on diversification policy etc. Second, with regard to the industries, these are primary resource extraction (total – 38 references) including agriculture (21) and mining (17) industries, followed by the service sector (total – 29 references), including tourism (17), while advanced industries (10) and "other" sectors (total 7) receive moderate attention. Though generally similar to the Canadian case, Australian-

based academia seems to give less attention to advanced industries, e.g. technology. Third, regarding the major types of economic diversification, academia appears to give higher priority to industrial (20) and product diversification (15) vis-à-vis market diversification (8) and diversification within the energy sector (2). This is somewhat similar to the Canadian case: their academic counterparts appear to prioritize product diversification over the other types, while Australian academia emphasizes the need to push for both industrial and product diversification.

The think tank community, first of all, emphasizes the following actors in their discourse: the private sector and government agencies (with 37 references for each), think tanks (28), the public and NGOs (27), while the remainder receives either moderate (academia – 13 references) or negligible attention (international organizations – 4, media – 2), as in Appendix 6b. It is worth noting a greater emphasis on the private sector vis-à-vis the Canadian case, while both cases appear to refer to the government as well. Second, the following sectors and industries are referred to: primary resource extraction (total 79), including mining (48) and agriculture (31), followed by the advanced industrial sector (total 46), e.g. knowledge (24) and technology (11), and the service sector (total 45), including tourism (17), while "other" industries (total 23) receive moderate attention, i.e. manufacturing (15) and military defense (8). This observation is similar to the Canadian case. Australian-based academia, while generally exhibiting similar trends, seems to give rather moderate attention to advanced industries. Third, with regards to the major types of economic diversification, think tanks place higher priority on industrial diversification (35 references), followed by market

diversification (22), while product diversification (9) and within the energy sector (5) receive far less attention. This is different from the Canadian case, which suggests greater attention to market diversification. Yet, this is somewhat similar to Australian-based academia, which places higher emphasis on industrial diversification, but also giving certain attention to product diversification.

The (online) public, first of all, largely refers to the following two key actors in its web-based discourse on economic diversification: the government (7 documented references) and the public (6), while other actors appear less significant (Appendix 3b). It is worth noting that while the other non-expert, i.e. Australia-based media, similarly emphasizes the government, it also points to the private sector as the other key actor. The Canadian netizens appear to exhibit similar attention trends, i.e. emphasizing the government and the public as key actors. Second, the following sectors and industries are referred to: advanced industries (total 11 references), including technology (9) and green energy (2), followed by the primary resource extraction sector solely represented by the mining industry (7). As mentioned earlier, Australian-based media suggests different key sectors, i.e. primary resource extraction, followed by "other" industries (e.g. manufacturing), the service sector, and advanced industries. Such a divergence in attention span may be due to the public's limited and possibly unsystematic interest in the (rather technical) area of economic diversification and due to media's professional focus on various policy issues, including diversification. Interestingly, Canadian netizens exhibit somewhat similar trends as their Australian counterparts, except that the Canadian case emphasizes primary resource extraction (23) vis-à-

vis advanced industries (15), as in Appendix 3a. Third, the only significant type of diversification emphasized is within the energy sector (3 references) while industry diversification receives negligible attention (1). The Australian online public does not appear bothered about types of economic diversification generally, which again supports the earlier observation that Australian netizens do not put diversification policy high on their agenda list. As mentioned earlier, Australian-based media emphasizes a range of diversification types, e.g. market diversification, followed by industrial diversification and within the energy sector (as in Appendix 2b). Interestingly, Canadian netizens show attention trends similarly to Australian media, not Australian netizens: they emphasize market diversification, followed by industrial diversification, and then within the energy sector (as in Appendix 3a). Thus Canadian netizens appear to pay more attention to the types of diversification than their Australian counterparts.

As in Appendix 4b, Australian government agencies, first of all, tend to refer to the following key actors in their discourse: their own government agencies (24 references), followed by the private sector (13), while others receive either moderate (the public and academia – 7 references each), or negligible attention (media – 1). It is worth noting that while the Canadian government similarly emphasizes its own institutions, the second key actor is the public, not the private sector (as in Appendix 4a). Second, with regards to the major sectors and industries, these include the primary resource extraction sector (total – 28 references), including agriculture (18) and mining (10) industries, followed by the service sector (total – 23), including tourism (8), and then advanced industries (total – 16),

including technology (8), knowledge and research (6), and green energy (2). Interestingly, the Canadian government appears to give higher priority to the advanced industrial sector, followed by primary resource extraction and then services. In other words, while the first priority industry is different among the two national governments, the top three sectors generally remain the same. Third, the Australian government refers to the following types of economic diversification: market (16), followed by industrial (11), then diversification of products and within the energy sector (7 references each). This is similar to the attention trends exhibited by the Canadian government: market diversification (10 references), followed by product and industry diversification (5 each).

Thus, to summarize this part, four of the five actors (i.e. media, the public, think tanks and the government) mainly point to government agencies in their discourse on economic diversification as applied to Australian context. Next, the think tank community equally emphasizes the private sector, while media, academia and government relate to the private sector as the second key actor. Finally, academia mainly points to itself, i.e. academic counterparts (23 references), closely followed by the private sector (22). Furthermore, it is academia that greatly outweighs the rest with regard to the number of causes and effects developed in its diversification discourse. Thus the core agenda-setting interactions should include the government and the private sector, while academia appears to be less robust. Next, regarding the key industrial sectors, nearly all actors emphasize the need for economic diversification policy discourse to be grounded in the context of primary resource industries, which suggests the continued dependency of the national

economy on resource extraction as perceived by the bulk of actors and thus these industries should be the foundation for further diversification efforts. Finally, regarding the types of economic diversification, unlike the Canadian case, the Australian context reveals a dilemma: on the one hand, media and government generally point to market diversification in their discourse, while on the other hand, the expert community i.e. think tanks and academia emphasize the importance of industrial diversification. It is interesting to note here a broad correlation between media and government trends, both emphasizing market diversification that appears relatively easier to achieve than promoting (perhaps higher-quality) industrial diversification policy, the latter being pointed to by the expert community. The next section should explore in detail the 'key actors' node to build a better understanding of agenda-setting interactions and identify the key actor(s) that drive(s) diversification policy agenda. The specific emphasis of the 'key actors' node is driven by the research question, i.e. to answer the question of who sets the policy agenda requires looking into this node in greater detail.

4.2.3 The content analysis of the 'key actors' node

Media

First, with regard to Australia-based media, its references to key actors are coded as applied to economic diversification[20]. As the preceding Descriptive

[20] A complete set of NVivo transcripts for media references can be found by following this link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327552016_NVivo_transcripts_Key_Actors_-_Media

analysis of NVivo nodes suggests, media predominantly refers to government (19 media references) and the private sector (17) in its discourse on diversification.

Regarding the Australian government institutions, media references, similarly to the Canadian case, can be divided into three groups: positive references in relation to government activities (10 references), neutral references (5), and followed by negative media sentiments toward government activities (4 references). It is striking to note both similarities and differences with the Canadian case. Both country cases appear similar in terms of numbers of positive and neutral references to their respective governments (11 positive media references in Canadian context versus 10 in the Australian case; and 4 versus 5 neutral references, accordingly). What is remarkably different is the amount of negative media sentiments, i.e. 18 versus 4 in Canadian and Australian cases, accordingly. This may tentatively point to a relatively higher degree of democratic deficit in Canadian context, at least at the time of Stephen Harper premiership (2006-2015) as contrasted to the Australian case.

Among the positive media references in relation to government activities, some sources point to the Australian government's active involvement in strengthening ties with the private sector and chairing business summits (i.e. References 1-3, 5, 6, 13), yet another source (Reference 7) serves as a vivid reminder that the government should intensify its activity to greatly reduce the regulatory burden facing the liquefied natural gas (LNG) industry. Other positive sentiments include government grants to support small and medium business (Reference 6), pushing Canberra as a regional hub and an engine for further

economic diversification (Reference 10), and support for Latrobe Valley authorities in shutting down heavy-polluting coal power (Reference 14). The overall breakdown of media references to government activities are presented in Figure 29 below. As these data demonstrate, the Australian government appears to enjoy a greater degree of positive media perception vis-à-vis its Canadian counterpart, i.e. 53% of all references in Australian context vs. 33% in the Canadian case.

Figure 29 Media semantic assessment of government activities on economic diversification in Australia



Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

Next, with regard to the total of 17 media references to the Australia-based private sector as suggested earlier by the Descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes, these can be categorized into the following groups (as presented in Figure 30 below): references to the strong influence of the private sector in its interactions with the government with regard to pushing economic diversification agenda (14 references) and the private sector also shaping the public sentiments and perceptions (2 references), and a single reference being rather neutral. First, media is extensively used as a platform for the private sector to pursue its own agenda on diversification issues (e.g. References 2, 5, 7 where the private sector takes part in business forums and summits pushing its own policy solutions to the government,

and References 6 and 17 where the government allocates resources to further assist the private sector with expansion projects etc.), and to set the government (policy) agenda specifically on start-ups and technology policy under the umbrella of economic diversification [Reference 8 where the Abbott government allocates $200 million over four years to push start-up development under the Industry, Innovation and Competitiveness Agenda program (Massola 2014, Oct 14); and then Reference 4 where CEO of Freelancer outsourcing company further pushes the Australian federal government to "put start-ups and technology on its national agenda" (Businessspectator 2015, Oct 5)]. This particular case further reinforces the thesis that it is the private sector that effectively sets the Australian government agenda on diversification policy. Secondly, media is also employed by the private sector, though to a lesser degree, to shape the public sentiments. Particularly, according to Reference 1, Bobbi Lambright of ATCO Australia attempts to distill public overreactions with regard to economic cycle ups and downs by skillfully switching the attention to the need to push (exports) market diversification to China, India and other developing nations. This message is further supported with the opinion of Wesfarmers CEO Richard Goyder: "We are on the doorstep of the high-growth region of the world" (as in Smith 2015, Dec 31). Then Reference 14 states that media outlets under control of "multinational owners of the power plants" increase the fears of the local public with regard to job losses, while these big energy firms continue to lobby the government for "more billions" in funding. As a final note, none of the references contain explicitly negative sentiments towards the role of the private sector. On the contrary, the private sector (and the powerful energy

industry) extensively uses media as a platform to set its agenda on diversification policy and shape public perceptions.

Figure 30 Media semantic assessment of private sector activities on diversification in Australia



Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

The complexity of mediatized agenda-setting interactions between the private sector (and the energy industry, to a lesser degree) on the one side, and the government and the public on the other can be outlined schematically as presented below (Figure 31). As mentioned above, the private sector (and the industry) exert stronger agenda-setting influence on the government (14 references) than on the public (2 references), while the government transmits its feedback to the private sector through *partnership* agreements.

Figure 31 Mediatized agenda-setting processes in Australian context on diversification



Note: As perceived by media, the private sector largely sets the government policy agenda on economic diversification and, to a lesser degree, the public agenda by employing the media platform and shaping public perceptions to the policy issue. The government further seeks to establish partnership links with the private sector by organizing joint business summits and crafting policy measures to boost diversification agenda.

Source: The author's own analysis.

The Public

As mentioned earlier (in the descriptive analysis and Appendix 3b), the two actors to which the Australian public more frequently refer to in the discourse on economic diversification are the government (7 references) and the public itself (6 references). Thus this sub-section seeks to incorporate the content analysis of specific NVivo codes to identify the public's semantic perceptions toward the government and to itself in order to identify the degree of plausibility of a certain actor to set the policy agenda on diversification in Canadian context.

First, regarding public references to the government, it is rather shocking, or at least unusual, to observe total public (sentimental) negativity: indeed, all 7 references point to Australian federal government failure to lead sound economic diversification policy, at least as perceived by the (online) public. Reference 1 bluntly puts that "…trying to woo Abbott into behaving responsibly on climate change[21] is a lost cause… He is working for fossil fuel interests", while Reference

[21] A reference to climate change is the context of the need to diversify the economy away from fossil fuels

2 is closely related: Abbott's oft-quoted "coal is good for humanity" has become an online meme to demonstrate the federal government's backward-looking stance on climate change; Reference 5 suggests pursuing renewable and alternative energy agenda is unlikely to be part of government agenda as the current and successive governments remain financially dependent on AGL (Australian electricity and gas supplier) and other "Big Energy ugly sisters"; Reference 7 cites the example of the Pilbara region as a case of "infrastructure and strategic failure" and a clear manifestation of a lack of government leadership and funds to drive the agenda on diversification of a highly mining dependent region, with the government being influenced by the mining and energy industry and property developer firms, as well as mainstream media. This is an important observation. While Australian media largely perceives the private sector (and to a less degree the energy industry) to set the agenda on economic diversification, the public appears to emphasize the leading role of the mining and energy industry, followed by the private sector (property developers) and media (Figure 32). Yet, as a final note here, a small N issue should be taken into account.

Figure 32 Agenda-setting processes, perceived by the public, on diversification in



Note: As perceived by the public, it is the mining and energy industry (to a greater degree), and the private sector and media (to a lesser degree) that drive policy agenda on economic diversification and exert agenda-setting influence on the government (with a small N).

Source: The author's own analysis.

Next, with regard to references to the public, these can be divided into the need to address aboriginal communities (references #1, 4) and the overall public's role in pushing policy agendas (references #2, 3, 5), while Reference 6 raises doubts with regard to the plausibility of achieving sound economic diversification. Particularly regarding agenda-setting interactions, Reference 2 suggests the need to diversify the national (export markets) economy away from dependency on China; Reference 3 points to hasty decision-making by Abbott government and the need for the public to mobilize and "send… a pressing message"; in a similar vein Reference 5 raises the need to develop and implement efficient investment and planning policy for the resource rich Pilbara region to prevent it from becoming a ghost region, and order to 'motivate' the (somewhat ignorant) government it is necessary to start "sacking them". All these references so far suggest the *agenda-setting potential* attributed to the public (note expressions such as "need to diversify", "need for the public to mobilize" etc.) rather than the *actual capacity* to set the government agenda on economic diversification. To this regard, Reference 4 serves as a reminder that while the public may have the potential to drive the policy agenda, it is the Australian mining industry that continues to expand its projects at the expense of the land (formerly) owned by local aboriginal

communities. Combined with the earlier analysis of references to the government, these observations in overall point to the mining and energy industry and the private sector that effectively push their agendas on the government with regard to economic diversification.

The Government

To begin with, it is rather unsurprising to observe, similarly to Canadian context, nearly total positive sentiments in G-2-G references: indeed, only a single idiosyncratic reference (#2) points to a negative sentiment, where it suggests that despite an earlier government allocation of $4.3 billion under the framework of the Automotive Transformation Scheme (ATS) to mitigate the consequences of the underperforming Australian-based auto manufacturing sector, the hopes failed to materialize and the industry eventually announced it was closing, which at least points to poor decision-making on the part of the federal government.

The remaining (positive sentiment) references can be broadly divided into the following major categories: references to infrastructure projects as developed or led by the Australian government (9 references, #3, 5, 8, 19, 20 [irrigation and other water infrastructure], #5 [ports and pipelines], #13 [IT and e-commerce infrastructure], #14 [roads], #12, 21 [other]); government-led projects to assist the private sector and industries (8 references, #5, 7, 8, 13, 17, 21 [the private sector and start-ups], #10, 16 [the auto industry]), and government contributions in terms of publically-appealing legal bills and free trade agreements with other nations, i.e. China and Japan (6 references, #1, 3, 9, 11, 15, 17), while the rest can be referred to as unclassified, or miscellaneous G-2-G references.

Furthermore, in terms of the key actors which G-2-G references mainly emphasize the private sector and industry (to a larger degree), as already referred to above (8 references) and the public, e.g. local communities (to a lesser degree with 4 references, #3, 12, 18, 21). Specifically, with regard to the private sector (and industry), Reference 5 relates to the (government-funded) Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility that aims at developing *partnerships* with the private sector across WA, NT and Queensland in terms of providing loans for infrastructure development projects. The NAIF offers concession-based finance for 5 years to complement private sector commitments to building infrastructure e.g. airports, electricity, ports, railways and water (NAIF 2018). Reference 7 points to the role of the Geelong Region Innovation and Investment Fund (co-funded by the federal, state governments and the industry) that has assisted the private sector, e.g. textile and manufacturing, in expanding their employment and production capacities.

Then Reference 8 relates to a government-supported investment in a Tasmania-based irrigation water project (with $60 MLN by the federal government, and $30 MLN each from the state government and the private sector) that is expected to spur economic activity in the region. Next, Reference 13 suggests the importance of the introducing the National Broadband Network as a strong stimulus to spur community-based business activities across regions, by developing e-commerce infrastructure. Reference 17 is related to a 2008 bill as an amendment to the Export Market Development Grants Act with the aim of providing funds for local firms to push their exports and seek new market opportunities. Finally, Reference 21 relates to the Blueprint for MidWest economic development of

Western Australia regions with a specific focus on developing aboriginal tourism, with key elements being infrastructure, business and industry. It is worth noting here that the MidWest largely remains dependent on natural resource extraction, i.e. primarily iron ore, gold mining, copper, lead, cobalt and nickel, as well as silver, oil and natural gas (to a less degree), as shown in Figure 33 below. It is thus unsurprising that pursuing economic diversification is high on regional government agenda, despite a growth in the combined production value of the region's natural resources from $2.5 billion to $3.5 billion over the period (Mid West Development Commission 2015, Aug 25). Furthermore, with regard to the auto manufacturing industry (as opposed to the smaller-size private sector), References 10 and 16 relate to government efforts to sustain the industry afloat only to realize eventually that these would doom to failure (as in Reference 2 mentioned above).

Figure 33 Combined Mid West minerals and petroleum production values (2009-10 – 2013-14)



Source: Mid West Development Commission (2015)

Next, regarding the role of the public, this is emphasized in Reference 3 (a new bill introduced with regard to irrigation water projects expected to spur product diversification in agriculture for the local communities involved), Reference 12 (where the minerals resource rent tax is used as the community dividend that should be spent strictly for those infrastructure projects needed by the local community), Reference 18 points to the Arts Leadership Group working with the community to obtain their feedback in order to develop a vision for developing the arts, culture and creative sector; and Reference 21 (as mentioned above) that points to the Blueprint for Mid West economic development focusing on aboriginal tourism.

To summarize, G-2-G references in the context of Australia-based economic diversification primarily emphasize the role of the private sector, while less emphasis is given to the local community in driving the policy agenda (Figure 34).

Figure 34 Key actors within government-to-government discourse on



Note:As perceived by the government, it is the private sector (to a greater degree), and the public, especially local communities (to a lesser degree) that drive policy agenda on economic diversification in Australian context. Similarly to the

Canadian case, the Australian government has established cooperation with the private sector via various schemes (loans, infrastructure) and with the public via infrastructure projects.

Source: The author's own analysis.

Next, with regards to government references to the next key actor, the private sector (the total of 13 references), it is interesting to observe that, apart from the private sector and government interactions, some references (4 references) point to the strong role of research that contributes to successful implementation of economic diversification projects. So, Reference 5 points to a space innovation industry-led project, further supported by the government (with $6 million commitments) and research sectors; Reference 7 relates to the case of heavy industrial city of Newcastle that also positions itself as a hub for research and knowledge-intensive manufacturing industries; bolstered with a robust skills base, the city enjoys a multi-sector diversified economy, now on the path toward developing clean energy research; then Reference 11 suggests the need to develop digital economy in NSW by attracting workers into the knowledge intensive sectors; and Reference 12 related to Canberra's knowledge economy supported with sound research, innovation and entrepreneurial resources, thus well positioned to further develop the emerging clean economy. The summary of agenda-setting interactions can be presented in Figure 35. Similarly to the Canadian case, the partnership of the government and the private sector remains central, while the role of academia is somewhat less pronounced.

Figure 35 Key actors within G-2-PS discourse on diversification in Australia



Note: As related to the private sector, government discourse on diversification emphasizes the role of the two-party partnership (government and the private sector), yet academia appears increasingly an important actor as the economy moves to become knowledge-based.

Source: The author's own analysis.

Academia

As mentioned earlier (as in Appendix 5a), the total number of A-2-A references in Australian context is 23, closely followed by 22 academia-to-the-private-sector (A-2-PS) references. With regards to A-2-A, these references can be broadly divided into policy areas emphasized in academia discourse: agriculture and nutrition policies (8 references, #4-6, 9, 12, 15, 20, 21), tourism policy (5 references, # 1, 11, 18, 22, 23), industrial and economic growth (4 references, #2, 3, 13, 19), climate change adaptation (3 references, #10, 11, 15), and social policy (2 references, i.e. #16, 17). Furthermore, Reference 20 points to the initial development of bio-products in the 20th century that laid the basis for diversification within mining and fishing industries, while Reference 21 points to the emerging bioenergy markets as a factor conducive to spur the diversification of the agricultural industry. Compared to the Canadian case, the Australian context

exhibits even a lower share of references to push the economic diversification within advanced industries, i.e. 2 references (#20, 21) on bioenergy versus 4 references in the Canadian setting (2 on bio-fuels and 2 on renewable energy). This may point to Canada's economy being somewhat better positioned vis-à-vis Australia's in terms of readiness to move to knowledge-based economy and pursue advanced industrial diversification agenda, though this is not a definitive observation due to a small N issue. Yet, similarly to the Canadian case, the Australian setting generally revolves around primary industries (13 references, including agriculture and tourism), and other policy areas (9 references), as in Figure 36.

Figure 36 The breakdown of Australian-based academic attention by primary vs. advanced areas



Note: similarly to Canadian context, the Australian case shows that despite the academic discourse on economic diversification policy, its major focus remains on primary industries (13 references), with little focus on advanced sectors (2 references) and the remainder (9) related to other (unclassified) references.

Source: The author's own analysis

Next, another way to classify the references is through the prism of key actors as related to academia discourse on diversification (A-2-A) in Australian context. Apart from academia itself (that features prominently across all references due to its research findings, policy recommendations, literature review etc.), other actors in academia's discourse include the private sector (i.e. business and industrial units of all sizes, both local firms and international corporations) – 9 references, #5, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18, 19, 22, 23; the public (i.e. local communities) – 5 references, i.e. #4, 6, 11, 12, 16; and government agencies both local and federal (4 references, #2, 3, 17, 23). It is worth noting that all references to the role of the private sector include positive sentiments, thus this actor is viewed as the second key actor following academia, which is then distantly followed by the public, i.e. local communities. Lastly, the government's 4 references, as perceived by academia, include a single negative sentiment (as in Reference 3, where it is suggested that the government's traditional tariff protection policy eventually failed to achieve industry diversification that had been its major goal.

Specifically, the private sector manifests itself in the following examples: Reference 5 points to farmers' efficient use of diversification among their projects as a means to minimize business risks; references 10 and 11 where local firms seek to reduce their vulnerability to climate change through diversification; #13 and 19 point to the role of industry players in pushing diversification agenda in the knowledge economy; #15 suggests usefulness of enterprise mix diversification in agriculture as a tool to mitigate climate change effects and as an effective strategy to protect against risks caused by climate change; #18 and 22 point to the tourism

industry as a leading actor in pushing Flinders Ranges region's diversification activities in South Australia; finally Reference 23, where the tourism industry is viewed as an engine for diversification in resource dependency context, and is regarded as a partner with the government to promote regional development; the role of the industry is especially commendable since past research indicates (e.g. Howlett and Brownsey 2008) that it is often challenging to pursue effective diversification in the face of 'staples trap' constraints. The summary of agenda-setting interactions can be presented in Figure 37.

Figure 37 Key actor interactions (A-2-A) in Australia-based economic diversification context



ased academia, as perceived by itself (A-2-A), largely drives government policy agendas on economic diversification. The private sector is another key actor that pushes government agenda, while the government occasionally views the private sector as a partner.

Source: The author's own analysis

Next, with regard to academia's references to the private sector (A-2-PS), 22 in total, these can be divided into the following policy areas: tourism policy (7 references, #1, 6, 7, 9, 18, 19, 22), agriculture and forestry (6 references, #4, 6, 10, 14, 16, including the role of scientific research as in Reference 21), then distantly followed by climate change (3 references, #8, 9, 14), natural resources (3

references, #11, 13, 17), the automotive industry support policy (2 references, #2, 3), and renewable energy (a single reference, #15). Similarly to A-2-A references, these A-2-PS references generally point to the discourse focused on primary resource use – 15 references including tourism, agriculture (except Reference 21 that emphasizes the role of scientific research in driving agriculture policy), and natural resources, with negligible attention falling on advanced sectors (2 references, one on scientific research as mentioned earlier, and another one on renewable energy) and 5 references classified as other (as in Figure 38).

Figure 38 The breakdown of Australian-based A-2-PS attention by primary vs. advanced areas



Note: similarly to Australian-based A-2-A discourse, A-2-PS references show the prevalent focus of (academia-perceived) private sector discourse on primary industries (15 references), with little focus on advanced sectors (2 references) and the remainder (5) related to other (unclassified) references.

Source: The author's own analysis

Another possible way to classify the A-2-PS references is with regard to key actors, which, apart from the private sector, include (all-level) government agencies (7 references, # 2, 3, 11-13, 16, including the role of public sector leaders as in Reference 18) and the public (with 4 references, i.e. #7, 8, 16, 17). It is worth noting that the 7 references to the government include 4 with rather negative sentiments, i.e. #3 where the Australian government by taking a short-term focus failed to proactively develop a competitiveness strategy for the national automobile manufacturing industry and instead opted for a single industry support scheme (in 2000-2005) which did not prevent the industry from bankruptcy and cost AU$2.4 billion to taxpayers; Reference 11 where it is suggested that the government does not have the sufficient capacity or capital funds to spur oil development projects so there is often a need to attract international oil corporations especially at the initial phase of natural resource development; references 12 and 13 suggest that while the Norwegian government intensified its own efforts to boost the industrial diversification rather than solely relying on market forces, while the Australian government largely relied on the market which then led to minimal cross-sectoral linkages but instead to a slowdown in the national industrial sector. Other references include #2 that provides an overview of different government approaches taken with regard to auto plant closures across England (based on competitive advantage by modernizing the auto sector) and Australia (based on comparative advantage vis-à-vis other domestic industries); Reference 16 suggests that with regard to managing rural-area pastoral properties, the Indigenous Land Corporation assists local aboriginal communities to acquire land for cultural,

economic and social purposes, while the government develops diversified carbon reduction opportunities for local farmers; and Reference 18 points to the role of imported externally-trained entrepreneurs with fresh minds (as opposed to local businesses) and public sector leaders in driving the economic diversification agenda and overcoming structural weaknesses in the Flinders Ranges region of South Australia. Thus, the government's role in the Australian agenda-setting mosaic as perceived by the private sector (A-2-PS) is moderate. Finally, the public contributes to economic diversification discourse in the following cases: being rather a passive recipient of policy messages in contexts of ecotourism sustainability from the industry (# 7), the social system being exposed to climate change extremes (#8), and communities being exposed to the often negative influence of the staples (i.e. resource dependent) economy on demographics in terms of race, class, and gender (# 17), and on the other hand local aboriginal communities acting as a partner (along with government agencies and the more dominant private sector) in setting the policy agenda on carbon farming (#16). The summary of agenda-setting interactions can be presented in Figure 39.

Figure 39 Key actor interactions (A-2-PS) in Australia-based economic diversification context



Note: The Australian-based private sector, as perceived within academia discourse (A-2-PS), largely drives both government and public agendas on economic diversification.

Source: The author's own analysis

Think tanks

As in Appendix 6b, the total numbers of think tank references to government agencies (TT-2-G) and to the private sector (TT-2-PS) in Australian context are 37 each. First, with regard to TT-2-G references, interestingly only 4 references point to negative sentiments toward government activities (#19, 20 where the Western Australia government's higher state taxes constrain the development of economic diversification in the region, and #29, 30 where two provinces – South Australia and Tasmania accordingly – are described as one of the least dynamic provincial economies in the country due to higher state taxes with both states in need of greater involvement of the private sector in pushing investment projects), while 3 references (#4, 32, 35) include neutral or mixed sentiments. The remaining 30 references generally point to the positive think tanks' semantic perceptions, as in Figure 40.

Figure 40 Think tank semantic assessment of the government on diversification in Australia



Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

The TT-2-G references, first, can be divided into policy areas. These include primary resource industries (with 20 references in total), e.g. agriculture (9 references, #1, 4, 10, 24-28, 36), mining and basic energy such as oil, gas, electricity (5 references, #4, 5, 19, 20, 36), tourism (3 references, #1, 9, 26), forestry (3 references, #6, 7, 11); advanced industries (with 9 references in total), e.g. [transitioning towards] renewable energy (3 references, i.e. #1, 3, 21), bio-energy (2 references #3, 8), technology (2 references, i.e. #21, 35), R&D and vocational training (2 references, #36, 37); and other unclassified, i.e. manufacturing (7 references, basically on the closure of car manufacturing, #14-18, 33, and other manufacturing, e.g. in Tasmania #6). Somewhat similarly to the Canadian case, Australian context demonstrates the (government-related) think tank discourse mainly focused on economy's dependency on primary resource industries, while attention to the advanced sector in general seems evenly distributed among specific industries with renewable energy receiving slightly higher attention (though this is not strongly emphasized due to small N).

Next, these references can be classified in terms of the key actors. Apart from the generally positive sentiments toward government agencies as perceived by the think tank community in the context of Australia-based diversification policy, the other key actors prominently featured in the [actor-centric] agenda-setting equation include the following: the private sector and industry (15 references in total, including 5 references #10, 12, 19, 29, 30 emphasizing the industry's leading position in pushing government policy agenda, and 7 references

#6-8, 23, 24, 26, 28 pointing to the partnership with the government and #12, 23, 24 in partnership with local communities), academia and research (4 references emphasizing the need to act in partnership with government agencies in setting the agenda on diversification, i.e. #2 related to higher education, #3 on renewables and bio-energy, #11 in partnership with government, local communities and the private sector with regard to forestry development policy in Tasmania, though the next reference #12 provides greater detail by pointing to both the industry and local communities being the more robust players in this context), the public (6 references i.e. #9 where the role of aboriginal communities is emphasized, in partnership with government and industry in Northern Territory and #23 and 24 similarly on local community partnership with government agencies, #10 with the aboriginal community and government being the other actors in addition to the small-sized private sector as the leader in pushing agricultural land lease reforms in Northern Australia, #12, as mentioned above, where the local community along with the forestry industry are viewed as the two robust actors in Tasmanian forestry policy agenda context, #22 with the local community setting its economic policy agenda on NSW government). The summary of agenda-setting interactions is in Figure 41 below.

Figure 41 Key actors within think tank-to-government discourse on diversification in Australia





Note: As perceived by think tanks, it is largely the private sector and industry that drive policy agenda on economic diversification in Australian context. Compared to the Canadian case, the Australian setting exhibits multiple (often tripartite, e.g. community-academia-industry, industry-community-government) partnerships among the key actors.

Source: The author's own analysis.

Second, with regard to think tank references to the private sector (TT-2-PS, 37 in total), first of all, it should be noted nearly all references portray positive sentiments toward the role of the private sector and industry, except a single reference (i.e. #8), where it points to Tasmania's continuing dependence on primary resources, mainly the fishery industry, and the dependent relationship that evolved over time between the government and the industry further entrenched inefficient policies. Compared to TT-2-G references that include a slightly larger share of negative sentiments toward government inefficiencies (4 negative and 3 mixed) and given that the private sector is found to drive the policy agenda, it can be concluded now that it is the private sector and industry that set the government and public agendas on diversification as applied to Australian context.

4. 3 The Summary: Economic diversification across Canada and Australia

The major purpose of the quantitative analysis is to observe and contrast attention trends among the key actors over the time span of 2008-2015 in relation to economic diversification in both country cases and to build a 'litmus test' picture in terms of agenda-setting processes among key actors. The analysis leads to a number of observations. First, regarding economic diversification in Canadian context, three actors – media, the public, and government – generally remain inactive with their attention increasing only around 2014 (media, government) and 2013 (the public), as in Figures 7-9. Thus it is largely the expert community, i.e. academia (with an attention spike around 2010 and recurring cycles, though somewhat downward as in Figure 10) and think tanks (with a distinct peak in 2011 and then 2014 and recurring and increasing attention cycles, as in Figure 11) that appears to act as more vital actors in agenda-setting processes. Second, similarly to Canadian context, the Australian case demonstrates that the same three actors – media, the public, and government – remain inattentive throughout much of the period, i.e. to 2014 followed by an increase by 2015 (Figures 24-26). Among the expert community it is academia that exhibits a more distinct attention cycle with two clear peaks as compared to think tanks, first around 2011-2012 and then by 2015. Thus both across Canada and Australia the major agenda-setting interactions are likely to involve think tanks and academia, as well as possibly another actor (or actors) as demonstrated by content analyses.

The descriptive analysis of NVivo-generated nodes reveals a number of interesting observations. First, with regard to the 'causes and effects' node (Table 6 below), both Canadian and Australian cases demonstrate an unambiguous division among actors in terms of evidence-driven attention intensity as measured by numbers of causes and effects. Particularly, while media, the public and government agencies appear to show limited attention, the experts – both academia and think tanks – largely demonstrate higher intensity of attention. This observation is important as this suggests that with a higher degree of evidence-driven attention intensity, i.e. interest to the issue, there is a greater plausibility of the experts' ability to set their own agenda on other actors, e.g. the government. Among the experts, while the Canadian case does not reveal substantial differences among academia and think tanks, the Australian case clearly suggests it is academia that well outweighs the think tank community in terms of the number of causes and effects. This possibly suggests academia's stronger evidence-driven interest in the issue vis-à-vis think tanks, possibly due to professional bias (i.e. focused on developing causal linkages) and thus its ability to set the agenda on other actors, i.e. non-experts and the government.

Table 6 Causes and effects on diversification across Canada and Australia

Canada			**Australia**		
	Causes	Effects		Causes	Effects
Media	8	4	Media	10	4
The Public	6	3	The Public	12	4
The Government	6	0	The Government	0	3
Academia	11	10	Academia	19	19

Think tanks	11	12	Think tanks	12	11

Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo-generated nodes

Second, with regard to the 'key actors' node, two country cases present both commonalities and divergence (Table 7). To begin with, all actors except academia appear to emphasize the government in their discourse on economic diversification in the context of both Canada and Australia over the period. However, it remains to be seen whether this actually suggests the government's stronger role in driving diversification policy agendas vis-à-vis other key actors or some references point to criticism toward government agencies for their policy failure and deficiencies in effectively driving the agenda on economic diversification. Next, both country cases demonstrate certain divergence. In the Canadian case, three actors – the public, government, and academia – refer to the public as the second key actor after the government, while media does so with regard to academia and think tanks with regards to the private sector. In the Australian example, it is largely the private sector that appears to be the second key actor (while think tanks co-assign the top spot both to the private sector and government agencies), except the government which, as in the Canadian case, views the public as the second key actor. Finally, the role of academia is also recognized though to a lesser degree than the government and the public: not only does academia view its own academic fellows as the top key actor in both countries, but Canada-based media considers academia the second key actor.

Lastly, it is interesting to contrast the two national governments in terms of resilience against external pressure. As mentioned earlier in the Quantitative analysis section, with regard to diversification the Canadian government mostly

refers to its own agencies (28 references), distantly followed by the public (7) as in Appendix 4a, thus further supporting another observation (in the case of violent crime) regarding Canadian government's stronger resilience vis-à-vis its Australian counterpart. The Australian government, on the contrary, though predominantly referring to its own government agencies, pays certain attention to other actors, such as the private sector, followed by the public and academia. Such a diffusion of attention across a wider range of actors in the Australian case further reinforces the observation regarding Canadian government's stronger resilience vis-à-vis its Australian counterpart.

Table 7 Key actors on economic diversification across Canada and Australia

Canada		**Australia**	
	Key actors		Key actors
Media	Government (33), academia (19), the private sector (13)	Media	Government (19), the private sector (17), academia (9)
The Public	Government (24), the public (13), academia (7), the private sector (6)	The Public	Government (7), the public (6)
The Government	Government (28), the public (7)	The Government	Government (24), the private sector (13), the public (7),

			academia (7)
Academia	Academia (20), the public (16), government (15)	Academia	Academia (23), the private sector (22), government (20), the public (13)
Think tanks	Government (33), the private sector (26), the public (17)	Think tanks	The private sector (37), government (37), think tanks (28), the public (27), academia (13)

Source: The author's own analytics based on NVivo-generated nodes

Third, as Table 8 below suggests, the actors across the two countries predominantly emphasize the following three major industrial sectors in their diversification discourse: first of all, the primary resource extraction sector, the followed by advanced industries, and the service sector, while the "other" sector, e.g. manufacturing and defense industries, is rather idiosyncratic. The focus by the majority of actors on the primary resource sector points to two important policy implications: first, the discourse is developed in the context of energy rich economy's continued dependency on primary resources, i.e. mining, agriculture, and forestry, and thus with the need to diversify into other, more sustainable, industries; and second, the primary resource sector is widely viewed by the majority of actors to be the basis for further diversification (green energy constitutes a significant part of the advanced industry sector).

Table 8 Industrial sectors for economic diversification in Canada and Australia

Canada	**Australia**

	Sectors/Industries		Sectors/Industries
Media	Primary resources (40): -Mining (27), agriculture (13). Advanced industries (39): -Tech (16), green energy (10), processing (8), knowledge (5). Services (24), including: - Transport (10), arts and culture (7), tourism (6).	Media	Primary resources (57): -Mining (33), agriculture (24). Other (41): -Manufacturing (24), defense (12), and construction (5). Services (35), including: -Tourism (18), arts and culture (4). Advanced industries (34): -Tech (13), green energy (11), and knowledge (10).
The Public	Primary resources (23): -Mining (19), agriculture (4). Advanced industries (15): -Tech (6), green energy (6), and oil and gas refinery (3). Services (6), including: -Arts and culture (2), tourism (1).	The Public	Advanced industries (11): -Green energy (9), tech (2). Primary resources [Mining]: (7).
The Government	Advanced industries (19): -Tech (8), knowledge (8), green energy (3). Primary resources (18): -Mining (10), agriculture (8). Services (13), including: -Tourism (8), entertainment (2). Other [manufacturing] (8).	The Government	Primary resources (28): -Agriculture (18), Mining (10). Services (23), including: -Tourism (8), transport (1). Advanced industries (16), -Tech (8), knowledge (6), and green energy (2). -Other [manufacturing] (12).
Academia	Primary resources (26): -Mining (13), agriculture (13). Advanced industries (15):	Academia	Primary resources (38): -Agriculture (21), mining (17) Services (29), including: -Tourism (17), transport (1).

	-Tech (6), bio-energy (3), green energy (5), knowledge (1) Services (14), including: -Tourism (9), transport (2).		Advanced industries (10): -Tech (4), green energy (3), and bio-fuels and processing (3). Other (7): -Manufacturing (5), and construction (2).
Think tanks	Primary resources (54): -Mining (38), agriculture (16) Advanced industries (28): -Tech (10), knowledge (9), green energy (9). Services (24), including: -Transport (10), tourism (3).	Think tanks	Primary resources (79): -Mining (48), agriculture (31). Advanced industries (46): -Knowledge (24), tech (11), bio-fuel and refinery processing (6), and green energy (5). Services (45), including: -Tourism (17) and transport (3). Other (23): -Manufacturing (15), defense (8).

Source: The author's own analytics based on NVivo-generated nodes

Lastly, among the major types of economic diversification, the following two types common among the majority of actors emerge: first of all, market and then followed by industrial diversification (as in Table 9 below). The remaining types of economic diversification, i.e. product diversification and diversifying within the energy sector, appear significantly less common. It is worth noting that media and governments tend to emphasize market diversification over other types. This appears understandable, as both media and government agencies tend to interact with the public: media's interest lies in 'selling' digestible press articles to the mass audience based on a less technical market dimension of diversification than higher-quality product and industrial types that often require sophisticated technical analyses, and, furthermore, as a non-expert, media itself might face

challenges trying to comprehend the essence of often research-intense product and industry diversification policy. It is thus natural to expect these two types of diversification policy (i.e. product and industrial diversification) to be the focus area for the expert community, i.e. academia and think tanks (as Table 9 largely demonstrates).

Table 9 Types of economic diversification across Canada and Australia

Canada		**Australia**	
	Types of diversification		Types of diversification
Media	Market diversification (11), industrial (9), within energy (6).	Media	Market diversification (14), industrial (9), within energy (6).
The Public	Market diversification (11), industry (9), and diversifying within energy (4).	The Public	Diversifying within energy (3), industry diversification (1).
The Government	Market diversification (10), industry (5), product (5).	The Government	Market diversification (16), industry (11), product (7), and within energy (7).
Academia	Product diversification (11), market (8), within energy (6), and industry (5).	Academia	Industrial diversification (20), product (15), market (8), and within energy (2).
Think tanks	Market diversification (37), product (18), industry (12), and within energy (8).	Think tanks	Industrial diversification (35), market (22), product (9), and within energy (5).

Source: The author's own analytics based on NVivo-generated nodes

Last, the content analysis of specific codes related to the 'key actors' node further reveals a number of interesting observations. First, with regard to diversification policy in Canadian context, media largely perceives academia to

drive economic diversification policy agenda, followed by a moderate role attributed to the government that is viewed to possess the capacity to lead policy agendas related to basic, i.e. primary resource, sectors (e.g. agriculture, energy and asbestos policies) and infrastructure-related projects, e.g. irrigation water supply in remote areas; similarly, the public also views academia, along with the private sector, to drive policy agenda-setting processes; government perceptions largely view the public to drive policy agenda-setting, though the importance of maintaining strong partnership relations with both the public and the private sector is also emphasized; academia views itself to be the key agenda-setter with the need to maintain partnership links with the private sector in order to sustain its own leadership position; and finally, the think tank community largely perceives the private sector and industry to set the policy agenda on economic diversification (as in Table 10). Thus, the leading role of academia is emphasized by three actors, i.e. media, the public and academia itself; the private sector is emphasized in the public's and think tank discourse; and the public is emphasized by the government. Though academia appears to set the policy agenda overall, it is closely followed by the private sector (as academia emphasizes the need to partner with the private sector in order to retain the leading position in agenda-setting). This is a vital finding, as the private sector is initially an important, though not crucial, omitted variable, i.e. not included into the agenda-setting equation. This entails certain policy implications, i.e. the Canadian government should account for messages and policy recommendations both from academia (primarily due to the technical nature

of the policy issue) and the private sector if it aims to effectively transition from policy agenda-setting to sound implementation.

Table 10 The summary of key actors in Canada-based diversification context

	Media	The public	The government	Academia	Think tanks
Key actors	M-2-G: the government's role is limited to basic sectors and infrastructure; M-2-A: academia sets the agenda	P-2-G: the private sector and industry and academia set the agenda; P-2-P: academia and the private sector and industry	G-2-G: partner with the private sector and the public; G-2-P: the public drives policy agenda*	A-2-A: academia sets public and government agenda; partner with the private sector.	TT-2-G: the private sector sets policy agenda; TT-2-PS: the private sector sets agenda

*Note: *denotes a small N issue, i.e. fewer than 10 references*

Source: The author's own analysis

Another policy implication is with regard to designing next policy steps, as perceived by some of the actors, for Canadian government agencies to adopt. Specifically, according to the major agenda setter, i.e. academia, further discourse on economic diversification in Canadian context should be primarily focused on the mining and energy industry as an engine for diversification (see p. 62 and the note for Figure 19), thus government policy measures should address the transformation toward advanced industries specifically around renewable energy and bio-fuels. This policy message is further triangulated with a recommendation by think tanks whereby diversification agenda should be pursued based on transforming the energy sector toward renewables and technology (p. 66) with a vivid realization of the continuing importance of the mining and agriculture industries as the basis for diversification discourse (p. 70).

Second, regarding economic diversification in the Australian case, media largely perceives the private sector to set both the government agenda on diversification policy (to a greater extent) and public agenda (to a lesser extent), while the government also pursues partnership relations with the private sector, as in Figure 31. Thus it is not surprising that based on government perceptions, the private sector should indeed seek to establish partnerships with government agencies, while the government also pursues partnerships with the public and academia (both to a lesser extent than with the private sector), as in figures 34, 35. Next, the public largely refers to government agencies with negative sentiments, thus undermining its capacity to lead diversification agenda (though with a small N issue in mind), while attributing a stronger role to the energy industry, followed by the private sector and media. With regard to the experts, both academia and think tanks attribute a robust role to the private sector and industry, while academia also views itself to be another key actor in setting the policy agenda on diversification in Australian context (see Table 11 below for the summary of key actors in setting the economic diversification policy agenda in Australian context).

Table 11 The summary table of key actors in the context of Australia-based diversification

	Media	The public	The government	Academia	Think tanks

Key actors	M-2-G: the private sector partners with government; M-2-PS: the private sector largely sets the agenda, while also in partnership with government.	P-2-G: the private sector and industry set the agenda*; P-2-P: the mining industry actually sets the agenda*.	G-2-G: partner with the private sector; G-2-PS: partner with the private sector.	A-2-A: academia and the private sector set the agenda; A-2-PS: the private sector.	TT-2-G: the private sector sets policy agenda; TT-2-PS: the private sector sets agenda

*Note: *denotes a small N issue, i.e. fewer than 10 references*

Source: The author's own analysis

Thus it is interesting to note that while the Canadian case suggests the relative prevalence of academia, followed by the private sector (still being another key actor), the Australian context demonstrates greater prevalence of the private sector and industry in setting the policy agenda on economic diversification, while academia is not viewed as a robust actor (except as perceived by itself). Given the near-monopoly position attributed to the private sector, as perceived by other key actors, it is thus unsurprising to observe Australian government's use of partnership as a strategy to accommodate the agenda-setting ambitions of the private sector (e.g. see Figure 31 as perceived by media, figures 34 and 35 as perceived by the government, Figure 37 as perceived by academia, and Figure 41 as perceived by the think tank community). On the contrary, the Canadian government somewhat appears to 'enjoy' the privilege of occasionally rejecting the public's calls for policy messages on diversification, primarily due to two reasons. First, economic diversification is rather a technical issue that requires deeper expertise often possessed by experts, e.g. academia, as well as the private sector. Second, Canadian

government apparently comprehends (or at least intuitively senses) that the policy agenda space is contested mainly by academia and private sector, while the public is also viewed by government figures as an actor that should not be ignored completely. The government, therefore, may occasionally reject public messages not out of ignorance but because of the 'need' to refer to the expertise provided by Canada-based academia and policy advice from the private sector. As a result, it is not surprising that the public in both countries largely views the government with negative sentiments (17 out 24 references, or 70.1% in Canadian context [see also Figure 14], versus 100%, or 7 out of 7 references, in Australian context, though a small N should be taken into account). Finally, in terms of policy implications, the Australian case similarly points to the continued importance of mining and energy sectors which should form the basis for further diversification discourse.

Chapter 5. Data Analysis on Violent crime

Similarly to the case of economic diversification policy, the three level analyses – the 'litmus test' quantitative analysis, the descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes, and the content (semantic) analysis of specific codes related to the 'key actors' node – are now applied to the violent crime policy case with regards to Canadian and Australian country contexts. As mentioned in Ch. 3, due to the social sensitivity around violent crime, the major assumption (Hypothesis 2) is that either the public or media is expected to drive the policy agenda. Thus this section should confirm, disprove, or more specifically refine this hypothesized assumption.

5.1 Violent crime in Canadian context

5.1.1 Quantitative analysis

The Government

The search for documented mentions, e.g. bills and online publications, related to Canadian government activities on violent crime over the span of 2008-2015 follows the same logic and procedure as for economic diversification (see Section 4.2 above). The search command employed is the following: "Violent crime AND Canada".

The *LexisInfo* Parliamentary database search offered 11 results. Following a check based on substance of content and relevance criteria, the final sample selected for analysis is 5 bills. *Google* search (with the following command: "violent crime AND Canada" filtered for the time span of 2008-2015) suggested the total of 106 results, of which then 27 have been selected. Thus, the total sample size is 32 documented mentions by Canadian government agencies.

The total sample of 32 documents selected for analysis includes the following: 6 documents in 2015, 5 in 2014, 2 in 2013, 2 in 2012, 5 in 2011, 5 in 2010, 5 in 2009, and 2 in 2008 (as in Figure 42 below). As plotted data suggest, the violent crime topic generally did not remain high on Canadian government agenda except two moderate spikes, i.e. in 2009-2011 (with 5 documented files), and then 2014-2015 (5 and 6 files).

Figure 42 Trends in Canadian government activity on violent crime



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

Media

The combined search (by employing *Google search* and *LexisNexis*) for media mentions on violent crime has led to the final selection of 155 articles. In the process of selecting media articles 5 *Google*-generated media articles and 150 pieces produced by *LexisNexis* were selected. The search command employed is the following:

- ["violent crime" AND Canada] for *Google* search as filtered for the time span of 2008-2015. The search brought 105 mentions (including pieces by international organizations, research depositories, all levels of Canadian governments, Wikipedia pages etc.

- ["violent crime" AND Canada and HEADLINE (Violent crime OR Violence), Geography - Canada] for the *LexisNexis* database, which then returned 240 news articles.

The final sample of 155 media articles includes 22 documented in 2015, followed by 19 in 2014, 14 in 2013, with a spike of 42 in 2012, 10 in 2011, 12 in 2010, 17 in 2009 and 19 in 2008 (see Figure 43 below).

Figure 43 Trends in Canadian media activity on violent crime



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

As data suggest, Canadian media remained dormant in 2008-2011, with a sudden, if not sensation-driven, spike in 2012 (42 mentions) mainly due to two horrific mass shootings – at the Eaton Center in June and on Danzig street in July – both in Toronto. Since 2013 onwards, media attention to the issue remained significantly lower than in 2012 but with a steadily growing trend, unlike the 2008-2011 period, which showed a downward trend.

The Public

The search for public sentiments employed the combination of *Google* (with the aim to collect any blog pieces), and *LexisNexis* (with the aim to collect media articles with public comments posted, letters to the editor, and opinion articles). The *Google* search did not generate any blog pieces over the analyzed time span, while *LexisNexis* produced the following: media articles with public comments posted (13), letters to the editor (4), and opinion articles (3). Due to the short nature of most comments online, for quantitative analysis readers' comments are analyzed as a separate unit of analyses vis-à-vis media articles.

Thus, over the time span of 2008-2015, the total of 20 media articles (with comments), letters to the editor and opinion articles have been selected for analysis. These include 5pieces in 2015, followed by 4 in 2014, 3 in 2013, 3 in 2012, 4 in 2011, 0 in 2010, 5 in 2009, and 2 in 2008 (Figure 44). The data suggest certain observations. First, while the public's attention increased gradually in the case of economic diversification, with regard to violent crime in Canada the pattern appears more chaotic. This is possibly due to the effect of various focusing events, as well as correlations with media publications. The qualitative content analysis sub-section below should offer specific reasons that would explain the observed phenomenon in greater detail. Second, the public's attention trends demonstrate 2 spikes – in 2009, and then 2015 (with 5 mentions each). Accounting for the number of reader comments, the 2015 spike appears to be more pronounced (with 7 comments) vs. the 2009 spike (with 2 comments).

Figure 44 Trends in Canadian (online) public activity on violent crime



Note: *Blue – media articles, letters, and opinion pieces; Red – readers' comments*.

Source: The author's own analysis based on the collected data

Academia

The search for academic publications related to violent crime in Canadian context was carried out by using Web of Science and Scopus. The total sample size over the time span selected for analysis is 60. This includes 9 publications in 2015, 12 in 2014, 9 in 2013, 7 in 2012, 7 in 2011, 6 in 2010, 6in 2009 and 4 in 2008 (Figure45).

The plotted data suggest a couple of interesting observations. First, Canada-related academia's attention trends to the issue ofviolent crime policy generally gradually increase throughout much of the time span, except a slight downward slope in 2014-2015. Another related observation is a single spike in academia's attention around the year 2014. Although its attention slightly went downward by 2015, it nevertheless remained quite high (with 12 publications in 2014 and 9 in 2015). Tentatively, academia's overall pattern resembles the trends shown by non-experts, i.e. lacking a distinct cycle of attention.

Figure 45 Trends in Canadian academic publications on violent crime



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

Think tanks

The search for relevant publications on violent crime from the websites of Canada-based think tanks results in the selection of 27 publications over the 2008-2015 time span. These include 7 publications in 2015, 6 in 2014, 2 in 2013, 1 in 2012, 3 in 2011, 5 in 2010, 2 in 2009, and 1 in 2008.

The generated results are plotted in Figure 46 below. There are two observations worth noting. First, the trends demonstrate that there are 2 distinct spikes in attention among think tanks in relation to violent crime – first, around 2010 (5 publications), and then a further spike in 2014-2015 (6 and 7 publications, accordingly).Furthermore, similar to economic diversification, the trends for violent crime generally demonstrate an increase over the time span. However, unlike diversification which does not show distinct cycles of attention, violent crime trends demonstrate a complete cycle, i.e. in 2008-2012 followed by a new take-off peaking around 2015. Academia, on the other hand, does not show cycles and instead resembles patterns attributable to non-experts. Think tanks, however, though resembling a pattern of an expert actor that follows its own agenda and not exposed to the pressure of other actors or critical events, do not produce a large number of documented mentions, i.e. 27 vs. 60 of academia. Thus it is unclear yet which actor is likely to set the agenda on violent crime in Canadian context. This should become clear as qualitative content analysis is completed.

Figure 46 Trends in Canadian think tank publications on violent crime



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

5.1.2 The descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes

Canadian-based media, as it refers to the issue of violent crime over the period, first of all, demonstrates attention toward specific actors that is measured by the number of media references (Appendix 2c). The key actors to which media refers to in its discourse on violent crime include government agencies (with 74 references), including police (31), closely followed by the public and NGOs (69), including aboriginal communities (15), while the rest receives either moderate (i.e. academia – 29 references and other media counterparts – 22) or negligible attention (i.e. think tanks, with 6 references). The semantic (content) analysis of specific codes related to the 'key actors' node below should clarify whether relatively frequent media references to the government actually means a stronger role assigned to this actor in setting violent crime policy agenda on or whether some references include criticism raised with regard to government, or police, inefficiencies in the area of violent crime policy. It is interesting to note a difference among the two policy issues in Canadian context: while the descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes on diversification suggests that the second key actor is academia

(following the government), this analysis on violent crime suggests that the second key actor is the public closely following the government. Again, the semantic analysis should clarify the degree of robustness of the public, as an actor, in setting the agenda on violent crime. Second, another important node is types of violent crime. Media pays more attention to the use of guns and firearms (60 references) and cases of murder and homicide (58), distantly followed by gang violence (34) and violence against youth and children (33), while the other types of violent crime receive less attention. Last, but not least, the third NVivo node is a set of causes and effects of violent crime: media develops the total of 67 causes and 7 effects over the time span.

The other non-expert, i.e. the (online) public or netizens, though exhibiting less attention to the issue vis-à-vis media outlets, first tends to emphasize the role of the public (21 references) in driving the agenda on violent crime in Canada, followed by government agencies (16), and then media (8) and academia (6), as in Appendix 3c. Second, the public-led discourse highlights the following two major types of violent crime: use of guns and firearms in committing violence (11 references) and violence against women (9), while the other categories receive less attention, e.g. murders and homicide (6), gang violence (4) etc. It is worth noting significant correlation in attention among the non-experts: both appear to predominantly focus on guns and firearms, and although the public's next priority is violence against women, both actors' attention also appears to be attracted to murder and homicide cases, which are the second priority item to media and the third to the public. Last, the public develops the total of 20 causes and none of effect

of violent crime. This appears plausible as establishing or suggesting possible causal and effect links generally presupposes regular institutionalized attention, while the public appears to exhibit sporadic and unsystematic attention, as noted earlier in Section 4.1.2 with regard to economic diversification in Australian context. Yet, it is interesting to observe that compared to the issue of economic diversification, the public demonstrates higher, though rather unsystematic, interest to violent crime as measured by the number of causes and effects overall, i.e. 6 and 3 versus 20 and 0 accordingly. Furthermore, the nature of the public's unsystematic attention is demonstrated by the quantitative analysis above (Figure 44, p. 118).

Among the experts, academia first of all, refers to contributions of their academic colleagues to violent crime discourse (55 references), distantly followed by the public (25) and the government (23), as in Appendix 5c. The other actors, i.e. media (10) and think tanks (1) receive significantly less credit. Second, academic interest appears to be spread across a range of types of violent crime: youth and child violence (18), closely followed by murder and homicide cases and violence against women (with 15 references each), and drug-fueled violence (14), while the rest receives less attention. Finally, academia appears to suggest a number of causes and effects of violent crime similarly to media, i.e. 63 causes and 7 effects (academia) vs. 67 causes and 7 effects (media), accordingly.

The other expert, i.e. think tanks, predominantly refer to government agencies (43 references) in their discourse on violent crime, distantly followed by the public (24), while the other actors receive less attention, i.e. think tanks (12), academia (10), and media (5). This differs from academia, which largely refers to

its own colleagues (academia – 55), followed by the public (25) and the government (23). Second, with regards to types of violent crime, the Canadian think tank community's interest appears to be concentrated around murders and homicide (17 references), while other categories are of less interest, e.g. physical violence (8), youth (6) and gun violence (6) among others. Finally, think tanks develop the total of 16 causes and two effects, thus failing to resemble the systematic and profound attention typically attributed to expert communities. This drastically differs from the Australian case that produces 64 references to causes and 11 effects as related to violent crime discourse (Appendix 6d).

The last remaining actor, i.e. the government, largely refers to its own agencies (23), distantly followed by the public (7) while other actors receive negligible attention (i.e. media with 2 references and academia with 1), which again supports the notion of government resilience against external pressure. Interestingly, the Australian government mostly refers to the public and NGOs (with 33 references, including 10 for aboriginal communities) in its violent crime discourse, followed by its own agencies (26, including 8 for police), while other actors receive moderate attention (Appendix 6d). With regard to types of violent crime, the government appears to focus mainly on physical violence (18), youth violence (13), and murder and homicide (12), while guns and firearms (9) and violence against women (9) receive moderate attention, and the rest even less so. Finally, the government produces the total of 10 causes and 4 effects of violent crime as related to Canadian context over the time span. This may resemble attention trends typically demonstrated by non-experts.

To summarize, nearly all actors (except academia) point either to government agencies or the public as key actors in their violent crime discourse, with government being the first key actor (as suggested by media, think tanks, and the government itself) and the second being the public (as suggested by media, academia, think tanks, and government). This may, at first glance, appear at odds with the domination of media and academia in the 'Causes and effects' node. However, this phenomenon can be explained as follows. Media's high interest to violent crime is understandable, as it is plausibly driven by its desire for sensation, which is tentatively found earlier (see Figure 43 and an analysis of trends) specifically related to high-profile cases of gun violence and mass murder. Academia's overreaction to developing a relatively high number of causes and effects (67 and 7 respectively) can be plausibly explained by professional bias, i.e. the very nature of conducting sound academic research that is based on building causality links. Thus the agenda-setting interactions are likely to include government agencies (at all levels) and the public, with a possibility of engaging yet another actor unobservable at this stage, i.e. omitted variable bias. Next, regarding types of violent crime, both media and the public emphasize gun violence, which further reinforces an earlier observation regarding media's quest for sensation. Another key type of violent crime is murder and homicide as pointed to by the majority, i.e. all actors except the public (and being the third priority to the government, closely following youth violence). As a final note, the next section analyzes the 'key actors' node in detail in order to better understand agenda-setting processes among various actors in violent crime policy context.

5.1.3 The content analysis of the 'key actors' node

Media

As the descriptive analysis above suggests, the two key actors with the larger numbers of media references are the Canadian government agencies (74 references) and the public (69). These references are further analyzed in terms of semantic assessments based on specific codes as related to violent crime[22].

With regard to Canadian government agencies, media references, similarly to the case of economic diversification, can be divided into the following three broad groups (as in Figure 47 below): positive references to government activities focusing on violent crime (36 references), negative sentiment assessments (30), followed by neutral references (8), i.e. those with the plain description of government (or police) reactions to certain cases of violent crime and those containing mixed assessments (i.e. Reference 8, where the Royal Canadian Mounted Police first issues a report on murder cases of indigenous women, that is an example of positive contribution to analytical debates, and yet the Conservative government rebuffs public calls for an inquiry to thoroughly investigate the causes of large-scale tragedy, an example of negative sentiment). It is worth noting that vis-à-vis the policy issue of economic diversification, the case of violent crime suggests that the government receives *less* negative assessments. This observation is due to two primary factors: first, given a higher degree of social sensitivity of violent crime versus diversification, the government appears to pay serious attention to this issue and thus attempts to craft efficient policies to address the evil;

[22] The complete content of NVivo transcripts can be accessed by following this link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327552016_NVivo_transcripts_Key_Actors_-_Media

second, the nature of the issue presupposes the greater involvement of police agencies (that function under the umbrella of public organizations). Indeed, among the 36 documented positive sentiment references, the role of police agencies (either by issuing worthy analytical reports or by conducting effective criminal investigations) features prominently in 20 sources; 10 sources refer to government ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Labor with its effective inspections aimed at reducing workplace violence, as in References 2 and 12), the role of Prime Minister and federal laws (Reference 38 where Ontario Premier McGuinty expresses his government's commitment to funding a Toronto-based special police squad; Reference 45 where residents of Samson Cree in the Edmonton area vote on a new bylaw entailing the imprisonment of individuals in connection with acts of violence that have devastating effects on the local aboriginal community); and the remaining 6 references point to the role of government agencies as a source of valuable data (primarily Statistics Canada, as in References 1, 11, 14, 16, 23 [Justice Canada], and 29 [police data]). Next, though outnumbered by positive sentiments, the 30 documented negative references include the following types: lack of proactive action on the part of key figures such as Prime Minister, provincial governments etc. (15 references # 3, 9, 10, 15, 17, 19, 21, 28, 47 – 49, 53, 59, 66, 69), criticism toward police agencies (9 references # 4, 5, 31, 32, 34, 36, 44, 50, 73), and, to less degree, inaccuracies in Statistics Canada reporting (references 6, 46, and 72 but particularly Reference 37, which shows a clash between what appears to be a drop in violent crime as recorded by Statistics Canada and Forum Poll (a public opinion poll) conducted for the National Post media indicating growing fears among the

majority of Canadian population (*54%* of those surveyed versus *one third* who disagreed). The latter episode is quite revealing, as it points to the potential of the public to push their own agenda on the government by effectively disproving official government statistics on levels of violent crime. The semantic content analysis of media references to the public should confirm this tentative (and rather idiosyncratic) observation. Further, it is worth noting that while Canadian police agencies enjoy relatively higher positive media semantic references (20 positive versus 9 negative), federal and provincial governments receive rather negative assessments (15 negative versus 10 positive references), which further supports the (triangulated) observation on the government's limited ability to set the policy agenda specifically on violent crime in Canada, though it appears resilient in pursuing its own agenda (as identified, first in Quantitative analysis, and then further reinforced in the Descriptive analysis above).

Figure 47 Media semantic assessment of government activities on violent crime in Canada



Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

Next, regarding media references to the role of the public in the context of violent crime discourse, it is worth noting that unlike media references to the government, the public largely avoids explicitly negative sentiments, i.e. 3

documented negative assessments out of the total of 69 media references. The remaining 66 media references to the public broadly include the following categories: NGOs and activists (26 media references), aboriginal communities (17), followed by the role of public opinion (16), and local communities and neighborhoods other than the aboriginal community groups (10)[23]. The role of NGOs, due to their institutionalized presence on the policy arena, tends to be mainly related to launching new projects and/or reports and data that spur analytic debates (e.g. references 3, 9, 23, 33, 37, 38 etc.) or providing assistance to victims of violent crime (references 7, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 35 etc.). In particular, a report issued by Quebec Native Women Inc. NGO (Arsenault 2015, Dec 14, as in Reference 3) on violence against indigenous women found the existence of a code of silence among aboriginals with female victims often feeling fear and shame, which sparked intense debates and further effectively set the political agenda, as the federal government is now set to begin a national inquiry to analyze cases of murdered and missing indigenous female victims. In an earlier similar case, the Native Women's Association of Canada developed data on the same issue, i.e. missing and murdered indigenous women, which amounted to 600 over the previous two decades (Woods 2013, Sep 1, as in Reference 33). However, at that time around 2013 the issue remained largely ignored as Prime Minister Harper was busy trying to delay Parliament processes that would look into the causes of the issue, and also trying to stall calls into a national public inquiry (ibid). Next, the role of local communities

[23] Some references may point to more than a single category, e.g. Reference 3 emphasizing both the need to respond to the needs of aboriginal communities with regard to murdered and missing Native women and the role of an NGO (Quebec Native Women Inc.) that sparked debates by issuing a report on violence against women.

and neighborhoods is largely limited to being reactionary to certain events, e.g. references 29, 30, 49 where the Somali Canadian community urges police to react to an upsurge of violence against the Somali diaspora, while in references 39, 43, 44 police comes into contact with local neighborhoods in attempts to moderate violent crime. Finally, with regard to public opinion, this manifests itself in a number of instances, e.g. Reference 5, where the public is outraged at the persistent prevalence of violence against women across the nation, with the public connecting this crime with larger social structures including within public institutions that the government continues to refuse. Put in other words, the Canadian government frequently demonstrates robust resilience against public pressure, although in some cases the public effectively sets the government agenda on violent crime, as described above (e.g. Arsenault 2015, Dec 14). The summary of mediatized agenda-setting interactions in the context of Canadian violent crime discourse is presented in Figure 48. To conclude this part, although the public initially appears to include four agenda-setting drivers – NGOs and activists, aboriginal communities, local communities and neighborhoods (other than aboriginal), and public opinion – local communities and neighborhoods generally remain rather passive as they mostly react to certain (often unfavorable) events or become somewhat active only in cooperation with police agencies. Compared with the government, the public in overall appears to set the policy agenda on violent crime in Canada as suggested by media discourse.

Figure 48 Mediatized agenda-setting processes in Canadian violent crime context



Note: Three elements - NGOs, aboriginal communities and public opinion - form the agenda-setting core of the public by sending messages to the government. The government, on the other hand, often (but not always) exhibits strong resilience against external pressure.

Source: The author's own analysis.

The Public

As noted earlier in the descriptive analysis (and also Appendix 3c), the two actors with the larger numbers of references in the context of violent crime in Canada as perceived by the public are the public itself (with 21 references) and the government (16 references). This section seeks to include a semantic content analysis of specific NVivo codes in order to identify which of these two actors is more plausible to drive the policy agenda on violent crime.

First, with regard to references to the public, similar to the Australian case these are generally void of negative sentiments (with only 3 exceptions, i.e. Reference 7 pointing to social stigma by blaming women for being victims of male-dominated violence; Reference 8 with the misogyny thesis and society remaining silent instead of taking action; and Reference 10 that suggests a lack of accountability among leaders of aboriginal communities when receiving support

from the federal government). Apart from these, the sentiments overall appear positive with regard to the Canadian public driving the agenda on violent crime. The major sub-issues of public interest include domestic (family) violence and against women (6 references #1, 6, 9, 13, 17, 19), gun violence (5 references, #4, 11, 15, 16, 18), while the rest refers to the mega-issue of violent crime. Again, similar to the Australian case below, the public's attention seems narrowly focused on two areas – domestic violence (and violence against women) and gun violence. Among the positive sentimental references to the public are Reference 2, where the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association (an NGO) brings up the issue of police brutality and police-involved deaths of local residents by conducting its own research and attracting wide attention of netizens; Reference 3, where in response to a Statistics Canada report Toronto-based Professor Anthony Doob refers to the 1960-70s period as an "unexplained upward blip" in violent crime, while the public appears to provide a plausible explanation for this being that the baby boom generation was born in 1952-1965, thus the peak ages of criminal activity happened around 14-25; Reference 13 where in the opinion of Canadian Women's Foundation CEO, effectively addressing violence against women requires bolstering public education (thus empowering the public), boosting violence prevention programs (thus strengthening the capacity of NGOs), and sound criminal justice response (thus in cooperation with a government department); Reference 14 where an online commentator reminds the audience that to questionable government decision-making can be avoided by eliminating voter apathy, hence the driving role of the public; Reference 20 pointing to the

importance of public perceptions, especially when readers express disagreement with police data on violent crime; and Reference 21 relates to the role of an NGO driving the policy agenda on prison reform, etc. To summarize, the public well presents itself as a robust actor able and motivated to drive policy agendas.

Next, with regard to the public's references to government institutions (16 in total), these can be broadly divided into the following three categories, as in Figure 49 below: negative sentiments (7 public references), positive (4 references) and neutral references (remaining 5 references, e.g. government statistical data as in references 1, 4, the need to strengthen immigration to control human inflows as in Reference 13, etc.).

Figure 49 Public perceptions of government activities on violent crime in Canada



Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

First of all, it is worth noting the public's relatively strong (negative) perceptions toward government activities as compared to positive sentiments. Thus, the public in overall remains rather skeptical about the government capacity to effectively tackle violent crime evils, although not entirely through the prism of total government failure since the relative share of negative sentiments remains less than 50% of the total number of references, i.e. 43% (7 out of 16). Further, the

public's perceived sentiments do not seem to correlate with specific types of violent crime, unlike the Australian case (see below in Section 4.2.2).

Second, the Canadian public focuses on the following types of violent crime in their references to the government: gun violence and gun registry policy (4 references, #2, 3, 7, 8), gang violence (4 references, #9, 10, 12, 14), violence against women (3 references, #1, 4, 5), ethnic violence (1 reference, #13), and assault (1 reference, #16). The 7 negative sentiment references encompass violence against aboriginal women (Reference 5, where a special committee, which was established due to growing public pressure to tackle the issue of missing and murdered aboriginal women, now has uncertain future as Premier Harper intends to derail the parliament; similarly Reference 6, where the new committee is viewed as a channel for corrupting aboriginal community leaders; Reference 7 points to contradictions in statements by police chief and city mayor in response to a shooting crime that left two casualties, with neither statement found true; Reference 8 points to negative sentiments toward politicians attempting to re-introduce non-registered guns that would make it easier to own guns; Reference 11 points to corrupt pro-feminist bias in the political system; in Reference 14 academia raises doubts whether tough sentencing would produce any effect with regard to deterrence of crime, as politicians rush to support federal government's proposed policy of toughened sentencing for drive-by shooters in response to increased gang activity in Vancouver; and Reference 16 points to a divergence between police data on lower violent crime and public perceptions that suggest violent crime increase over the period of 1998-2007). The positive sentiments include Prime Minister Harper's

decision to dismantle gun registry (Reference 2) and his tough sentencing policy for gang violence cases (Reference 12), the decision of three provincial governments to collectively demand a package of amendments into existing laws on gang violence (references 9 and 10), and the need to strengthen immigration and border control services that should be able to more efficiently address illegal immigration (Reference 3). As a final note, these references are exposed to a small N issue, thus these observations should be viewed with caution.

The Government

As mentioned earlier in the descriptive analysis of nodes (and as in Appendix 4c), the total number of government references to the government (G-2-G) in the context of Canada-based violent crime is 23. This content analysis, first of all, suggests that all G-2-G references point to the positive semantics attributed to Canadian government agencies. Second, with regard to specific contributions of the government to violent crime discourse, these can be divided into the following categories: government agencies as sources of valuable data and research (5 references, # 11, 15, 17, 18, 23), refining definitions of concepts related to violent crime and its types (4 references, #1, 2, 7, 11), references related to guns and firearms control (4 references, #3, 9, 11, 21), references to domestic and family violence (3 references, #5, 16, 23), as in Table 12.

Table 12 Canadian government (G-2-G) contributions to violent crime discourse

Categories	The number of references
A source of valuable data and research	5

Definitions of violent crime concepts	4
Guns and firearms control	4
Domestic and family violence	3

Source: The author's own analysis

Further content analysis of specific codes, however, points to a limited role of government units beyond what is suggested in Table 12. Specifically, with regard to agenda-setting interactions, it is primarily the public (with public opinion and perceptions being key elements) that seems to take a leading role in setting the policy agenda on violent crime (7 references, #4, 6, 8, 13, 14, 22 and 23). So, Reference 6 suggests that the government discourse considers public perceptions vital as related to perceived inefficiency of the law enforcement system, while references 4 and 8 relate to assessing the public perception of crime, specifically that crime rates either remain constant (perceived by 62% of surveyed Canadians) or increased (26%), as contrasted with police reported data trends that show steady decline of crime over the period from 2000 to 2012 (Government of Canada 2014, Sep 10 in Reference 8), as in Figure 50.

Figure 50 Police-reported violent crime rates in Canada, 2000 to 2012



Source: Government of Canada (2014, Sep 10)

The government commitment to addressing public needs is further emphasized in Reference 13, where the government expresses its intent to protect specifically the most vulnerable (elderly) strata of society by introducing tougher sentencing against abusers, while references 14 and 23 point to public opinion as collected through the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) survey 2010 to assess perceived severity of violent crime such as homicide and robbery (as in Reference 14) and through the General Social Survey (GSS) collected by Statistics Canada on a regular basis on perceived intimate partner physical abuse. Finally, Reference 22 relates to the tripartite unique relationship (of government agencies, guardians and child service centers) in protecting vulnerable children and youth based in B.C. Finally, Reference 4 (apart from what is mentioned above) also suggests that the tendency of public perception to 'overestimate' levels of violent crime is due to news media's power to influence public minds by employing the fear factor. Thus, the summary of agenda-setting interactions can be presented in Figure 51.

Figure 51 Key actors within government-to-government discourse on violent crime



Note: As perceived by the government (G-2-G), the public both sets the policy agenda and acts as the partner with government agencies in driving the policy agenda on violent crime, while media may occasionally shape public perceptions by instilling fear among its readers.

Source: The author's own analysis.

The next key actor as perceived by government discourse on Canada-based diversification is the public. The G-2-P references (14 in total) point to the following agenda-setting interactions. First of all, the public largely perceives violent crime is increasing (Reference 14), although crime in general is not a top public agenda issue (Reference 4). Furthermore, in addition to what G-2-G discourse analysis above suggests, G-2-P discourse reinforces an observation that media does not seem to play a strong agenda-setting role, as Canadians largely reject the notion of influential media as an actor (Reference 5), so the public believes violent crime increase is real, not due to media effect (ibid). On the contrary, the public views specifically police chiefs and victim rights groups (NGOs) to be highly perceived, while (academic) researchers and (general) government statistics appear less credible, and media even less so (Reference 6). The public believes federal and provincial governments deserve the least ranking and the law enforcement is seen as not rigorous enough (ibid). Based on the above, the summary of agenda-setting interactions from the G-2-P viewpoint is presented in Figure 52.

Figure 52 Government perceptions toward the public (G-2-P) on violent crime in



Note: the public is presented as a robust independent actor that sets the (government) policy agenda on violent crime in Canadian context. The government's capacity to set public agenda and shape perceptions is limited; however, police agencies are better equipped with interacting with the public as sources of valuable data and research. Media and academia remain weaker actors that may occasionally shape public perceptions.

Source: The author's own analysis.

Academia

The total number of A-2-A references is 55 (as in Appendix 5c). One way to classify these is by dividing into policy areas analyzed: the predominant share is given to sexual abuse and violence sub-issues (20 references), distantly followed by alcohol and drug-fueled violence (with 13 references), physical violence and robbery (10 references), murder and homicides (7), while youth violence (3), domestic violence and against women (2), and ethnic violence (1) sub-issues within the violent crime umbrella receive negligible research attention.

Yet, another way to classify the references is with regards to the specific key actors emphasized in academic discourse on violent crime in Canadian context. These actors are profoundly academia (nearly all references point to academic research improving earlier research findings and suggesting policy recommendations), followed by the role of the public (19 references in total, which include local neighborhoods and communities – 8 references, #7, 9, 18, 25, 34, 35, 45, 48; aboriginal communities – 2 references #38, 49; public opinion and

perceptions – 5 references, i.e. #11, 29, 40, 44, 52; society in general – 3 references, i.e. #8, 10, 46; and NGOs – 2 references #12, 44[24]), government agencies (14 references in total, including government programs and legal acts – 8 references, #8, 19-21, 23, 31, 32, 54;police and Canada's correctional system – 5 references, #2, 9, 18, 40, 44;and as a source of data – as in Reference 55). Furthermore, to a lesser degree, media features as an independent actor that often exploits the public's fears (references 29, 46, and slightly different #53 where media is portrayed as one of important actors that influence policy discourse on organized crime along with government papers and academic research).

Further, the role of the public deserves closer scrutiny. Indeed, it may first appear that it is viewed as a robust actor (with the total of 19 documented references), though still far behind academia (nearly all references). However, it should be noted that a number of academia references to the public suggest negative sentiments toward local neighborhoods and communities by pointing to a lack of robustness in driving policy agenda (references #8-10, where the society is portrayed as being vulnerable due to alcohol influence which causes criminal burden on Canadians; #29 and 46 where media exploits the public's fears and moral panic with regard to violent crime). To summarize this part, academia appears to view other actors, e.g. the public (society, local communities, NGOs) and government agencies as rather moderate, as opposed to robust, players on the policy arena as related to violent crime discourse in Canadian context. The major agenda-setting picture can be presented in Figure 53.

[24] Reference 44 overlaps across public opinion and NGO elements of the public, thus the total number is 19.

Figure 53 Key actors within academia (A-2-A) discourse on violent crime in Canada



Note: Canada-based academia perceives itself as the robust actor that drives the policy discourse by improving its earlier findings and making policy recommendations to government agencies and the public on violent crime. The public (with communities and public opinion) and the government act as moderate actors that drive the agenda to a lesser degree, and furthermore, media may occasionally shape public perceptions by employing the fear factor among its readers.

Source: The author's own analysis.

Think tanks

Canadian think tank references relate to government agencies (43 in total) and to the public (24 in total), as in Appendix 6c. To begin with, think tank to government (TT-2-G) references should be analyzed in terms of overall semantics expressed toward government activity in the context of violent crime policy discourse. These can be classified across the following types: negative sentiments toward government and public agencies (15 references, #6, 13-16, 19, 25, 27-30, 36, 38, 39, 43) mostly directed towards Harper's 'tough on crime' policy perceived

inefficiency as violent crime rates do not seem to be on significant decline, generally positive sentiments (9 references, i.e. #1, 2, 5, 11, 17, 22, 23, 33, 37) mainly pointing to the government's responsiveness to citizens' security needs and police effectively apprehending perpetrators of violent crime, and neutral (e.g. as a source of statistical data) or mixed semantic references (19 references), as in Figure 54.

Figure 54 Think tank perceptions of government activities (TT-2-G) on violent crime in Canada



Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

In terms of specific policy areas emphasized, TT-2-G references include the following: murder and homicide (8 references, #5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 26, 32), gun and gang street violence (6 references, #1, 11, 19, 25, 26, 33), physical violence e.g. assaults and robbery (5 references, #4, 10, 20, 21, 26), violence against women and sexual abuse (4 references, #17, 24, 26, 29), alcohol and drug (substance) – fueled violence (3 references, #3, 22, 25), and youth violence (3 references, i.e. #31, 37, 43). As compared with academia patterns, the think tank community's attention appears more evenly distributed, unlike academia's predominant focus on sexual abuse (20 references), and then distantly followed by alcohol- and drugs-fueled

violence (13), which further supports the earlier observation with regards to academia as the 'Ivory tower'.

Finally, with regard to specific actors emphasized in think tank discourse (as related to government activities, i.e. TT-2-G references), these include the following: the public (8 references, i.e. #4 that suggests the importance of community safety and social cohesion and thus measures to minimize violent crime, e.g. assaults, to retain trust within society, #5 where public perceptions toward safety clash with government statistics suggesting steady decline in homicide, #11 where the public has effectively set the government agenda on gun control policy for the last two decades and Harper, in light of 2015 elections, endorses the use of firearms for self-defense, #15 where the public continues pushing for changes in the correctional system due to overcapacity of prisons as a result of 'Tough on crime' policy, #23 where public opinion is employed to assess perceived effectiveness of police contributions to community safety in New Brunswick with 89% being satisfied and in #34 where public opinion shows support for physician-assisted suicide and then further endorsed by a parliament act on a way to government agenda [though the government resisted], #27 where the government breaches the long-standing social consensus [i.e. shows resilience to public pressure] by adopting the 'Tough on crime' strategy even though the public's priority had been a focus on crime prevention and a think tank's report stresses the importance of involving expert knowledge to a greater degree [i.e. think tanks and academia]; on the other hand the public can be occasionally manipulated by the government, as in Reference 25, where the government, using the fear factor and

media as a platform, pushes its own narrative of gang and gun crime epidemic with public being terrified and ready to support government measures); think tanks as an independent actor, with academia (#6, where reacting to a new think tank's report a faculty from University of Victoria responded with a claim the report demonstrated political bias as it inaccurately supports Harper-led 'Tough on crime' policy that seems appealing to the wider public due to its perceived simplicity, #27, as mentioned above, with a think tank calling for expert knowledge, #31 where a think tank pushes government agenda on crime prevention, and #38 similarly a think tank criticizes the government for the inefficiency of 'Tough on crime'); and finally, media, can occasionally act as an independent actor by stirring moral panic among the public, e.g. following a high-profile murder case, as in Reference 39, though this still appears relatively infrequent. The summary of key actors interacting in agenda-setting processes can be presented in Figure 55.

Figure 55 Key actors within think tank-to-government discourse on violent crime in Canada



Note: As perceived by the think tank community, it is largely the public that drives policy agenda on violent crime in the Canadian case, despite occasional attempts to resist on the part of the government. Compared to economic diversification, the violent crime policy issue does not seem to emphasize the need for partnerships among key actors but instead exhibits intense one-way and two-way agenda-setting processes through two platforms - the parliament (by the public and government in their debates) and media (by government). Finally, the role of academia and think tanks (as independent actors) in driving the government agenda and the role of media in shaping public perceptions remain less strong as perceived by think tanks. Source: The author's own analysis.

Next, regarding think tank to the public references (TT-2-P, 24 in total), these, first of all, can be divided in terms of specific elements of the public. These include the public in general e.g. voters and citizens (9 references, i.e. #3, 4, 7, 15-18, 21, 24), public opinion and public perceptions with regard to violent crime (6 references, i.e. #1, 2, 13, 14, 19, 20), NGOs and activists (4 references, i.e. #5, 6, 11, 23), aboriginal communities (Reference 10), and a councilor for youth equity appointed by the Toronto city government to serve as a liaison representing the public within the council and other government levels (as in #22). Last, a number of references (#6, 8, 9, and 23) relate to cases of murdered aboriginal women and references #12, 18 to aboriginal prisoners, however the aboriginal community itself generally does not appear to act in a way resembling an agenda-setting manner, in other words members of aboriginal communities do not actively push policy agenda (again except as in Reference 10). Thus it is largely active citizens and voters,

public opinion, and (to a lesser extent) NGOs that form the driving elements of the public as an agenda-setting actor in the context of violent crime in Canada, as opposed to other elements e.g. local and aboriginal communities, perceived by think tanks (Table 13).

Table 13 The key elements of the public in TT-2-P discourse

#	Key elements of the public	The number of references
1	Society in general, i.e. voters and citizens	9
2	Public opinion and perceptions	6
3	NGOs and activists	4

Source: The author's own analysis

TT-2-P references can be further classified in terms of policy areas (or sub-issues) emphasized within violent crime discourse. These predominantly include murder and homicide (11 references, i.e. #5-10, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24), distantly followed by guns (and other weapons) and gang violence (4 references, i.e. #5, 7, 15, 16), and violence against women and sexual assault (3 references, #9, 16, 23), while physical assault (#1), youth violence (#22) receive negligible public attention as perceived by the think tank community. As this analysis suggests, the public reacts predominantly to highly sensitive cases of murder and (to a less degree) to related cases of gun violence, as well as sexual abuse.

Finally, these references can be classified in terms of key actors involved in agenda-setting interactions. The most frequently emphasized actor (apart from the public, as analyzed above) is government, which is referred to as a source of

statistical data and police research (2 references, i.e. #7, 9) and a single reference (#20) pointing to government robustness through resilience to public pressure for euthanasia with the government clearly articulating its position not to endorse assisted suicide in hospitals and further debating this issue in the Canadian parliament. The government, however is predominantly referred to with negative sentiments (5 references, i.e. #10 where Harper refuses a public inquiry into missing and murdered aboriginal women referring to the issue as crime, not a sociological phenomenon,and similarly #18 where Harper policies are viewed as an attempt to divide the society into naturally bad people versus law-abiding, good citizens, #15 where Harper's 'Tough on crime' policy is viewed as likely to pose risks to public safety, #17 with the government breaching the social consensus by introducing 'Tough on crime' policy, highly unpopular with the public whose priority had been crime prevention, #21 where Harper decides to shut the secretariat on palliative care for the elderly. The other actors include to a much less extent, as mentioned in TT-2-G reference analysis, media, as well as think tanks (as an independent actor) and academia.

To summarize, it is largely the public that is perceived to set the policy agenda on violent crime in Canadian context. As Table 13 suggests, the Canadian public predominantly pushes the government by voters and active citizens through political election campaigns and, to a less extent, by NGOs and activists. The government, on the other hand, often conducts opinion polls in order to assess public perceptions to certain policy areas of concern to government institutions and police agencies. It is worth noting that, as perceived by think tanks, the public

mainly views government activity with negative sentiments (62.5%, or 5 out of 8). Furthermore, as suggested by public-to-government discourse earlier (pp. 131-133), the public itself perceives government activities relatively through negative sentiment terms (43% of all references, i.e. higher than positive sentiments but still less than half all references). This suggests (with a small N issue taken into account) that the think tank discourse, though not perfect, translates a relatively adequate representation of public sentiments toward government activities on violent crime.

5.2 Violent crime in Australian context

5.2.1 Quantitative analysis

The Government

The search for publications and bills of the Australian government related to violent crime policies over the span of 2008-2015 follows the same logic and procedure outlined earlier, e.g. section 4.2.2 (on economic diversification in Australia):

- *The Search Hansard* Parliamentary document database produced the total of 93 bills introduced by all chambers and committees over the period of 2008-2015, of which 29 were selected into the final sample.

- *Google search* by using the*www.gov.au* domain filtered for the time span from January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2015, produced 102documents, of which 18 files were finally selected for further analysis.

Thus the total final sample size equals 47 documented files. These include 16 files in 2015, 7 in 2014, 4 in 2013, 4 in 2012, 2 in 2011, 9 in 2010, 5 in 2009, and none recorded for 2008 (see Figure 56 below).

Figure 56 Trends in Australian government activity on violent crime



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

The data plotted above suggest the following. First, in overall the Australian government demonstrates increasing trends related to violent crime over the time span. This is different from the patterns shown by the Canadian government, which were rather monotonous without clear spikes (section 4.3.1).This may suggest that the Canadian government is more resilient against possible pressure from external actors and against critical events, e.g. mass shootings, vis-à-vis its Australian counterpart. This observation is supported by existing research. Pickup and Hobolt (2015) find that although minority governments tend to better respond to voters, they are less legislatively effective than majority governments. In other words, majority governments, including the Harper government (2006-2015) are therefore less responsive to the public. Dyussenov (2016) finds that when comparing attention trends of Canadian and Kazakhstan governments with regard to corruption

in 1997-2014, the Canadian government appeared less responsive to the growing (online) public debates on corruption than the Kazakh government, as measured by the number of bills introduced through their parliaments. Furthermore, the Canadian government appeared less responsive than Canadian courts (as measured by the number of laws and legal acts introduced over the period).

Second, the government produces two spikes, first in 2010 due to a focus on gang and street violence (5 documents out of 9) thanks to assistance by the federal government through the COPS (Community Oriented Policing Services) program spurred by a violent incident at the Sydney airport in 2009 in which a man was beaten to death by violent gang members (Hayes 2010; Fielding 2010), and second around 2015. The 2015 spike is mainly characterized by the following three major issues: family violence (domestic violence, violence against women) - 6 sources, followed by immigration policy – 3 sources, and gun violence – 3.

Media

The combined search (with both *Google search* and *LexisNexis*) for media articles on violent crime in Australian context led to the final selection of 281 articles. In the process of selecting media articles 9*Google*-generated media articles and 272 pieces produced by *LexisNexis* were selected. The search command employed is the following:

- ["violent crime" AND Australia] for *Google* search filtered for the span of 2008-2015. The search brings 93 mentions including online documents uploaded by Australian governments of all levels, research depositories, lecture notes etc.

- ["violent crime" AND Australia and HEADLINE (Violent crime OR Violence), Geography – Australia] for *LexisNexis*, which then returned 569 news articles unfiltered for relevance and substance of content.

The final sample of 281 media articles includes 55 documents in 2015, followed by 46 in 2014, 28 in 2013, 23 in 2012, 23 in 2011, 32 in 2010, 33 in 2009 and 41 in 2008 (see Figure 57).

Figure 57 Trends in the Australian media activity on violent crime



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

Australian media attention trends first move gradually downward in 2008-2012 followed by a spike around 2014-2015. It is interesting to note that while Canadian media trends demonstrate a short and sudden spike around 2012 with regard to violent crime (section 4.3.1 above), Australian media shows a more gradually increasing spike spreading from 2013 to 2015.

Another observation is a plausible correlation between media and government attention trends and activities. As noted earlier, the most prominent theme within the 2015 attention spike of the government is family and domestic violence. A brief analysis of 2015 media articles shows that out the total 55 articles, the theme of domestic or family violence comes prominently in 46 media articles,

while the rest, e.g. alcohol-driven violent crime (2 articles), gang violence (2), and gun control (2), appears rather insignificant. Finally, Australian media pays significantly more attention to the topic of violent crime than economic diversification (281 versus 71 articles selected). Specific reasons explaining these phenomena, as well as identifying the key agenda-setting actor should be possible by conducting detailed content analysis.

The Public

The search for public sentiments involved the use of *Google* (to collect any relevant blog pieces), and *LexisNexis*(to select those media articles with public comments posted, letters to the editor, and opinion articles). The *Google* search returned 1 blog piece over the analyzed time span, while *LexisNexis* produced the following results: media articles with public comments posted (10),opinion articles (10) some of which also with public comments, and letters to the editor (8).Thus, over the time span of 2008-2015, the total of 29 media articles (with comments), letters to the editor and opinion articles have been selected for analysis. These include 6 pieces in 2015, followed by 7 in 2014, 5 in 2013, 5 in 2012, 2 in 2011, 2 in 2010, 1 in 2009, and 1 in 2008 (Figure58). Public comments are spread over the time span in the following manner: 2015 – 26 selected comments, 2014 – 27, 2013 –4, 2012 – 5, 2011 – 9, and none over the rest of the period, i.e. 2008-2010.

Figure 58 Trends in Australian (online) public activity on violent crime



Note: *Blue – media articles, letters, and opinion pieces; Red – readers' comments*.

Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

The data suggest the following. First, as the number of media articles with public commentsposted only gradually increases over the time span (blue), the public comments themselves (red) demonstrate a sudden disproportionate spike around 2014-2015. This spike correlates with a spike in media attention (Figure 57). Thus it would be interesting to see whether media sets the public agenda with regard to violent crime in Australian context or vice versa, which should be clarified with content analyses. In overall, the patterns shown by public trends resemble those of non-experts, i.e. demonstrating a spike only towards the end of the time span.

Comparing with violent crime trends in the Canadian setting (Figure44), the Australian public demonstrates increased attention in 2014 and 2015, while the Canadian public only did so in 2015. Furthermore, the sample size in Australian context is 29 vs. 20 in Canada (i.e. 69% of the Australian sample size), despite the fact that the size of Australian population is about 68% the size of Canadian population, i.e. 24.4 million vs. 36.2 million (Countryeconomy.com 2018). This suggests the issue of violent crime appears more important and relevant in the

context of Australia than Canada. This is also reflected in the ratio of media sample sizes, i.e. 281 articles selected for analysis in the Australian case vs. 155 in Canadian context.

Finally, vis-à-vis economic diversification trends in Australian context, the public's attention across both issues remained largely dormant until 2014 in the case of violent crime and 2015 for diversification. Despite this seeming similarity in patterns, violent crime remains more intensely debated among Australian netizens than diversification (29 vs. 8 documents), although the difference in Canadian context is rather negligible (20 vs. 18). This also suggests greater importance of violent crime than diversification among the Australian public.

Academia

The search for violent crime publications in Australian context by using Web of Science and Scopus led to the total selection of 66 documents. This includes 14 publications in 2015, 8 in 2014, 13 in 2013, 7 in 2012, 8 in 2011, 5 in 2010, 4 in 2009 and 7 in 2008 (Figure 59 below).

The data suggest the following. First, Australian academia's attention trends to violent crime policy remained rather moderate (but not dormant) over more than half of the time span to 2012, followed by two spikes – in 2013 and then 2015. Though year 2014 witnessed a downward trend, it still corresponds to 2011 (with 8 publications), the highest year of the "moderate" period.

Figure 59 Trends in Australian academic publications on violent crime



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

Compared to Canadian violent crime context with a sample size of 60, the Australian case presents a higher sample size selected for analysis, i.e. 66 publications. This suggests prima facie that Australian scholars pay greater attention to the issue vis-à-vis their Canadian counterparts. It also reinforces the earlier observation that violent crime appears to be more relevant in Australian context more generally. Next, in terms of trends, both country cases show moderate trends through the majority of the time span followed by a spike (2 spikes in Australian context) toward the end of the period.

Finally, the analysis would be incomplete without comparing to Australian economic diversification trends. First, the sample size for violent crime is, again significantly larger than for diversification (66 vs. 40). This may suggest that violent crime appears to be of more importance to Australian academia than economic diversification. Second, academia attention trends show two spikes for each issue though for diversification the spikes (2011-2012 and 2015) are more spaced out than for violent crime (2013 and 2015). This may indicate the presence of a regular pattern, or a cycle, in the case of economic diversification.

Think tanks

The search for relevant publications on violent crime from the websites of Australia-based think tanks results in the selection of 94 publications over the 2008-2015 time span. These include 22 publications in 2015, 12 in 2014, 7 in 2013, 14 in 2012, 8 in 2011, 15 in 2010, 7 in 2009, and 9 in 2008 (as in Figure 60 below. There are two observations worth noting. First, the data demonstrate that, similarly to the issue of economic diversification, violent crimetrends generally show an increase over the time span. However, while diversification trends do not show a clearly regular cycle but instead gradually increasing trends, violent crime trends demonstrate rather regular cycles, i.e. 2009-2011, 2011-2013, and from 2013 onwards. Thus it is interesting to note that Australian think tank trends appear to resemble expert patterns with regard to the issue of violent crime with a plausibility to set its agenda on the issue, while for diversification it is academia that appears to set the ground, as mentioned earlier.

Figure 60 Trends in Australian think tank publications on violent crime



Source: The author's own analysis based on collected data

5.2.2 The descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes

Australia-based media appears to demonstrate more intense attention to the issue of violent crime vis-à-vis its Canadian counterpart, as measure by the number of references to key actors, types of violent crime and causes and effects (Appendix 2d). First, media emphasizes the following key actors in its discourse: the government (119 references, 66 of which are assigned to police), closely followed by the public and NGOs (101, including 17 for aboriginal communities), media (57) and academia (54), while think tanks receive less attention (34, including 26 for government-affiliated think tanks). This is generally similar to the Canadian case with the government and the public being the key actors, followed by academia and media. Second, with regards to the types of violent crime, Australian media mainly focuses on domestic and family violence (109), followed by alcohol-fueled violence (76), violence against women (56), youth and child violence (50), and physical violence (50). This drastically differs from Canadian context, which demonstrates not only other priority types of violent crime (e.g. gun violence and murder) but also media's interest spread across a range of types of violence without a clearly dominant type. This primarily suggests a more explicit quest for sensation news in Australian context (vis-à-vis the Canadian case) in efforts to please the mass audience, and furthermore, as mentioned below, media's priority attention correlates with the public whose major sub-area of interest is also domestic violence. Last, media suggests the total of 114 causes and 18 effects of violent crime in its discourse, which is significantly higher compared to Canadian context (67 and 7, accordingly). In other words, violent crime appears to be higher on Australian media agenda than in Canadian context.

The (online) public apparently demonstrates a higher degree of interest, or concern, regarding violent crime issues in the Australian case than in Canada (Appendix 3d). First, the following key actors are emphasized: the public and NGOs (27 references), closely followed by the government (25), media (19), while academia (5) and think tanks (1) received negligible public attention. While generally similar to Canadian context in the sense of including both the public and government as the top key actors, the Australian case also suggests a strong role attributed to media. Interestingly, Australian media also refers to its (media) institutions as the third key actor, following the government and the public (as in Appendix 2d). Second, the public highlights the following two major types of violent crime: domestic and family violence (30), followed by physical violence (20), while other types receive moderate attention, i.e. murder and homicide (9), alcohol-fueled violence (9), guns and firearms (8), violence against women (8), ethnic violence (7) etc. It is worth noting that not only does Canadian public appear to pay less attention to violent crime than in Australian context, but the priority types are different, i.e. guns and firearms (11) and violence against women (9) being the top two items on Canadian public agenda list as related to violent crime discourse. Furthermore, the public's attention trends correlate with media that, similarly to the public, points to domestic and family violence as the top item under the violent crime umbrella (109). Lastly, the public suggests the total of 41 causes and 5 effects of violent crime, while media, as an institutionalized non-expert actor, develops a significantly higher number of both causes and effects, as mentioned earlier, i.e. 114 and 18 accordingly (as in Appendix 2d). It is also worth noting that

the Australian public's attention seems more attracted to violent crime than economic diversification, with 0 cause and 3 effects (Appendix 3b), and shows higher attention to violent crime vis-à-vis the Canadian public as measured by the number of causes (20 causes and 0 effect in Canadian context, as in Appendix 3c), possibly due to a higher perceived degree of severity of violent crime.

With regard to the experts, academia first of all, points to the following key actors in its violent crime discourse: academia (35) closely followed by the public (33), the government (27), and media (19), while the private sector receives less attention (7), as in Appendix 5d. While generally similar to the Canadian case with the top three actors being the same, the Australian case also attributes a role to media. Second, academic attention is focused on the following types of violent crime: alcohol-fueled violence (24), drug-fueled violence (19), physical violence (15), violence against women (15), and murders and homicide (14), while the rest receives less attention. This is somewhat different from the Canadian case, where academic focus on youth and child violence (18) is heavier than other items, yet violence against women (15), murder and homicide (15) and drug-fueled violence (14) also receive significant attention, which is similar to Australian context. Lastly, academia suggests the total of 69 causes and 7 effects, being quite similar to the Canadian case (63 causes and 7 effects, Appendix 5c).

The other expert actor, the think tank community first of all, tends to points to the following key actors in its discourse on violent crime in Australian context: their fellow think tanks (63 references) including 40 government-affiliated think tanks, followed by the public (52) including aboriginal communities (21); and the

government (50) including police agencies (17); while other actors receive moderate (media – 22 and academia – 18) or negligible attention (the private sector – 2) over the time span (as in Appendix 6d). This is generally similar to attention trends suggested by academia (Appendix 5d) which emphasize their academic fellows (35), closely followed by the public (33), then the government (27). However, in contrast to Australian counterparts, Canada-based think tanks refer to the government (43), distantly followed by the public (24), as in Appendix 6c. Again, the semantic (content) analysis of codes related to the 'key actors' node should clarify plausible reasons why Australia-based think tanks mainly refer to their fellow think tanks and whether Canadian think tanks' more frequent references to government agencies translate to the government's robust role in driving violent crime agenda or whether some references to government inefficiencies. Second, the following types of violent crime are generally given higher priority by think tanks: physical violence (49 references), followed by domestic and family violence (35), and murder and homicide cases (33), while the remainder receives less attention. Canada-based think tanks generally exhibit divergent attention trends, i.e. murders and homicide (17) followed by physical violence (8), then gun (6) and youth violence (6). The only plausible explanation for this is a substantial involvement of government-affiliated institutions in violent crime discourse led by Australian think tanks, i.e. 40 out of 63 references to think tanks, as mentioned above. Indeed, as described below, the top two sub-issues emphasized by the Australian government are domestic violence (14) and physical violence (13). Furthermore, this correlates with the public's attention trends, i.e.

domestic violence (30 references) and physical violence (20). Australia-based academia, on the contrary, emphasizes rather different types of violent crime: alcohol-fueled violence (24), followed by drug-fueled violence (19), then physical violence and violence against women (15 each), and murder and homicide (14), as in Appendix 5d. Third and finally, the think tank community produces the total of 64 causes and 11 effects of violent crime. This is largely typical of experts, e.g. compared with Australian academia (69 and 7, accordingly, as in Appendix 5d).

Lastly, Australian government agencies, first of all, mainly refer to the following two actors in their discourse on violent crime: the public and NGOs (33 references) including aboriginal communities (10), and government agencies (26) including police (8), while other actors receive less attention, as in Appendix 4d. This is starkly different from Canadian context, where the government remains the most emphasized actor (23 government references), followed by the public (14), with the remaining actors receiving insignificant attention (Appendix 4c). While the Australian case suggests the public possibly setting its agenda on the government (or at least exerting certain influence), the Canadian case clearly shows the government's resilience against external pressure, e.g. coming from the public. Second, the following types of violent crime are emphasized: domestic and family violence (14 references), physical violence (13), and drug-fueled violence (12). This is somewhat different from Canadian context, in which the government mostly refers to physical violence (18 references), followed by youth violence (13), and murders and homicides (12). Finally, the Australian government produces the total

of 46 causes and 8 effects of violent crime, which largely resemble trends exhibited by non-experts, e.g. the public (41 and 5 accordingly, as in Appendix 3d).

5.2.3 The content analysis of the 'key actors' node

Media

Based on descriptive analyses, Australia-based media mainly refers to the government (119 media references) and the public (101 references) as key actors. These are further analyzed in terms of media (semantic) perceptions based on NVivo codes regarding violent crime.

Regarding media references to Australian government agencies, these can be divided into the following categories: positive assessment (55 references), negative assessment (47 references), then followed by neutral assessments (17 media references), as in Figure 61 below. The positive sentiments mainly refer to government agencies as sources of valuable data that spur further media and public debates (references 2, 3, 7, 17, 22, 37, 48, 57, 77) and as providers of valuable services, e.g. to help domestic violence victims (references 19, 31), new bylaws positively perceived by media (references 8, 14, 26, 56, 58, 106, 115), stricter measures adopted by police and government agencies with regard to street violence (references 21, 64, 107, 117), alcohol violence (references 27, 35, 44, 52, 57, 59, 68, 72, 76, 79, 80, 90, 96, 100) and domestic violence (references 4, 6, 9-14, 16, 25, 28, 30, 32, 50, 66, 70, 99, 105, 114), though a number of negative accounts serve as a vivid reminder that the domestic and family violence issue persistently remains debated (i.e. Reference 4 points to the public's limited understanding on the complexity of the issue; Reference 17 points to media frustration about

increased domestic violence in Victoria as "the state's most shameful social problem" and Reference 37 on increased domestic violence in rural New South Wales; Reference 18 points to continuing debates among opposition and NGOs, with a commonly agreed factor being alcohol as a driver of domestic violence; Reference 20 calls for the need of better security for domestic violence victims as they often face re-victimization back home; Reference 40 points to NSW government measures to impose GPS tracking bracelets on perpetrators of violence but the parliament then rejects this idea due to unreliability and violation of personal freedom; it is thus unsurprising that increased domestic violence sparks calls for stricter sentencing, as in references 42 and 54; furthermore, Reference 69 points to widespread underreporting of domestic violence due to fear of retribution across Western Australia in 2010, and Reference 74 where Victoria police describes the domestic violence situation in 2011 as a "frightening" problem, although later in 2014 Victoria police saw "positive signs" since police had started to actively intervene with domestic violence orders that consequently led to increased reporting on the crime, as in Reference 24).

Figure 61 Media semantic assessment of government activities on violent crime in Australia



Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

Next, apart from domestic violence, the other negative sentiment references embrace the following issues: gun violence (i.e. Reference 1, where the 1996 gun ban[25] is viewed through negative terms as a number of violent crime types peaked in the post-ban period; Reference 55 where NSW Police Minister views gun violence as organized crime with perpetrators often immune from prosecution, hence the need to strengthen laws); mandatory sentencing (Reference 39, where NSW Labor opposition expresses negative views on mandatory sentencing referring to research by academia and NGOs on the issue, which is an interesting observation, as the below media references to the public should indicate the public frequently pushing the government agenda on stricter policy measures including tougher mandatory minimum sentencing; Reference 43 is closely related as the legal professionals also criticize mandatory sentencing policy proposed in NSW as it may not have an effect on lowering alcohol-fueled assaults; Reference 49 with the public urging the government to introduce stricter mandatory sentencing; Reference 54 where in 2013 the government responds to public pressure and introduces tougher sentencing measures to address the issue of domestic violence as weak sentences discouraged victims to report crime ; street violence (Reference 47 where the online public criticizes Sydney city government for ignoring the issue of violent assaults in the streets; Reference 65 where street violence is viewed to be

[25] The 1996 Port Arthur massacre with 35 people dead and 23 injured led to a series of government measures, primarily the National Firearms Agreement, aimed at banning the use of semi-automatic and fully automatic weapons across Australia (Wikipedia, 2018. Gun laws in Australia. Retrieved from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gun_laws_in_Australia#Port_Arthur_massacre)

caused by extended drinking hours; Reference 81 where Melbourne is depicted as a place of fear due to high levels of street and alcohol violence, while politicians often use the fear factor in attempts to manipulate the public perceptions). Finally, another important issue debated within media discourse is alcohol-fueled violence (e.g. in Reference 33 experts doubt the effectiveness of controversial forced alcohol rehab policy and on-the-spot alcohol ban policy, etc.), which primarily includes references to the suggested 3 a.m. lock-out policy targeted toward nightclubs, bars and hotels across some Australian states. Initially, it was the state of Queensland to witness a proposed policy to move operating hours of local nightclubs and hotels backwards from 5 a.m. to 3 a.m. under a parliamentary inquiry (Sandy 2010, Mar 17 as in Reference 87), while it is worth noting that the Australian parliament is largely driven by the public interest, as among its key functions are to provide an arena for popular representation and control the actions of the Australian government (Parliament of Australia 2018). Thus it is the public that appears to effectively set the government agenda via the Parliament in Queensland. Then, in 2014 New South Wales witnesses a distressed father, whose son had been physically assaulted, who pushes the NSW and federal government agenda on a 6-item plan to address alcohol-fueled violence, which includes the proposed measure of 1 a.m. lock-out and 3 a.m. closing time for licensed premises (Nicholls 2014, Jan 17, as in Reference 46). In response to the public call, NSW Premier O'Farrell expressed a commitment to developing a response to alcohol-fueled violence but excluded the possibility of considering the proposed closure of bars and nightclubs at 3 a.m. (ibid). Yet, a few days later the public agenda was effectively set on the

Sydney city government as local pubs and nightclubs would be affected with a new 3 a.m. closure policy, as well as strict mandatory sentencing against perpetrators of alcohol-fueled violence (Nicholls and Whitbourn 2014, Jan 22). The agenda-setting interactions are summarized in Figure 62 below.

Figure 62 Mediatized agenda-setting processes in Australian context on violent crime



Note: The public employs media (to a greater degree) and the parliament (to a lesser degree)as policy arenas to exert its agenda-setting influence on the government. The government, on the other hand, occasionally attempts to manipulate public perceptions by using the fear factor.

Source: The author's own analysis.

The comprehensive analysis of media references to the government as described above suggests a number of vital observations. First, the public effectively sets the policy agenda on the government by employing two key platforms, or policy arenas – media (to a larger degree) and the parliament. Though politicians may occasionally attempt to shape public perception on certain sensitive issues, e.g. street and alcohol violence (Reference 81), this observation remains rather idiosyncratic. The public sets the policy agendas specifically on tougher sentencing (such as in the context of domestic violence) and alcohol-fueled

violence policies. Furthermore, while quantitative analysis earlier suggests that the general public exhibits rather sporadic, unsystematic attention patterns to both diversification and violent crime issues, key observations from this section along with earlier descriptive analyses of NVivo nodes clearly demonstrate that a) it is specific subgroups that most actively push government agenda, i.e. distressed family members of victims of violent crime and NGOs, which possess institutionalized capacity to drive policy agendas; and b) the public appears to strongly prefer the media platform rather than (online) Google and the parliament platforms for effectively transmitting their agenda-setting signals to other key actors, mainly the government.

Secondly, due to a significant share of negative sentiments (47 out of 119 media references, or 39.5%, strikingly similar to Canadian context with 30 out of 74 media references, or 40.5%), the government is rather limited in its ability to effectively set the policy agenda, though it remains a key actor as a source of valuable data that often spark intense media and public debates and as an engine for relevant laws and legal amendments. Further similarly to the Canadian case, it is the public that appears to set the government agenda (at all levels – city, state and federal). However, while the Canadian case points to the presence of three drivers of the public, namely NGOs and activists, aboriginal communities, and public opinion, this analysis of media references to Australian government agencies falls short of pointing to specific elements of the public that drive agenda-setting processes. Thus, the next sub-section on media references to the public might reveal further details.

Regarding media references to the public as related to violent crime discourse in Australian context, similarly to the Canadian case, the public enjoys negligible negative semantic references (2 references out of 101 in total). The remainder of references can be divided into the following broad categories: *NGOs and activists* – 32 media references, *public opinion (and perceptions)* – 25, *communities* (other than aboriginals) – 18, *aboriginal communities* – 14, distantly followed by a *role model* – 4, and *the Ombudsman* – 1[26]. NGOs and (human rights) activists are mainly featured with regards to leading new projects and research related to protecting the rights of domestic violence victims (references 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 25, 26, 29, 53, 55, 59, 60), violence against women (references 19, 27, 28, 55, 72, 73, 100), alcohol abuses and street violence (references 4, 80, 95), a critique of mandatory sentencing (references 37, 87), ethnic violence (Reference 51), and workplace violence (Reference 56). Particularly, NGOs contribute to violent crime discourse in the following ways. First, it is a special type of NGOs, i.e. women's rights groups, that pioneered in setting the public agenda on family violence issues decades ago (Salter 2015, Aug 20, as in Reference 10); in a related case it is women's group Destroy the Joint that developed an alternative narrative with regard to domestic violence by referring to it as being a result of *societal misogyny*, while political opposition initially developed a more simplistic narrative as being a result of *entrenched disadvantage* and poverty (Alcorn 2015, Jun 8, as in Reference 17). It should be noted here that even earlier as of 2013, a media article

[26] Due to negligible numbers of references, the role model and ombudsman will not be included into detailed analysis. The role model is Rosie Batty, the 2015 Australian of the Year and campaigner on domestic violence issues (which have been extensively analyzed above).

(Meltzer 2013, Nov 24, as in Reference 49) developed the *misogyny*-based narrative with regard to pervasive violence against women. This is a vital observation: given the modern web-based interconnected world, it is a fair assumption that key actors learn from each other as relates to the same context, i.e. violent crime discourse in Australia. If so, it appears that media may act not only as a platform for the public to transmit its agenda-setting messages to other actors but occasionally acts as an independent actor that may shape agendas for other key actors, e.g. the public. This is further supported with other references, i.e. #22 where media ignores the child abuse 'epidemic', since NSW law bans publication of children's pictures and media tends to pick those issues that have 'a name and a face' to tell the story to the wider public; references 70 and 83 where increased violence among young girls is attributed to long exposure to violent TV content, while Reference 90 (referring to the Australian Medical Association Western Australia's council of general practice) attributes this to both the influence of TV and newspapers, and finally Reference 101 points to tabloid media that employs emotions and sensation to simplify its narrative into "tough on crime" and "soft on crime" categories.

Second, in response to the government's proposed introduction of a register of domestic violence offenders, it was first civil rights groups that disproved the validity of this policy by noting its deficiencies such as being rife for abuse due to its public availability and lack of reliable safety for the victims of crime, the idea which was picked up by Victoria police (whose major agenda is safety of victims) and further elaborated in a submission to the Royal Commission into Family Violence (Hall 2015, Jul 1, as in Reference 14). In a similar case, again Destroy the

Joint NGO (mentioned above) effectively disproves the government narrative with regard to violence against women: while the government attempted to promote "Going Home, Staying Home" policy to the masses, it only intensified the 'epidemic of women's violent deaths', while Destroy the Joint feminist group noted that increasingly women had been "stabbed, beaten, strangled or shot, at or near home, by closely related men and often after prolonged control by fear", thus effectively refuting the reasonability behind the government's proposed policy (Farrelly 2015, Apr 23, as in Reference 19). Furthermore, this misogyny narrative further translates into an NGO-driven organizational policy aimed at improving the awareness of male-dominated violence against women in the workplace, with 24 organizations already in the program by the end of 2014 (as in Reference 28).

The third manifestation of NGO-driven agenda-setting is observed with regard to disproving the soundness of government-promoted *mandatory sentencing* and *tough(-er) penalty* policy toward perpetrators of violent crimes. Reference 37 describes the NSW opposition (Labor and Greens) derail the state government's narrative of pushing anti-violence law based on mandatory sentencing as this policy does not seem effective, at least as suggested by criminology research and civil freedom NGOs. It is worth noting that the role of academia and research is also emphasized in references #76, where crime research shows overall declined rates of gun violence over the past 20 years despite growing public perceptions, #80 where researchers, doctors and counsellors point to alcohol as the primary drug-abuse problem in Australia, #82 where academia (Professor J. Toumbourou, chair in health psychology from Deakin University) emphasizes the importance of early

intervention to avoid widespread use of knives and other weapons by young people, and #93 similarly points to preventive programs and early-age intervention as means to change community culture. Thus, having disproved the effectiveness of mandatory sentencing policies, NGO-driven discourse develops an alternative approach based on early intervention and preventive programs focused on educating the youth as opposed to the forced incarceration mentality attributed to state governments (as in Reference 87). Furthermore, when comparing contexts of West Australia and Victoria, the latter's successful policy is driven by the greater involvement of NGOs in monitoring the rehab programs for young offenders (ibid).

Last, since the paid domestic violence leave provision was introduced in 2010 by Victoria's Surf Coast Shire, there had been around 700,000 Australia-based workers entitled to it by the end of 2012, with unions and NGOs further pushing the agenda on expanding the coverage under the new provision which increasingly attracts the interest from European and North American policymakers (Schneiders 2012, Oct 27, as in Reference 59). This is a revealing case: indeed, it is a provincial government (Surf Coast Shire) that pioneers the paid domestic violence leave initiative which is then further driven by labor unions and NGOs not only across the nation but the globe.

The next most important category of media references to the public is *public opinion and perceptions*. This category of the public discourse encompasses the following two key areas and policy sub-issues: alcohol and street violence (10 media references #33, 40, 43, 44, 46, 48, 89, 91, 92, 97), domestic, family violence and violence against women (8 references #24, 30, 35, 36, 38, 39, 49, 86).

Furthermore, two references point to the fear factor inherent in perceptions of violent crime, i.e. Reference 2 where recent criminalization surveys show around 25% adults feel unsafe to walk in the street at night (thus public perception) which is supported by actual data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics with violent crime growing at recreational facilities, shops and around business locations following a period stability since 2005; and Reference 63where, according to Family First MLC[27] Hood, the public does not feel safe despite official government stats data that suggest otherwise. The presence of the fear factor is important: as the earlier analysis suggests, politicians can potentially exploit the fear factor to their benefit in attempts to shape the public agenda and perceptions (see also Figure 63 below). Furthermore, another three references point to the role of media and its interactions with public opinion: Reference 3, where the murder of a French student in Brisbane, referred to as 'stranger' murder (the victim and the killer did not know each other) is found to be more 'attractive' to media driven by sensationalism than a domestic murder case (with victim and perpetrator familiar with one another); Reference 24 suggests that when discussion turns toward women's views, then media and the general public are quick to frame it as a "women's issue" implicitly related to a narrow niche. Reference 40 suggests an almost (or somewhat) equal agenda-setting role of both the public and media in setting NSW government agenda on the introduction of 3 a.m. closure policy with regard to pubs and nightclubs in an ongoing fight against alcohol-fueled violence. All these three media-related references point to the following. First, media occasionally acts as an

[27] Member of the Legislative Council

independent actor, though certainly less robust than the general public (see Figure 63 below for a comprehensive layout of key actors in the mediatized agenda-setting context on violent crime discourse). Secondly, media attention tends to focus mainly on highly sensational issues while leaving a bulk of less exciting issues aside (or paying less attention). Third, it is worth noting a correlation of attention both among public opinion (i.e. the general public) and media and among NGOs and media, while academia in some instances correlates with NGOs but not significantly with the general public. This can be explained by the institutionalized status of NGOs (that conduct their own research and regularly publish reports, thus referring to relevant academic sources when necessary) as opposed to the general public often with sporadic and unsystematic attention patterns.

Figure 63 Mediatized agenda-setting processes in Australia on violent crime: The comprehensive marketplace of narrative ideas



major elements – NGO pinion ities, ar

less extent aboriginal communities – form the agend f the pu

sending messages to, and setting the agenda of, mainly the government but also the Parliament (on tough sentencing) and organizations (violence against women in the workplace). Key politicians may occasionally attempt to shape the public perceptions playing on the fear factor (as shown in the lower diagram pasted from Figure 62).

Source: The author's own analysis.

Third, local communities (apart from aboriginal communities) tend to focus mainly on the following key sub-issues within violent crime discourse: street and alcohol-fueled violence (also included into this bandwagon are use of guns outdoors and a single case of forced abduction) – 8 references, #41, 42, 61, 65, 68, 76, 88, 94; and domestic violence and violence against women (7 references, #6, 12, 20, 23, 69, 75, 99), while Reference 1 analyzes the community-driven agenda-setting on the parliament with regard to tough sentence policy for perpetrators of violent crime sparked by an earlier series of violent deaths across NSW. Two other (closely interrelated) references that show an agenda-setting example are 41 and 42, where in response to intensified community pressure, the NSW government (under Brian O'Farrell premiership) introduces mandatory sentencing policy for alcohol and drug-fueled violent crimes with a range of 8-25 years in prison. Lastly, references 68, 69 and 99 point to the presence of two key actors in the violent crime discourse – the public (as local communities) and police. While references 68 and 99 emphasize the need to develop closer cooperation between police and the local communities (as two key actors) to more efficiently tackle violent crimes and anti-social behavior, Reference 69 points to a clash of narratives among police and a

Victoria-based Sudanese ethnic community: first, police claims this community features high in police crime statistics (with around 330 Sudanese immigrants accused of assault in 2009-2010), then the leader of the community responds the data came as a shock, since earlier police assured the community their youth had been less involved in committing assaults than other ethnic groups.

Finally, the major sub-issues of aboriginal community discourse include domestic violence and violence against women (and children) – 9 references, #8, 12, 31, 34, 52, 58, 78, 79, 98, and alcohol-fueled violence – 3 references, #32, 81, 91. In contrast to the local communities, the aboriginal community generally does not exhibit intense agenda-setting patterns. The only notable exception is Reference 67 where protests unfolded after two aboriginal youngsters were shot by police, and attempted to push the parliament to introduce tougher gun laws for law enforcement bodies. Other references suggest the passive stance of aboriginal communities in the context of violent crime discourse in Australia (e.g. Reference 12 where the spread of domestic and family violence in the Canberra area is believed to impact especially Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women, as acknowledged by the ACT government; Reference 32 describes a new policy of Temporary Beat Locations (TBLs), i.e. stationing police near liquor stores to contain alcohol-fueled violence but this turns out to cause severe restriction of local aboriginal communities with police being accused of unfair treatment, while Reference 78 refers to "the chronic violence in north Australian Aboriginal communities" with no sign of improvement anywhere in the next 25 years or so (Hall and Karvelas 2010, May 28). Thus, the aboriginal community appears to be the least (pro-)active

element in the public actor paradigm as related to the context of Australia-based violent crime discourse. The summary of relevant agenda-setting interactions is presented in Figure 63 above.

The Public

As the descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes suggests, the two key actors with the larger numbers of public references as applied to violent crime discourse in the Australian case are the public itself (with 27 references) and the government (25 references)[28]. Since the difference between the two in terms of numbers of references is negligible, further detailed content analysis of specific codes should be conducted to identify a degree of plausibility to set the policy agenda on violent crime in Australian context.

First, with regard to the public, the overall sentiment analysis suggests rather a positive and (potentially) strong role attributed to the public. To begin with, out of the total 27 references only two explicitly suggest a weaker role of the public, i.e. Reference 1 where the public is viewed as being preoccupied with lust for 'money and title', much less for benign abstract ideas such as democracy thus there is no use teaching good concepts at school when a young student's home environment appears to be so 'erratic' and violent; and in Reference 15 the public often exhibits almost a total lack of compassion for others even refusing to contact police for help. Apart from these two negative sentiment references, the overall tone appears quite positive with regard to the public driving (and setting) the policy

[28] Full transcripts are available by following this link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327551915_NVivo_transcripts_Key_Actors_-_the_Public

agenda on violent crime in Australian context. Among the remaining 25 references the following sub-issues are mainly analyzed: domestic violence and violence against women (though rather distinct, these two types of violence still often overlap) – references, #3-8, 10-14, 17, 18, 23-26; alcohol-fueled and street violence (again, these two types of violence often overlap in discourse) – references, #2, 9, 20-22, 27; and Reference 19 relates to a single murder case. As this brief overview suggests, the public's attention (as expressed via the public's lens) appears quite focused on a narrow set of sub-issues within violent crime discourse, i.e. domestic violence (and against women) and alcohol-fueled violence, as opposed to, for instance, gang and/or workplace violence, or drug-fueled violence that are also analyzed by media etc.

The positive role attributed to the public is evident through some of the following references. Reference 5 raises a critical question as to why the Australian federal government does not take heed of policy advice from Rosie Batty, Australian of the Year 2015 and a campaigner for domestic and family violence issues, and instead reduces the funding to fight domestic violence. This reference is important in two regards: first, the public pushes the policy agenda on domestic violence reminding all of the importance to maintain funds at an adequate level; and secondly, the (online) public shows support for the human rights campaigner, a role model that is (somewhat a less pronounced) part of the general public as the actor (that mainly consists of NGOs, public opinion, local communities, aboriginal communities, and to a less extent, the role model Rosie Batty and the ombudsman), as in the media section above. Reference 7 points to the importance of the public-

driven ‘national forum’ to develop new ideas and issues related to *domestic violence*, as opposed to media and political figures’ preoccupation with *terrorism* – the latter may have caused 100 Australian casualties over the last 50 years while domestic violence kills thousands lives every decade or so. Next, Reference 9 presents a clash of narratives offered by media versus the public over domestic violence, namely the public points to the media’s narrow focus on blaming men (via the misogyny thesis, also emphasized in references 23 as men brutalizing women with ‘overwhelming frequency’ and 18 as ‘male privilege’ and distorted masculinity) for causing trouble to ‘helpless women’, but instead the problem should be that both genders employ the abuse as a means to resolve their own issues. Furthermore, Reference 11 explicitly calls for men to initiate awareness campaigns via media sources as related to domestic violence. Another example of the public’s robust role in setting the policy agenda is in Reference 16, where it is actually suggested that while charity NGOs traditionally assist people in need, the government should do ‘some in depth work’ as it cannot simply ‘keep leaving it up to the charities’. Another important area where the public is seen to set its agenda is street violence. To this regard, Reference 20 suggests that while the NSW government has ignored the escalation of violence in Sydney streets and the follow-up (public) intense debate, its official (government) statistics suggest a third of reduction in the number of assaults lately in the Kings Cross area of Sydney, whereas the public points to police recorded data with only 4.25 per cent reduction in 12 months. This case suggests that while the public’s attention to violent crime broadly can be inconsistent and sporadic (as suggested earlier in Quantitative and

NVivo Descriptive analyses), nevertheless in specific circumstances of high local significance i.e. at the community level, the public can effectively mobilize to push their agenda on certain sensitive (sub-)issues, e.g. street violence in Sydney. References 24 and 26 further support this observation by pointing to the need for local communities to get involved and form a policy response to a recent escalation of street violence in Sydney, which attests to police being unable to prevent violence. Finally, Reference 25 is less critical of police, instead pointing to the need of strengthening cooperation among the public, police and other key government agencies (customs and border control) to prevent the spread of gun violence.

Second, with regard to the public's references to the government (25 references), these are divided into negative sentiment (15 public perception references), positive sentiments (9 references), and a single neutral reference, i.e. with mixed assessments (Figure 64).

Figure 64 Public perceptions of government activities related to violent crime discourse in Australian context



Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

In terms of specific sub-issues analyzed in the public discourse, these include domestic violence and against women (10 public perception references), street and alcohol-fueled violence (8 references), gun violence (4), and ethnic

violence (3). It is interesting to note that not only negative sentiments prevail over the positive references as perceived by the public but specifically with regard to domestic violence and violence against women the references are predominantly negatively sentimental (9 out of 10 references). This suggests that the public largely perceives government policy measures aimed at reducing the spread of domestic, family violence and violence against women largely as failure. Another manifestation of perceived failure is with regard to ethnic violence, though it is vital to note a small N of references (3 references #19-21) thus caution should be taken in overgeneralizing this observation and drawing specific conclusions. Regarding street and alcohol-fueled violence, the public perceptions are mixed, with positive assessments prevailing overall. Reference 11 points to NSW government downplaying the significance of street violence in Sydney while the public pushes this issue on government agenda through 'urgent debate'; Reference 12 points to the government, along with political opposition and the hotel industry refer to the need to toughen laws on alcohol by 'talking in hypotheticals', while the public specifically pushes the need to restrict alcohol sales after 10 p.m. and access to liquor stores after 1 a.m. (the Newcastle model) and thus attempts to minimize violence described as unacceptable. On the other hand, the public appreciates the contribution of police forces to containing street violence with calls for further police involvement (references 13, 22-25). This particular sub-issue clearly demonstrates the public's overall positive sentiments toward Australian police agencies while exhibiting negative sentiments toward other government institutions in dealing with policy measures. Next, gun violence (both in the street and inside

premises) is generally perceived with positive sentiments (though the issue of small N remains as with regard to ethnic violence), with a single reference (#14) producing mixed assessments: following the gun buyback campaign in 1996-97 that lowered gun ownership from 3.2 to 2.2 million, this trend was reversed to its previous level and the nationwide homicide level was reduced only 8 years after the policy was introduced, thus it appears this reduction is not directly due to government policy (somewhat negative sentiment) but increased police forces (positive) that correlate over the period. In another account (#15) it is argued that gun buyback is generally successful, especially in preventing reoccurrence of events such as the 1996 Port Arthur massacre and tougher laws on automatic and military firearm ownership. Further, Reference 16 calls for cooperation among the community, police and customs and border control agencies to reduce gun violence, while Reference 17 presents an anecdotal account of the effective mobilization of security staff at the moment of a break-in at a Sydney-based self-storage facility and its cooperation with police that arrived at the scene minutes later to arrest the perpetrators and avoid casualties.

To summarize this part, the public largely perceives itself as largely a robust actor that can and should drive the policy agenda and discourse on violent crime in Australian context. With regard to the government, the public perception, though generally negative, appears to be highly sub-issue specific (see Table 14 below), and further exhibiting somewhat positive sentiments with regard to the role of police forces in containing the spread of violence.

Table 14 Public perception sentiments in Australian context by violent crime type

Types of violent crime	Domestic violence and violence against women	Ethnic violence	Street and alcohol violence	Gun violence
Public perception sentiments	(Predominantly) *negative*	*Negative* (with a small N)	*Mixed (somewhat positive)*	*Positive* (small N)

Source: The author's own analysis based on NVivo codes

The Government

The government discourse on Australian-based violent crime policy emphasizes two key actors, i.e. the public (33 references) and government institutions (26 references), as suggested by the descriptive analysis of NVivo nodes earlier, and as in Appendix 4d.

First, with regard to government references to the public (G-2-P), one way to classify these is with regard to the sub-issues analyzed within the umbrella of violent crime discourse. These include the following: violence against women and domestic violence (9 references, #4, 5, 7, 13, 19, 20, 24, 25, 29), drug-fueled violence (2 references, #1, 11), gang (street) violence (3 references, #15-17), alcohol-fueled violence (2 references, #18, 32), physical violence (2 references, #21, 23), while gun violence, child abuse and kidnapping receive negligible attention, i.e. with a single reference each). The second way of classification is through the elements that constitute the concept of the public. Here, the references are divided into the following types: aboriginal communities (10 references, #5, 10,

12, 14, 20-22, 24, 27, 33), local communities (apart from aboriginals) – 9 references, #2, 4, 7-9, 11, 13, 17, 23; the public in general (7 references, #6, 15, 18, 28, 29, 32 including empowerment of women, i.e. #3), public opinion (4 references, #21, 24-26), NGOs (3 references, #16, 19, 30), and the ombudsman (a single reference, #31). As this analysis suggests, three primary elements of the public – local and aboriginal communities, and the public in general – tend to drive the policy agenda on violent crime in Australian context. This is in sharp contrast with the Canadian case, where (at least from the G-2-G reference viewpoint) it is largely public opinion and perceptions that form the core of the public's engine to set the policy agenda on violent crime.

Next, in terms of agenda-setting interactions, first Reference 4 points to an interesting case. Here the community sends strong agenda-setting signals (i.e. calls to take policy measures) to the government with regard to violence against women and family violence issues, however the government then approves a budget without an increase in funds for the services required to address these issues. Though this is rather an idiosyncratic case, it demonstrates the Australian government occasionally resorts to exercising resilience, if not refusal, to accept policy propositions from the public at times of budget constraint. Closely related is Reference 7 where the community presses the government to take action with regard to family violence as it regards this of primary importance. Next, the public effectively sets the government policy agenda on kidnapping and abduction, where initially high public awareness of the sub-issue led to media and police forming a partnership aimed at intensifying reporting on related offences, which then led to

an increase in recorded statistics, i.e. intensified policy action. In another case (as in # 30), an initial push for a government response by a youth NGO with regard to assaults was then effectively reflected in higher police recorded statistics on public assaults, i.e. by 27% from 2004/2005 to 2008/2009. Finally, Reference 29 points to another public campaign in early 2009 with regard to mandatory minimum sentencing for family violence, which was introduced later the same year with an accompanying increase in recorded statistics.

As the above analysis suggests, the public largely drives policy agendas on a range of sub-issues under the violent crime umbrella in Australian context, as perceived by the government with regard to the public (G-2-P references). The summary of agenda-setting interactions can be presented in Figure 65 below.

Figure 65 Government perceptions toward the public (G-2-P) on violent crime discourse in the Australian context



ved by the government with reg c (G-2-P), the public (especially with two key elements – local and aboriginal communities) acts as a robust actor that sets the policy agenda on violent crime. The public furthermore

employs media and police as platforms through which it also sends messages to the government (though to a lesser degree).

Source: The author's own analysis.

Second, regarding government references to itself, i.e. government institutions (26), related to violent crime context in Australia, theses should be classified in order to analyze relevant observations. One way to categorize the references is a range of specific sub-issues related to violent crime. These include the following: domestic and family violence (5 references, #17, 19, 22, 24, 25), physical and other gross violence (5 references, #15, 20, 21, 23, 26), gun and/or gang violence (4 references, #5, 7, 9, 16), and substance abuse e.g. alcohol and drugs (3 references, #6, 13, 18). It is worth noting certain commonality with the attention pattern of G-2-P references that predominantly focus on domestic violence, however treating physical violence as insignificant. One possible reason for this could be related to operationalization, i.e. it is easier to quantify and assess change in domestic and family violence incidents than an amorphous concept of physical abuse, including a range of crimes e.g. serious injury, kidnapping, torture etc. The other reason is the public's fear factor being driven by physical abuse incidents such as highly visible tortures and kidnappings rather than often behind-the-door and underreported domestic violence. The second way of categorizing the references is identifying the key elements of the public as a robust actor. These include the (local) community – 5 references, #2-4, 7, 16, then aboriginal communities (2 references, #12, 19), and to a lesser degree public perceptions and fears (Reference 22). It is worth noting that similarly to G-2-P, these G-2-G

references emphasize the local community as a key element of the public, however paying less attention to aboriginal communities. One possible explanation is that aboriginal communities tend to reside in remote areas often away large cities which make it more challenging to properly record the related crime and thus quantify change processes related to this crime.

Thus, in terms of agenda-setting interactions, it is largely the public (and especially local communities) that drive the policy agenda from the G-2-G viewpoint in Australian violent crime context. Furthermore, references 2-4, 7 specifically emphasize the need for government agencies to address the needs of local communities. Finally, the government responds to public agenda calls with regard to introducing mandatory minimum sentencing for various types of violent crime, as in references 5, 7, 9 (for gun violence), 18 (for drug and alcohol-fueled violence), 20 (gross violence, e.g. serious injuries), and 25 (domestic and family violence). Yet another key actor also referred to in this discourse is police (Reference 8 that points to police carrying out "an exceptional job"; Reference 10 where federal police is praised for the ability to conduct technical analysis and collect information; and in Reference 16 in response to gun violence epidemics, local police, with the assistance by the federal government, developed a safe streets program in partnership with the local community). The summary of agenda-setting interactions can be outlined in Figure 66 as presented below.

Figure 66 Government perceptions toward itself (G-2-G) on violent crime in



Note: The public (driven by local communities) sets the government agenda on violent crime and acts as a partner with local police departments, which are funded by the federal government.

Source: The author's own analysis

Academia

As in Appendix 5d, the total number of A-2-A references is 35. First, a way to classify these is by policy area applied, including substance abuse i.e. alcohol and drugs-fueled violence (10 references, #2, 3, 8, 13-15, 19, 24, 31, 35); then distantly followed by physical violence (4 references, #25, 29, 30, 34); youth violence (4 references, #4, 20, 26, 27); domestic violence and against women (3 references, #1, 12, 18); gun violence (2 references, #9, 17); sexual abuse (2 references 7, 22), homicide (Reference #21). It is worthy to note that while Canadian context of academia discourse mainly points to sexual abuse, the Australian case emphasizes the severity of alcohol and drug abuse sub-issues as part of violent crime policy.

Another way of grouping the references is with regard to key actors. Apart from academia as the key predominant actor, these include government agencies (11 references in total, i.e. #1 where it is suggested to frame intimate partner

violence and against women as crime against humanity and state crime thus should be put into international law in the context of public and institutional policy, #2 with a reference to a corrections policy document, #9 analyzing the government's gun buyback policy, #10 on military conscription lottery policy, #26 on the positive effect of restorative justice on lowering youth violence, #27 with government-led diversionary conferences lowering youth violence, and #8, 19 pointing to statistics agencies as sources of data and classification of types of violent crimes; furthermore negative sentiments include #12 with the government systemically trivializing and ignoring intimate partner violence and against women sub-issues, #15 where Western Australia correction system releases prisoners with a higher mortality rate due to drug use, #17 where despite stringent restrictions, the number of legal firearms have grown); and the public (4 references, i.e. #6 with compulsory community treatment reducing violent victimization, #16 where specific locations of communities correlate with prevalence of violent crime and negative sentiments – 2 references, i.e. #5 where community-driven collective efficacy and social ties fail to materialize in reducing violent victimization in Brisbane, and #33 where public perception, or self-reported counts of aggression can be inaccurate in measuring an extent of video gaming effects on physical aggression). To summarize, academia views itself as the most predominant actor that drives the policy agenda on violent crime in Australian context, while government agencies act as a moderate actor (11 references including 3 with negative sentiments), and the public is viewed to be rather passive and under-emphasized (4 references,

including 2 with negative sentiments). Schematically, agenda-setting links can be presented in Figure 67.

Figure 67 Key actors within academia (A-2-A) discourse on violent crime in Australian context



Note: Australian academia perceives itself as the robust actor that drives the policy discourse for government agencies and the public on violent crime. Government agencies act as a moderate actor that drives the discourse to a lesser degree, and furthermore, the public appears to act as an under-emphasized player on the violent crime policy arena.

Source: The author's own analysis.

Next, the 33 academia references to the public (A-2-P), first, can be similarly classified in terms of policy areas analyzed. These predominantly include domestic violence and violence against women (5 references, #2, 17, 18, 23, 29), alcohol and drugs-fueled violence (4 references, #4, 10, 11, 15), and youth violence (4 references, i.e. #1, 6, 7, 25), while other sub-issues such as sexual abuse (2 references, #22, 30), physical violence (#13), gun violence (#14), and murder and homicide (#20) receive negligible public attention as perceived by academia in A-2-P discourse. This is an interesting observation: while academic discourse (A-2-A) tends to largely focus on a single sub-issue within violent crime policy, i.e.

substance abuse (alcohol and drugs), the public's attention span covers a broader range, as analyzed above. This further supports a tentative observation with regard to Canadian-based academia as the Ivory Tower.

Another way to group the references is with regard to the key actors emphasized in A-2-P discourse on violent crime policy in Australian context. Apart from academia that predominantly drives the policy agenda, another key actor appears to be the public (15 references with positive sentiments, i.e. #4 where NGOs are praised for their proactive involvement in tackling alcohol abuse, #5 where NGOs partner with a local government in lowering violent crime around a Sydney neighborhood, #8 and 9 where social control based on collective efficacy is viewed as a strong factor in reducing violence, #10-12 where the local community and government partnership is viewed as a strong factor in effectively reducing alcohol-fueled violence, #14 with community-based interventions being most effective in addressing gun violence as opposed to government policies, #16 where the public partnering with government promotes the notion of restorative justice that eventually is found to be an effective approach in addition to procedural justice practices, #17 with the public pushing the government agenda on introducing aggravated sentencing for high-profile violence against women cases, #25 with a local community pushing the public agenda on framing Sudanese ethnic violence as an issue not only of concern to refugees but also to wider society, #26 and 27 where the public moral outrage is viewed as a strong independent factor that explains the severity of punishments in the context of retributive justice, and including the public and media as partner actors, i.e. #1, 3), while the role of

aboriginal communities seems rather passive (e.g. references 13, 15, 22 etc. that only raise the overall importance of addressing violence within aboriginal communities without any specific initiative on their part, and Reference 32 points to the possibility of inaccurate public perception as in the case of NSW courts whose sentencing verdicts have actually become tougher over time as opposed to public opinion.

On the other hand, government agencies in overall act as a moderate actor (6 references with positive sentiments versus 3 containing negative sentiments). The positive sentiment references include #7 with sound government programs to address gun violence, #19 with police refining their efforts to contain violent crime by using TASER, #24 with the Australian government being commended for its better social wellbeing policy vis-à-vis the US that reduces outright deprivation and poverty as major preconditions for violent crime, and #1, 6, 28 as sources of data, while negative sentiments are reflected in #2 where government bodies are criticized for creating and maintaining institutional conditions that disempower women and thus ignoring the issue of intimate partner violence in their discourse, #14 where government policies are found ineffective in addressing gun violence, and #23 where the government criminal justice system is criticized for taking lenient measures in cases of indigenous domestic violence). Finally, a somewhat moderate role is attributed to media: apart from above-mentioned references 1 and 3 where media is viewed as a partner with the public in addressing violence, media is found to drive moral panic in its portrayal of high-profile rape (i.e. violence against women) scandals as gender issues as in references 29, 30.

To summarize this part, academia predominantly drives the policy agenda on violent crime, while the public acts as the second key actor often pushing its own agendas whether in partnership with other actors (government and media) or on its own. The summary of agenda-setting interactions in the context of violent crime discourse in Australia as reflected in academia-to-public (A-2-P) references is presented in Figure 68 below.

Figure 68 Key actors within academia-to-public (A-2-P) discourse on violent crime in Australia



Note: Academia-to-public references suggest the presence of two key actors – predominantly academia and then the public (to a lesser degree, with NGOs and local communities and neighborhoods being its key elements) that set the government policy agenda on violent crime. Academia also partners with government and the public. Furthermore, government agencies not only act as a moderate actor but also partners with the public (along with media) as perceived by academic research.

Source: The author's own analysis.

Think tanks

As in Appendix 6d, the two actors to which the Australia-based think tank community most frequently refers to in their violent crime discourse are their local counterparts (TT-2-TT references, 63 in total), followed by the public (TT-2P references, 52 in total). First, the semantic content analysis of TT-2-TT references is conducted. To begin with, it is important to classify these references in terms of the following think tank categories:

- think tanks setting or shaping the government agenda on violent crime (7 references, i.e. #6 where the government-affiliated Australian Institute of Criminology [AIC] is presented as a vital think tank institution that conducts relevant research to inform policy debates mainly related to substance abuse, child sexual abuse, and family violence and similarly #52 with AIC setting government agenda on substance abuse, domestic violence in vulnerable communities with a focus on youth and aboriginal communities, #33 where a new AIC report in human trafficking with the aim to improve the existing knowledge on help-seeking strategies for victims is viewed as a vital source to assist both government and communities in responding to this crime, #46 where a Labor party-affiliated Evatt Foundation critically reassesses government prison policy with regard to psychological intervention and cognitive therapy of prisoners, #48 and 55 where AIC pushes government agenda on aboriginal overrepresentation in Australian prisons, #58 where AIC effectively sets the government agenda on physical assault that has been debated for long time); on the other hand, think tanks are also engaged in partnerships with other actors though to a lesser degree, i.e. government (as in references 7, 53) and academia (as in #7, 30, 53); finally, think tanks' discourse is

often somewhat shaped by data provided mainly by police, as in references 11, 12, 31, 44, 60);

- think tanks as strong actors that shape public perceptions on violent crime (9 references, i.e. #1, 3, 28, 29, 33, 34, 36, 50, and 59 where think tanks seek to clear the public misperceptions on violent crime, thus in a way setting the public agenda in a manner perceived to be right by think tanks, including the intermediary use of media as in #50); and

- think tanks as sources of valuable data and research (nearly all references include relevant statistics employed to establish links between violent crime and other phenomena, such as mental health issues, alcohol consumption etc.).

It is vital to note the following key distinction vis-à-vis the think tank discourse in the Canadian setting, i.e. that the Australian case exhibits greater robustness of think tanks that act not only as a platform through which other key actors send their agenda-setting messages to government agencies (detailed analysis below) but themselves appear as independent actors motivated and empowered to drive the policy agenda as related to violent crime. As described above, it is predominantly the (government-affiliated) AIC that often sets the policy agenda on government agencies and the public. Given its somewhat higher premium institutionalized status, that is affiliated with the Australian Ministry of Home Affairs (AIC 2018), it is empowered to demonstrate robustness in policy agenda-setting through its established status as the nation's major research center focusing on criminal justice policy, "compiling trend data and disseminating research and policy advice" (ibid). Together with the other three related institutions

(BOCSAR – the NSW government-affiliated Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 8 references, the Labor Party-based Evatt Foundation with a single reference, and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, one reference), the Australia-based government-affiliated think tanks and research centers feature prominently in 50 references (including 40 related to AIC), while the remaining references include academia-affiliated university-based research centers (11 references) and other, uncategorized think tanks (2 references), as in Figure 69 below.

Figure 69 Australia-based think tanks and research units, by institutionalized status (affiliation)



Source: The author's own analysis

Another useful way to classify the references is by policy areas analyzed. These include physical violence (e.g. burglary, assaults, robbery) – 20 references, i.e. #2, 3, 5, 10-12, 15, 20, 36, 44, 48, 49, 51, 52, 56-59, 62, 63; family, domestic violence and sexual abuse (both against women and children) – 17 references, i.e. #6, 8, 10, 12-14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 27, 45, 47, 52, 54, 55, 57; substance abuse (i.e. alcohol- and drugs-fueled violence) – 16 references, i.e. #3-6, 9, 11, 15, 18, 24, 28, 35-37, 49, 51, 52; murder and homicide (10 references, i.e. #10, 12-14, 34, 49, 51-53, 59); weapons (guns, knives) – 5 references, i.e. #5, 31, 38, 39, 44; while the

remainder receives negligible attention, i.e. prison violence (2 references, i.e. #23, 46), and human trafficking (#33). Similarly to the Canadian case, the Australian context suggests the think tank community focuses on a wider range of policy areas as analyzed above, as compared to academia which predominantly looks into substance abuse, i.e. alcohol- and drugs-fueled violence research.

Last, apart from the think tank community, the other key actors involved include the public – 8 references in total, including 3 references that point to robustness of the public in setting government agenda on violent crime (i.e. #1 and 59, where it is suggested that public perceptions toward crime victimization and violent crime generally remain high on government agenda, and #54 where it suggests that the society-driven notion of restorative justice is increasingly applied to crime cases of gendered violence, e.g. sexual assault and rape etc.), and 5 references on driving think tank agenda through public opinion and perception surveys i.e. #3, 20, 24, 52, 57; and 3 references that emphasize public misperceptions toward violent crime to which think tanks contribute by providing evidence-based policy recommendations, i.e. # 1, 15, 34); and the industry – Reference 37, where the digital technology industry, via media, effectively pushed a policy at the local state government level to introduce the use of ID scanners in Geelong (Victoria) as a measure to contain alcohol violence near liquor stores and nightclubs. The summary of key actors interacting in agenda-setting processes can be presented in Figure 70.

Figure 70 Key actors within TT-2-TT discourse related to violent crime in Australian context





Note: As perceived by think tanks, this actor itself appears to drive the violent crime policy both onto the government and the public (i.e. by shaping and/or correcting its perceptions), occasionally via media. Furthermore, think tanks can also engage in partnership relations with academia and government. Yet, another key actor that also sets government agenda is the public.

Source: The author's own analysis

Next, with regards to think tank references to the public (TT-2-P, 52 in total), these can be, first classified in terms of semantics, i.e. positive versus negative references to the role of the public in leading violent crime discourse in Australian context. The analysis suggests that all negative sentiment references (8 in total) relate to the public's misperception toward violent crime levels (3 references, #6, 34, 40) and the public's susceptibility to media manipulation that can exploit the fear factor stirring the moral panic (5 references #17-19, 22, 30). On

the other hand, however, the public remains to be a robust actor that drives the government policy agenda on violent crime (9 references, i.e. #1 where the public's concern with regard to crime victimization is a significant factor that government decision makers take into account when forming their agenda, #8 where aboriginal communities express their willingness to develop initiatives aimed atsafety improvement in their locales, #12 which suggests that feminist NGOs historically have set the government agenda on family violence, #20 where public awareness campaigns led to increased rates of violent crime reported to police, #25 where public opinion informs government official statistics, while victimization surveys inform police reported crime, #35 where alcohol-fueled violence among the youth translates from a community concern to all-level government agenda, #38 where community corrections appears to be a more efficient approach to dealing with violent recidivism than prison rehab, #49 where public perception toward violent crime is viewed to be an important factor that needs to be considered along with police statistics, and #50 where [NGO-led] public awareness campaigns lead to higher reporting to police on physical violence and sexual assaults; yet occasionally government policy has an effect on local citizens, i.e. #27 where Western Australia Government's proposed 'stop and search' legislation is viewed with negative terms with likely repercussions on citizens' interactions with local police).

Second, apart from the government, the public also shapes the policy and research agenda for think tanks (9 references, i.e. #2, 7, 21 where public opinion and local community perceptions inform think tank research findings and similarly #14 where youth's perceptions on youth violence have an impact on a think tank's

discourse, #3 where vulnerable communities are the focus of AIC research which in turn shapes government policy, specifically for the Intergovernmental Committee on Drugs, #9 where aboriginal initiatives related to alcohol-fueled violence inform think tank discourse, #28 where it is local communities, families and NGOs that effectively help victims of human trafficking break this exploitation and similarly #47 where community, family, individual characteristics, along with historical events, are viewed as determinants of violence in aboriginal communities, and #48 where individual, community and family functionality are presented as predictors of physical violence in aboriginal communities). Finally, the public is engaged in partnership with police and government agencies (as in references 16, 23), and so is the think tank community, to a lesser extent (i.e. Reference 12, where a think tank develops a collaborative project with Victoria police on youth violence).

In essence, the analysis of think tank references to the public (TT-2-P) suggests that apart from the think tank community, the public appears as another key actor that often drives the policy agenda on violent crime in Australian context, both in relation to government agencies and to the think tank community. Furthermore, it is the public that appears to set the government agenda to a greater extent than think tanks, as related to TT-2-P references, while think tanks serve as a platform through which the public transmits its messages. With regard to shaping public perceptions, it is media (to a greater degree, 5 references as mentioned above) and think tanks (to less extent, 3 references) that are found to have impact (Figure 71).

Figure 71 Key actors within TT-2-P violent crime discourse in Australian context



Note: With regard to TT-2-P reference discourse, the public is largely shaped by media through the fear factor and moral panic and, to a lesser extent, by think tanks. The public (to a greater extent) and think tanks (to a lesser extent) set the government policy agenda on violent crime. Furthermore, think tanks occasionally engage in partnership with police, while the public does so with police and government.

Source: The author's own analysis

5.3 The Summary: Violent crime across Canada and Australia

The major purpose of the quantitative analysis is to observe and contrast attention trends among the key actors over the time span of 2008-2015 with regard to violent

crime issues as applied to two country cases. The analysis leads to a number of observations. First, regarding violent crime in Canadian context, the actors demonstrate less coherence in terms of trends vis-à-vis economic diversification. The government (Fig. 42) exhibits steady, recurring cycles which may suggest government's resilience against external pressure both to events and other actors thus able to pursue its own agenda but unlikely to drive the policy agenda on other key actors, while the public does not appear to show clear patterns (Fig. 44), though exhibiting somewhat increased attention toward the end of the period, i.e. 2015 both in terms of the number of articles and reader comments. The other non-expert, media (as in Fig. 43), following a steady downward trend shows a distinct peak around 2012, possibly sensation-driven due to 2 mass shooting events, then returning to the pre-shock state by 2013 followed by steadily growing trends to 2015. It is worth noting here that the public does not appear to react to media's heightened attention immediately but only toward 2015, thus not likely due to media effect since media actually exhibits lower attention trends since 2012. Finally, among the experts, academia only shows a somewhat increased trend by 2014 thus resembling non-experts, while the think tank community exhibits two distinct recurring attention cycles, first in 2010 and then 2014-2015, thus more likely to drive the policy agenda on violent crime discourse. The Australian case shows different, more coherent, patterns. To begin with, the three non-experts, i.e. government agencies, media and the public, as well as one of the experts, academia, largely exhibit increased attention trends towards the end of the period, i.e. 2014 (media, the public), 2015 (government), and 2013 (academia), though government

trends show a slight uptick in the earlier period, around 2010 (Fig. 56-59). Finally, think tanks exhibit two distinct spikes in 2010 and 2012, thus pointing to a correlation with government trends over the year 2010. This is one interesting observation that should be further investigated at the content analysis stage. Another observation is a possible correlation between think tanks, media and the Australian government in 2014-2015 (as in Figures 56, 57, 60).The most prominent theme within the 2015 attention spike of the government is family and domestic violence. Similarly, out the total 55 media articles that came out in 2015, domestic or family violence is a major theme in 46 articles, while think tanks relate to domestic violence in 8 out of 22 publications in 2015.The third observation is that although economy generally is the most important issue according to public opinion polls in 2015 in Canada (CBC News 2015) and Australia (Roy Morgan Research, 2015), Australian context shows that violent crime as a sub-issue of general crime is of greater concern to all actors vis-à-vis economic diversification, as a sub-issue within the economy umbrella. Thus, quantitative analysis tentatively points to the prevalence of think tanks in driving violent crime agenda across both countries, less plausibly in Australian context. This may seem counterintuitive given the issue's high position in opinion polls and as in the above analysis. Two possible factors can explain this. First, there might be an omitted variable issue, i.e. an unobserved key actor that may manifest more prominently, as perceived by other actors at the stage of more detailed content analysis. Second, the public might play a more robust role than what is suggested by this 'litmus test' quantitative analysis, as the public may not necessarily express its sentiments and policy stances through the online

platform but via public polls conducted by government institutions and think tanks, via public perceptions assessed by academia, via NGOs etc.

Next, the analysis of NVivo nodes related to violent crime leads to certain observations. First, regarding causes and effects of violent crime (see Table 15 below), similarly to the issue of economic diversification, both countries demonstrate an overall division among actors as related to attention intensity. Of particular relevance is an interesting similarity (in terms of lower attention trends) among the public and government institutions across both countries. A striking exception to the division of attention intensity among key actors is the think tank community: while exhibiting somewhat higher attention intensity (64, 11) in the Australian case, which is typical of experts, it demonstrates rather lower intensity in the Canadian example (16 and 2, accordingly). This actor, therefore, does not appear to set its agenda on violent crime, at least with regard to the cause and effect node in Canadian context. On the contrary, it is largely media and academia that can effectively compete for setting the agenda as related to the cause and effect node in the Canadian case, as well as possibly another hidden actor that might be identified in the process of content analysis. The Australian case presents a different picture: here it is media that seems to exhibit strongest interest in the issue, while academia and think tanks remain other key actors. Thus these actors should be further analyzed and contrasted in detail.

Table 15 Causes and effects on violent crime across Canada and Australia

Canada			**Australia**		
	Causes	Effects		Causes	Effects

Media	67	7	Media	114	8
The Public	20	0	The Public	41	5
The Government	10	4	The Government	46	8
Academia	63	7	Academia	69	7
Think tanks	16	2	Think tanks	64	11

Source: The author's own analytics based on NVivo-generated nodes

The second node employed is related to key actors. As Table 16 below suggests, Canadian and Australian cases present a number of interesting observations. Unlike the analysis of economic diversification, in which almost all actors refer to the government across both nations, violent crime points to the prominence of the public and government agencies. Media (both in Canadian and Australian examples) refers mostly to the government, followed by the public. Furthermore, the government is emphasized by Canadian government agencies and Canadian think tanks. The Australian case presents different key actors: while media refers to government institutions more than to other actors, it also emphasizes the public as the next key actor. Furthermore, the public is mostly referred to by the (online) public, and the government, while think tanks and academia refer to the public as the second key actor. Lastly, another interesting divergence between the two country cases is a stronger role of media in Australian context vis-à-vis the Canadian case, emphasized by media institutions and academia. It is worth noting that media's presence as an actor in Australian context is also observed for economic diversification. In other words, the nature of policy issues does not seem

to cause substantial variation in media's presence, as emphasized by other actors, in the context of agenda-setting interactions in the Australian case, even despite media's increased interest to violent crime vis-à-vis diversification, as measured by the number of developed causes and effects. However, the nature of policy issues appears to influence the agenda-setting interactions among the public and government: indeed, while the government is much emphasized in relation to economic diversification policy across both nations, violent crime analysis suggests an increased emphasis of the public. This tentative observation should be further confirmed or disproved by the content analysis of the 'key actors' node below. Finally, similarly to the diversification case, violent crime discourse points to a greater degree of resilience attributed to Canadian government agencies vis-à-vis the Australian government (with Canadian government making 23 references to its own agencies versus 7 to the public, while the Australian counterpart makes 33 references to the public and 26 to itself). This may indicate Australian government's greater receptiveness to public messages as compared with the Canadian case. The content analysis of specific codes related to the 'key actors' node should test this proposition.

Table 16 Key actors on violent crime across Canada and Australia

Canada		**Australia**	
	Key actors		Key actors

Media	Government (74), the public (69), academia (29)	Media	Government (119), the public (101), media (57), academia (54)
The Public	The public (21), government (16)	The Public	The pubic (27), government (25), media (19)
The Government	Government (23), the public (7)	The Government	The public (33), government (26)
Academia	Academia (55), the public (25), government (23)	Academia	Academia (35), the public (33), government (27), media (19)
Think tanks	Government (43), the public (24)	Think tanks	Think tanks (63), incl. government-affiliated (40); the public (52); the government (50)

Source: The author's own analytics based on NVivo-generated nodes

Lastly, the actors mainly focus on the following types of violent crime in their discourse (as in Table 17 below): in the Canadian case, media and the public's attention seems to correlate by mainly focusing on gun violence, while academia and think tanks' attention patterns correlate by focusing on murder and homicide, while government's attention is uncorrelated by focusing more on physical

violence; in Australian context, media, the public and government mainly focus on domestic violence, though physical violence also remains an important area, while think tanks mainly address physical violence (which is also high on government agenda), while academia seems rather alone focusing on alcohol violence cases. The Canadian case appears to support the notion of government resilience by pursuing its own agenda related to physical violence, while the Australian example supports the notion of academia as the 'Ivory tower'. Finally the Australian case points to a certain degree of correlation between government and think tank agendas with both domestic and physical violence being the focus of their attention. This is understandable – as the detailed content analysis of the 'Key actor' node shows, a significant part of Australian-based think tanks are government-affiliated.

Table 17 Types of violent crime across Canada and Australia

Canada		**Australia**	
	Types of violent crime		Types of violent crime
Media	Gun violence (60), murder and homicide (58), gang violence (34), youth violence (33)	Media	Domestic violence (109), alcohol-fueled violence (76), violence against women (56), youth (50) and physical violence (50)
The Public	Guns and firearms (11), violence against women (9), and murder and homicide (6)	The Public	Domestic violence (30), physical violence (20)
The Government	Physical violence (18), youth (13), murder and homicide	The Government	Domestic violence (14), physical violence (13), and

	(12), gun violence (9), and violence against women (9)		drug-fueled violence (12)
Academia	Youth violence (18), murder and homicide (15), violence against women (15), drug violence (14)	Academia	Alcohol violence (24), drug-fueled violence (19), physical violence (15), violence against women (15), and murder and homicide (14)
Think tanks	Murder and homicide (17), physical violence (8), youth (6) and gun violence (6)	Think tanks	Physical violence (49), domestic violence (35), and murder and homicide (33)

Source: The author's own analytics based on NVivo-generated nodes

Last comes the content analysis of codes related to the 'key actors' node on violent crime discourse. First, regarding the Canadian case, media largely perceives the public to drive the policy agenda (both for media-to-government and media-to-public references) though the government exhibits greater resilience against public pressure as compared to the case of economic diversification. Interestingly, in media references to the government, police is relatively referred to with positive sentiments, i.e. 20 out of 36 positive sentiments attributed to (public) government agencies. This entails an important policy implication, i.e. despite the government's use of resilience against public pressure it can effectively employ police as an agency to communicate with the public with regard to relevant data and research on violent crime. Next, the public also views itself as the leading actor in setting the agenda (with overall positive sentiments toward itself, i.e. public-to-public, including only 3 negative out of 21 references in total), while the public regards the

government with negative sentiments in 7 out of 16 references or 43%, though with a small N to be kept in consideration. One of the negative references points to government resilience against public pressure in the case of Harper government attempts to derail the parliament with regard to investigations into missed and murdered aboriginal women (p. 137). Compared to economic diversification policy, the public's negative sentiments toward the government appear to be less intense (70.1% for diversification). This suggests the Canadian government is motivated to keep the public generally satisfied with its violent crime policy as this issue appears socially sensitive, according to recent polls (as in CBC News 2015, Sep 10). Third, the government perceives the public to drive violent crime policy agenda while also cooperating with police as a source of recent data on crime (both in government-to-government and government-to-public references). Then academia (A-2-A) largely perceives itself to drive the agenda, followed by a moderate role attributed to the public (Fig. 53). Finally, the think tank community (with perceptions toward the government, TT-2-G) largely views the public to be a key driver of policy agenda though the government may occasionally resist public pressure (see Fig. 55), followed by think tanks (as an independent actor) and, to a less extent, academia that often disprove the inaccuracies in government statements and thus contribute to better understanding of policy processes by the public, e.g. with regard to Harper-led 'tough on crime' policy. Furthermore, think tank references to the public (TT-2-P) specifically point to the following driving elements of the public: active voters and citizens (9 references), public opinion (6), followed by NGOs (4), as in Table 11. The government, on the other hand, often

organizes public polls in attempts to measure perceptions to certain policy areas. The above analyses can be summarized in Table 18 below.

Table 18 The summary table of key actors for Canada-based violent crime

	Media	The public	The government	Academia	Think tanks
Key actors	M-2-G and M-2-P: the public sets the agenda (NGOs, aboriginal communities and public opinion)	P-2-P: the public; P-2-G: negative sentiments to the government relatively prevail*	G-2-G and G-2-P: the public drives policy agenda, while partnering with police	A-2-A: academia, followed by the public	TT-2-G: the public, then think tanks; TT-2-P: the public (active voters, opinion polls, NGOs)

*Note: *denotes a small N issue, i.e. fewer than 10 references*

Source: The author's own analysis

It is interesting to note that as compared to the case of economic diversification, the violent crime discourse emphasizes the government's use of resilience against external pressure to a greater degree: indeed, while it is only the public that perceives certain resilience on the part of government in the case of economic diversification (Fig. 17), the violent crime case points to a wider range of actors, i.e. media (Fig. 48), the public (p. 137), and think tanks (as in Fig. 55) that perceive government resilience against public pressure as clearly manifested. Canadian government's resort to resilience against external actor pressure appears

to correlate with a degree of social sensitivity of policy issues (as comparison of diversification and violent crime suggests). Thus further research might look into these phenomena in detail.

Second, the Australian context suggests that media, in reference to the government (i.e. M-2-G references), points to the public that largely drives the policy agenda, with the specific elements including distressed family members and NGOs, by employing media (to a greater degree) and the parliament (to a lesser degree) to effectively set the government agenda on sub-issues related to violent crime, e.g. alcohol violence and tougher sentencing. The government still remains a key actor, as a source of valuable data for public discourse and as engine for producing relevant laws and legal amendments as related to violent crime. Furthermore, M-2-P references emphasize the following key driving elements of the public: NGOs, followed by public opinion, and local communities (as in Table 19).

Table 19 The summary table of key actors for Australia-based violent crime

	Media	The public	The government	Academia	Think tanks
Key actors	M-2-G: the public; M-2-P: the public sets the agenda (NGOs, public opinion,	P-2-P: the public; P-2-G: negative sentiments to the	G-2-P and G-2-G: the public drives policy agenda (local, aboriginal communities and	A-2-A: academia; A-2-P: academia and the	TT-2-TT: think tanks set government and public agendas. It is then

	and communities)	government prevail	the public in general)	public as key actors.	followed by the public*; TT-2-P: the public, and media*.

*Note: *denotes a small N issue, i.e. fewer than 10 references*

Source: The author's own analysis

The public likewise largely views itself (in public-to-public references, i.e. P-2-P) as the key actor that drives the Australian government agenda on violent crime, while exhibiting largely negative sentiments toward government policy measures, though according to Table 14, their sentiments vary depending on a specific sub-area. The government (both G-2-P and G-2-G) largely views the public to be a key actor setting the policy agenda, with local, aboriginal communities, and the general public being the leading elements (Table 19). The public specifically sets the policy agenda on family violence and physical violence (assaults, kidnapping and abduction) from the viewpoint of G-2-P references and on introducing mandatory minimum sentencing for various types of violent crime from the viewpoint of G-2-G references. Next, academia views itself (A-2-A) as the most robust actor driving government policy agenda (Figure 67). Unlike the other key actors, academia appears focused on a narrow range of sub-issues within violent crime discourse, i.e. mainly on substance abuse (alcohol and drugs), similarly to Canadian context where academia is found to mainly focus on sexual abuse. This reinforces the thesis regarding academia as the 'Ivory tower'. The analysis of

academia references to the public (A-2-P) suggests that in addition to academia, another key actor appears to be the public. Furthermore, academia, the public and government agencies often engage in partnership relations to collectively address the evils of violent crime. Finally, think tanks largely perceive their local counterparts, mostly government-affiliated think tanks (in TT-2-TT references), to set the government agenda on violent crime and to shape public perceptions, followed by the public as the second key actor (Figure 70). It is worth noting that compared to the Canadian case Australian context demonstrates a greater role attributed to think tanks as an independent actor, not just a platform through which other actors send their agenda-setting messages to the government or the public. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the Australian government endeavors to adopt the partnership approach to more efficiently accommodating the agenda-setting playing field, in this case establishing links with the local think tank community mainly government-affiliated think tanks and research institutions such as the AIC, BOCSAR etc. (pp. 190, 191). Regarding think tank references to the public (i.e. TT-2-P), though the public remains to be perceived as the key actor that sets the government agenda on violent crime, certain criticism is raised regarding the public's vulnerability to misperception of violent crime levels and trends, as well as media manipulation (yet with a small N in consideration). Still, the public is perceived to set the policy agenda on governments and think tanks (as reflected in think tank references to the public, TT-2-P). Thus, by setting the policy agenda on think tanks and using the think tank community as a platform through which it transmits messages to the government, the public remains the most vital actor.

Chapter 6.Key Findings and Discussion

The thesis largely seeks to answer the following research questions as raised in Chapter 3 (section 3.2):

RQ 1: Who sets the agenda? It is largely the public that is found to set the policy agenda on violent crime both in Canadian and Australian cases. Regarding economic diversification, it is academia that appears to set the policy agenda in Canadian context, followed by the private sector, while the Australian case largely attributes the leading agenda-setting role to the private sector and industry. Thus Hypothesis 2 is found to be confirmed: indeed, the public unambiguously appears to set the policy agenda on violent crime in both Canadian and Australian settings. Hypothesis 1, on the other hand, is only partially supported: while Canadian context suggests the agenda-setting power of academia in the economic diversification case, the Australian country context points to an omitted variable issue, i.e. the role of the private sector.

RQ 2: Is the agenda-setting influence uni-, bi-, or multi-directional for each of the two issues over the period from 2008 to 2015? Generally agenda-setting influence is the mixture of all three types of relationships. First, regarding economic diversification, the Canadian case suggests that media and the public perceive agenda-setting interactions to be one-way, i.e. messages being transmitted by academia (to greater extent) and the private sector (lesser extent) onto the government agenda without any explicit feedback from the government. However, the remaining three actors – government, academia and think tanks – largely point to bi-directional agenda-setting interactions, i.e. Figure 18 where partnership links

are observed among the government on the one hand, and the private sector and the public, on the other hand, Figure 20 that points to a mixture of one-way and two-way links as perceived by academia, and Figure 23 with partnerships between the private sector and government, as perceived by think tanks. In Australian context, the reverse is found to be confirmed, i.e. two actors (media and government) point to bi-directional partnership links between the private sector and government, while three actors (the public, academia and think tanks) largely suggest one-way agenda-setting links from the private sector and government (all three) and between both academia and government, and the private sector and government one-way links (one actor, i.e. the government). Thus, regarding economic diversification, it is largely uni-directional (AUS) and bi-directional (CAN) agenda-setting links that appear more prominent.

Next, regarding violent crime, the Canadian case suggests the applicability of multi-directional agenda-setting links (perceived by government, academia and think tanks) versus uni-directional relationships driven by the public (as perceived by media and the public). Likewise, Australian context largely points to multi-directional links, i.e. as perceived by the government (Fig. 65), academia (fig. 67, 68), and think tanks (fig. 70, 71), while media and the public suggest the presence of one-way agenda-setting processes driven by the public. Thus, the violent crime case (in both countries) points to the prevalence of multi-directional links.

The findings of this thesis should be contrasted with findings of some of the existing research as described in the literature review of Ch. 2 (section 2.1). To begin with, this thesis supports observations of Neuman et al. (2014) and Copeland,

Hasell and Bimber (2016) that refer to agenda-setting processes as two-way and multi-directional links. Second, these findings not only generally support the importance of the public and academia as robust actors capable of setting (context-specific) policy agenda, but further specify the role of the public in driving the policy agenda on violent crime. Namely, the following major elements of the public have been found to be key drivers: public opinion (e.g. as also found by Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2013); local communities (e.g. as in Duan-Barnett et al. 2012,Dearingand Rogers 1996); NGOs (e.g. as in Murphy 2010); and to a lesser extent, active citizens and voters (e.g. Margetts et al. 2016, Wlezien and Soroka 2016, Bonafont and Palau 2011), as described in Canadian context on violent crime through think tanks perceptions toward the public (see Table 13). Yet, this thesis fails to support the robustness of netizens (e.g. Coopers 2006 as in Denham 2010), indeed the public does not appear to express strong preference for using Google search as an online platform for sending its messages and the numbers of reader comments collected for analysis suggest rather unsystematic and inactive attention to both issues. This might be due to netizens' tendency to react to and engage in specific events and stories (as Coopers 2006 finds) rather than giving attention to broader issues such as violent crime, though this thesis finds that the public's overall attention to violent crime remains greater than to economic diversification as this correlates with a degree of perceived social sensitivity.

Furthermore, this thesis seeks to refine some of agenda-setting theories. First, as the thesis finds, media's role generally appears to be rather inactive, i.e. largely serving as an intermediary platform for other key actors, e.g. the public in

the violent crime case and the private sector as related to economic diversification, to transmit their agenda-setting messages to other players, primarily government agencies. Interestingly, this validates some of the recent theories of agenda-building, where media is viewed as a passive actor whose agenda is shaped, or built, in the process of an "ongoing negotiation between media personnel and their sources of information" (as in Denham 2010, p. 311)[29]; similarly, Wanta and Kalyango 2007 find US media coverage being influenced by presidential emphasis of terrorism issues across African nations. This thesis finds that with regard to economic diversification the key source of information, as perceived by media, is academia in the Canadian case (see media perception in Table 10) and the private sector and industry (often in partnership with government) in Australian context (Table 11), while regarding violent crime it is the public in both country cases, including NGOs, communities and public opinion (tables 18, 19). Furthermore, it is vital to clearly differentiate between *agenda co-building*, i.e. as what appears to be the case in Denham 2010 and what this thesis finds with regard to the case of economic diversification policy where media jointly constructs stories with major sources from the private sector and government agencies (this is a plausible claim given the technical nature of the policy issue), and *pre-built*, or *pre-fabricated agenda-setting*, where there is little time for media to build the agenda for itself but whose agenda is rather set (or pre-built) often driven by a combination of a high-profile event (mass murder, gun shooting, rapid spread of disease etc.) and public

[29] Not to be confused with the notion of *intermedia agenda building* that Denham 2010 refers to as phenomena where media builds agenda for themselves (which might be valid but remains outside the scope of the thesis).

opinion and perceptions when press staff would only have a few hours to grasp the sentiments of reader comments to related events before writing their own story. Again, this thesis endorses support to the latter as related to violent crime discourse.

The second theory that requires re-assessment in light of thesis findings is the classical notion of political contestation based on the need to define the scope of conflict among key actors (Schattschneider 1960). Specifically, this thesis finds that while the notion of *conflict-driven contestation* among actors generally remains valid, the notion of partnership is increasingly emphasized across Canadian and Australian cases as applied to both violent crime and diversification policy discourse, more so in the Australian setting where it appears to have been adopted to a greater extent than in Canadian context. Thus, the emerging notion of a *partnership-driven agenda setting* process, whereby a key actor (the government in the case of this research) strategically attempts to set mutually reinforcing and dependent ties with another powerful actor, e.g. the private sector in the case of economic diversification policy in Australian context, is context specific and should become a fruitful area for further scholarly attention.

As a final note, the above described notion of *partnership agenda-setting* appears somewhat similar to the *advocacy coalition framework (ACF)* as developed by Sabatier (1988). Both rely on extended periods of analysis, i.e. Sabatier 1988 calls for the need to embrace a decade or more to fully observe a cycle in policy change, and the new notion of partnership agenda-setting is similarly based on 8-year time frame. Furthermore, both theoretical notions analyze a set of actors and their interactions in setting policy agendas with an explicit need to cooperate in

order to effectively achieve policy goals and to withstand the pressure from other actors or coalitions. Yet, there are key differences. First and foremost, Sabatier's (1988) ACF is not specifically grounded in agenda-setting but apart from its initial focus on problem perception and changes in elite and public opinion (elements attributable to agenda-setting), it then continues to emphasize the stages that follow in "…an iterative process of policy formulation, problematic implementation, and struggles over reformulation" (p. 130). The partnership-driven notion is specifically grounded in the agenda-setting stage, or agenda-building (Denham 2010) as contrasted to Schattschneider's notion of conflict-driven contestation in an actor-centric context. Second, Sabatier's framework is still based on the assumption of "intense conflict" (p. 133) that 'policy brokers' attempt to minimize in the context of conflicting tactics and strategies "from various coalitions" (idid). On the other hand, the notion of partnership agenda-setting assumes the near-monopoly position the 'partners' (or a single coalition) enjoy, e.g. attributed to the partner cooperation between Australia-based private sector and government agencies as applied to economic diversification policy (see Table 11 for a summary). This is in stark contrast to *government resilience* (observed more in Canada-based violent crime context than related to economic diversification and the Australian case), which is largely embedded both in Sabatier's (1988) ACF and more narrowly in Heclo's (1974) notion of 'iron triangles' (as in Sabatier 1988).

Chapter 7. Conclusion

The thesis, hopefully, leads to a number of relevant findings. First, it contributes to ongoing academic debates around the key question of who sets the agenda for various policy issues. Specifically, it generally supports the existing agenda-setting literature that the public remains an important actor, in this case related to violent crime policy, while academia is found to play a key role in Canadian economic diversification policy context and the private sector in the Australian case. However, contrary to much of traditional media agenda-setting research (e.g. McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Wood and Peake 1998) that emphasize media as a key actor to set public agendas, this thesis reinforces the notion of agenda-building theory (originally Cobb and Elder 1972, 1983; and Denham 2010), specifically as applied to diversification policy in Canadian context whereby media is involved in an ongoing process along with other more powerful sources to jointly build the agenda for other media outlets. Furthermore, media is found to be rather inactive with regard to pushing the policy agenda on violent crime discourse, instead serving as an intermediary platform for other key actors to transmit their messages to the government. Second, the thesis attempts to refine some of the existing agenda-setting theories, i.e. Schattschneider's (1960) notion of contestation, and Denham 2010 agenda-building framework, while also contrasting against Sabatier's (1988) ACF.

Next, it is important to point to certain limitations of the thesis. First, both Canada and Australia are energy-rich Anglo-Saxon democracies. Thus the findings from this research may not be immediately generalizable to the broader context that includes other Anglo-Saxon nations such as the US, UK and New Zealand, let alone

other western democracies, e.g. Continental Europe. Further studies should take a step further to test whether the key findings and observations of this research remain valid in the broader context of Anglo-Saxon democracies, specifically related to violent crime policy, or in the context of comparative analysis of other energy-rich nations, e.g. Norway, Brazil specifically with regard to economic diversification. Further yet, the energy-rich nations could be divided into developed democracies (e.g. Canada, Australia, Norway) and emerging economies (e.g. Brazil, Russia). Second, the thesis is limited to analyzing two issues, thus further scholarly attention may encompass a wider range of issues.

Certain limitations notwithstanding, the thesis suggests the tentative applicability of an emerging *partnership-driven agenda-setting framework* in Australian context. Since the thesis only focuses on two issues, further research should try to test the validity of the partnership framework in the context of actor-centric agenda-setting as applied to other issues across jurisdictions. Thus, while seeking to refine some of the actor-centric agenda-setting theories as analyzed above (Schattschneider 1960; Sabatier 1988; Denham 2010), the thesis further supports the validity of uni-, bi- and multi-directional links observed in agenda-setting interactions among various players, as increasingly employed in academic research (e.g. Neuman 2014).

All the above mentioned analysis points to a number of policy implications. First, knowing what actor actually sets the agenda for a specific policy issue allows government decision makers and the society to arrange a more efficient policy design. If academia plays a vital role in setting the agenda on diversification policy

in Canadian context, then the federal government should direct its budget, human and organizational resources to facilitate academia's interests through research grants and joint programs, as opposed to organizing additional media campaigns or public hearings (with NGOs involved). Since the public is found to drive policy agenda on violent crime across both nations, the government is better accommodate public interest by organizing various hearings, (mediatized) seminars and round tables with NGOs and active citizens, fund NGO-led projects aimed at providing shelters to victims of abuse etc. The second policy implication stems from the two opposing notions of *partnership-driven agenda-setting* (in the Australian case) and *government resilience* (in a Canadian setting). While the notion of *'who sets the agenda'* suggests what an ideal policy design should be in terms of accommodating the most vital actor's interest, the notions of *partnership agenda* and *government resilience* are important as these help identify the likelihood that this ideal policy design is indeed adopted. If a government demonstrates a pro-partnership stance (as is the case in Australian context), then this environment is more favorable to adopting this policy design whereby the government is likely to be interested in building strategic partnership with another powerful agenda setter. If, on the other hand, the government demonstrates resilience toward external pressure (the case of the Harper cabinet in Canada), then it becomes less plausible for this government to adopt the ideal design and instead continue to play the policy game in isolation.

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Appendices

Appendix 1 Agenda-setting publications related to Canada and Australia

#	Author, title of publication	Jurisdiction
1	Walsh, B., van der Plank, S., and Behrens, P. (2017). The Effect of Community Consultation on Perceptions of a Proposed Mine: A case study from southeast Australia. Resources Policy, 51, 163-171. doi:10.1016/j.resourpol.2016.12.006	Australia
2	Baker, P., Gill, T., Friel, S., Carey, G., and Kay, A. (2017). Generating Political Priority for Regulatory Interventions Targeting Obesity Prevention: An Australian case study. Social Science and Medicine, 177, 141-149. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.01.047	Australia
3	Whiteford, H., Meurk, C., Carstensen, G., Hall, W., Hill, P., and Head, B. (2016). How Did Youth Mental Health Make It Onto Australia's 2011 Federal Policy Agenda? SAGE Open 6(4). doi:10.1177/2158244016680855	Australia
4	Anker, T. B. (2016). Analysis of the Paternalistic Justification of an Agenda Setting Public Health Policy: The case of tobacco plain packaging. Public Health Ethics, 9(2), 208-228. doi:10.1093/phe/phw007	Australia
5	Wei, J., Wei, Y., Western, A., Skinner, D., and Lyle, C. (2015). Evolution of Newspaper Coverage of Water Issues in Australia during 1843–2011. Ambio, 44(4), 319-331. doi:10.1007/s13280-014-0571-2	Australia
6	Lankester, A. J., Bohensky, E., and Newlands, M. (2015). Media Representations of Risk: The reporting of dredge spoil disposal in the great barrier reef marine park at abbot point. Marine Policy, 60, 149-161. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2015.06.009	Australia
7	Shannon, B., and Smith, S. J. (2015). 'A Lot More to Learn than Where Babies Come from': Controversy, language and agenda setting in the framing of school-based	

	sexuality education curricula in Australia. Sex Education, 15(6), 641-654. doi:10.1080/14681811.2015.1055721	Australia
8	Schäfer, M. S., Ivanova, A., and Schmidt, A. (2014). What drives media attention for climate change? explaining issue attention in Australian, German and Indian print media from 1996 to 2010. International Communication Gazette, 76(2), 152-176. doi:10.1177/1748048513504169	Australia
9	Prokofieva, M. and Clark, C. (2014). The effect of press visibility on voluntary disclosure: cross-country evidence. Corporate Ownership and Control, 11(3), 72-82.VirtusInterpress	Australia
10	Sgrò, S. (2014). Health workforce policy and industrial relations in Australia: Ministerial insights into challenges and opportunities for reform. Australian Health Review: A Publication of the Australian Hospital Association, 38(4), 471. doi:10.1071/AH14027	Australia
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12	Dixon, H., Warne, C., Scully, M., Dobbinson, S., and Wakefield, M. (2014). Agenda-setting effects of sun-related news coverage on public attitudes and beliefs about tanning and skin cancer. Health Communication, 29(2), 173-181. doi:10.1080/10410236.2012.732027	Australia

13	Marsh, I. (2013). Setting the post war Australian policy agenda - causes and content: Setting the post war Australian policy agenda. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 72(4), 473-480. doi:10.1111/1467-8500.12046	Australia
14	Crowley, K. (2013). Irresistible force? Achieving carbon pricing in Australia. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 59(3), 368-381. doi:10.1111/ajph.12021	Australia
15	McKnight, D., and Hobbs, M. (2013). Public contest through the popular media: The mining industry's advertising war against the Australian labor government. Australian Journal of Political Science, 48(3), 307-319. doi:10.1080/10361146.2013.821101	Australia
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18	Crowley, K. (2013). Pricing Carbon: The politics of climate policy in Australia. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 4(6), 603-613. doi:10.1002/wcc.239	Australia
19	Johnston, J., and Clegg, S. (2012). Legitimate Sovereignty and Contested Authority in Public Management Organization and Disorganization: Barangaroo and the grand strategic vision for Sydney as a globalizing city. Journal of Change Management, 12(3), 279-299. doi:10.1080/14697017.2012.673071	Australia
20	Lodhia, S., and Martin, N. (2012). Stakeholder Responses to the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 25(1), 126. doi:10.1108/09513571211191770	Australia

21	Lewis, J. M. (2012). Influencing Public Policy on Oral Health. Community Dentistry and Oral Epidemiology, 40(5), 148-153. doi:10.1111/j.1600-0528.2012.00735.x	Australia
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23	Lancaster, K., Hughes, C. E., Spicer, B., Matthew-Simmons, F., and Dillon, P. (2011). Illicit Drugs and the Media: Models of media effects for use in drug policy research. Drug and Alcohol Review, 30(4), 397-402. doi:10.1111/j.1465-3362.2010.00239.x	Australia
24	Hinchcliff, R., Poulos, R., Ivers, R. Q., and Senserrick, T. (2011). Understanding Novice Driver Policy Agenda Setting. Public Health, 125(4), 217-221. doi:10.1016/j.puhe.2011.01.001	Australia
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26	Johnstone, M., and Kanitsaki, O. (2009). Population Ageing and the Politics of Demographic Alarmism: Implications for the nursing profession. Australian Journal of Advanced Nursing, the, 26(3), 86-92.	Australia
27	Battams, S., and Johnson, A. (2009). The Influence of Service Esers and NGOs on Housing for People with Psychiatric Disability. Health Sociology Review, 18(3), 321-334. doi:10.5172/hesr.2009.18.3.321	Australia
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31	Keskitalo, E. C. H., Pettersson, M., Laszlo Ambjörnsson, E., Davis, E. J., Social Sciences, Luleå University of Technology, . . . Department of Business Administration, Technology and Social Sciences. (2016). Agenda-setting and Framing of Policy Solutions for Forest Pests in Canada and Sweden: Avoiding beetle outbreaks? Forest Policy and Economics, 65	Canada
32	Hopkins, V. (2016). Institutions, Incentives, and Policy Entrepreneurship. Policy Studies Journal, 44(3), 332-348. doi:10.1111/psj.12132	Canada
33	Cumming J. M. (2016). Priority Setting Meets Multiple Streams: A match to be further examined? Comment on "Introducing new priority setting and resource allocation processes in a Canadian healthcare organization: a case study analysis informed by multiple streams theory." Int J Health Policy Manag. 5(8), 497–499. doi:10.15171/ijhpm.2016.58	Canada
34	Margulis, M. (2015). Forum-shopping for Global Food Security Governance? Canada's Approach at the G8 and UN committee for world food security. Accessed: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/366f/d344d40ac4c4140053a79fb6094a063ef254.pdf	Canada

35	Lee, J. K. (2015). Knowledge as a Measure of News Reception in the Agenda-setting Process. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 59(1), 22-40. doi:10.1080/08838151.2014.998225	Canada
36	Walker, J., and Rubenson, K. (2014). The Media Construction of an Adult Literacy Agenda in Canada. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 12(1), 143-163. doi:10.1080/14767724.2013.859002	Canada
37	Hoffbauer, A., and Ramos, H. (2014). Social and Political Convergence on Environmental Events: The roles of simplicity and visuality in the BP oil spill: Social and political convergence on environmental events. Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne De Sociologie, 51(3), 216-238. doi:10.1111/cars.12045	Canada
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40	Howlett, M. (2013). Predictable and Unpredictable Policy Windows: Institutional and exogenous correlates of Canadian federal agenda-setting. In: Canadian public policy: Selected studies in process and style. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.	Canada
41	Macnaughton, E., Nelson, G., and Goering, P. (2013). Bringing Politics and Evidence Together: Policy entrepreneurship and the conception of the at Home/Chez soi housing	Canada

	first initiative for addressing homelessness and mental illness in Canada. Social Science and Medicine (1982), 82, 100-107. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.01.033	
42	Ahchong, K., and Dodds, R. (2012). Anthropogenic Climate Change Coverage in two Canadian Newspapers, the Toronto Star and the Globe and Mail, from 1988 to 2007. Environmental Science and Policy, 15(1), 48-59. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2011.09.008	Canada
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44	Riboni, A., and Ruge-Murcia, F. J. (2010). Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, chairman dominance, or simple majority? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(1), 363-416. doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.1.363	Canada
45	Momani, B. (2010). Canada's IMF Executive Director. Canadian Public Administration, 53(2), 163-182. doi:10.1111/j.1754-7121.2010.00123.x	Canada
46	Kirchhoff, D., McCarthy, D., Crandall, D., McDowell, L., and Whitelaw, G. (2010). A Policy Window Opens: Strategic environmental assessment in York region, Ontario, Canada. Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy and Management, 12(3), 333-354. doi:10.1142/S1464333210003632	Canada
47	Howlett, M., Craft, J., and Zibrik, L. (2010). Government Communication and Democratic Governance: Electoral and policy-related information campaigns in Canada. Policy and Society, 29(1), 13-22. doi:10.1016/j.polsoc.2009.11.002	Canada
48	Sutcliffe, J. B., Soderlund, W. C., Hildebrandt, K., and Lee, M. F. (2009). The Reporting of International News in Canada: Continuity and change, 1988-2006.	Canada

	American Review of Canadian Studies, 39(2), 131-146. doi:10.1080/02722010902848185	
49	Rex, J., and Jackson, D. J. (2009). Window of Opportunity? Internet gambling in Canada. Canadian Public Policy / Analyse De Politiques, 35(1), 121-137. doi:10.3138/cpp.35.1.121	Canada
50	Young, R., and McCarthy, K. (2009). Why do Municipal Issues Rise on the Federal Policy Agenda in Canada? Canadian Public Administration, 52(3), 347-370. doi:10.1111/j.1754-7121.2009.00087.x	Canada
51	Contandriopoulos, D., and Bilodeau, H. (2009). The Political Use of Poll Results about Public Support for a Privatized Healthcare System in Canada. Health Policy, 90(1), 104-112. doi:10.1016/j.healthpol.2008.08.001	Canada
52	Bernstein, M., and Naples, N. A. (2015). Altared States: Legal structuring and relationship recognition in the United States, Canada, and Australia. American Sociological Review, 80(6), 1226-1249. doi:10.1177/0003122415613414	Australia, Canada
53	Watson, S. D. (2015). Impugning the Humanitarian Defence. International Migration, 53(2), 353-373. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2010.00657.x	Australia, Canada
54	Mazur, A. (2009). American Generation of Environmental Warnings: Avian influenza and global warming. Human Ecology Review, 16(1), 17-26.	Australia, Canada

Appendix 2 NVivo Content Analysis - Media

a) Diversification, Canada

Nodes

Name	Files	References
Cause & effect	0	0
Causes	1	8
Effects	1	4
Key actors	0	0
The Government	1	33
Media	1	6
The Public & NGOs	1	10
Aboriginal communities	1	1
Academia	1	19
Think tanks	1	6
Business & the private sector	1	13
Industries	0	0
Services	1	31
Transportation & logistics	1	10
Arts, culture, entertainment	1	7
Tourism	1	6
Primary resource extraction	1	40
Agriculture & aquaculture	1	13
Mining & other primary resource sectors	1	27
Advanced industries	1	39
Technologies	1	16
Processing & refinery	1	8
Green energy, renewables	1	10
Research & knowledge products	1	5
Other	1	17
Manufacturing	1	13
Construction	1	4
Types of diversification	0	0
Market diversification	1	11
Product diversification	1	1
Industrial diversification	1	9
Diversification within the energy	1	6

Appendix 2 b) Diversification, Australia

Nodes

Cause & effect	0	0
Causes	1	10
Effects	1	4
Key actors	0	0
The Government	1	19
The Public	1	4
Media	1	2
Academia	1	9
Business & the private sector	1	17
International organizations	1	3
Think tanks	1	4
Government-affiliated think tanks	1	1
Types of diversification	0	0
Market diversification	1	14
Product diversification	1	2
Industrial diversification	1	9
Diversifying within the mining & energy	1	6
Diversifying single-industry towns	1	2
Industries	0	0
Services	1	35
Tourism	1	18
Arts, culture & other creative industries	1	4
Primary resource extraction	1	57
Agriculture & aquaculture	1	24
Mining & other primary resource sector	1	33
Advanced industries	1	34
Technology	1	13
Green energy, renewables	1	11
Research & knowledge sectors	1	10
Other	1	41
Manufacturing	1	24
Construction	1	5
Defense and the military	1	12

Appendix 2 c) Violent crime, Canada

Nodes



Causes		1	67
Effects		1	7
Key actors		0	0
The Government		1	74
Police agencies		1	31
The Public & NGOs		1	69
Aboriginal communities		1	15
Media		1	22
Academia		1	29
Think tanks		1	6
Types of violent crime		0	0
Family & domestic violence		1	18
Alcohol-fueled violence		1	1
Drug-fueled violence		1	17
Gang violence		1	34
Murder & homicide		1	58
Violence against women		1	21
Violence at care facilities		1	10
Workplace violence		1	9
Guns & firearms		1	60
Physical violence		1	23
Ethnic violence		1	18
Violence against youth & child		1	33

Appendix 2 d) Violent crime, Australia

Nodes



Cause & effect	0	0
Causes	1	114
Effects	1	18
Key Actors	0	0
The Government	1	119
Police agencies	1	66
The Public & NGOs	1	101
Aboriginal communities	1	17
Media	1	57
Academia	1	54
Think tanks	1	34
Government-affiliated	1	26
The private sector	1	12
Types of violent crime	0	0
Alcohol-fueled violence	1	76
Drug-fueled violence	1	34
Gang violence	1	14
Guns & firearms	1	19
Murder & homicide	1	45
Violence against women	1	56
Youth & child violence	1	50
Physical violence	1	50
Domestic & family violence	1	109
Ethnic violence	1	14
Workplace violence	1	10

Appendix 3 NVivo Content Analysis - The Public

a) Diversification, Canada

Nodes



Cause and effect	0	0
Causes	1	6
Effects	1	3
Key actors	0	0
The Public	1	13
Aboriginal communities	1	1
Youth	1	1
The Government	1	24
Business and the private sector	1	6
Academia and scholars	1	7
Media and entertainment figures	1	2
Industries	0	0
Services	1	6
Tourism	1	1
Arts and culture, and other creative industries	1	2
Primary resource extraction	1	23
Mining and other primary resource industries	1	19
Agriculture and aquaculture	1	4
Advanced industries	1	15
Green energy, renewables	1	6
Technologies	1	6
Petroleum refinery	1	3
Other	1	5
Manufacturing	1	5
Types of diversification	0	0
Market diversification	1	11
Diversification within the energy sector	1	4
Industrial diversification	1	9

Appendix 3 b) Diversification, Australia

Nodes



Cause and effect	0	0
Causes	0	0
Effects	1	3
Key actors	0	0
The Government	1	7
The Public	1	6
Media	1	1
Academia	1	2
International organizations	1	2
Business and industrial groups	1	3
Industries	0	0
Primary resource extraction	1	7
Mining & other primary resources	1	7
Advanced industries	1	11
Tehnologies	1	2
Green energy	1	9
Other	1	2
Manufacturing	1	2
Types of diversification	0	0
Market diversification	0	0
Industry diversification	1	1
Diversification within the energy sector	1	3

Appendix 3 c) Violent crime, Canada

Nodes



Causes and effects	1	2
Causes	1	20
Effects	0	0
Key actors	0	0
The Public & NGOs	1	21
Aboriginal communities	1	5
The Government	1	16
Media	1	8
Academia	1	6
Business and industry groups	1	1
Types of violent crime	0	0
Violence against women	1	9
Domestic and family violence	1	3
Murder and homicide	1	6
Police brutality	1	2
Guns and firearms	1	11
Youth violence	1	3
Gang violence	1	4
Physical violence, assaults	1	1

Appendix 3 d) Violent crime, Australia

Nodes



Appendix 4 NVivo Content Analysis - The Government

a) Diversification, Canada

Nodes



Cause and effect	0	0
Causes	1	6
Effects	0	0
Key Actors	0	0
The Public and NGOs	1	7
Aboriginal communities and NGOs	1	3
Government	1	28
Business and the private sector	1	3
Academia and scholars	1	1
Industries	0	0
Services	1	13
Tourism	1	8
Entertainment	1	2
Primary resource extraction	1	18
Agriculture, aquaculture	1	8
Fishery	1	1
Mining and primary resource industries	1	10
Advanced industries	1	19
Alternative and green energy, and renewables	1	3
Knowledge and research	1	8
Technology	1	8
Other	1	8
Manufacturing	1	8
Types of diversification	0	0
Market diversification	1	10
Product diversification	1	5
Industrial diversification	1	5

Appendix 4 b) Diversification, Australia

Nodes

Cause and effect	0	0
Causes	1	12
Effects	1	4
Key Actors	0	0
Government	1	24
The Public & NGOs	1	7
Aboriginal communities	1	3
Business and the private sector	1	13
Academia and scholars	1	7
Media	1	1
Industries	0	0
Services	1	23
Transport & logistics	1	1
Tourism	1	8
Primary resource extraction	1	28
Mining and other primary resources	1	10
Agriculture and aquaculture	1	18
Fishery	1	3
Advanced industries	1	16
Technologies	1	8
Knowledge and research	1	6
Green energy, renewables	1	2
Other	0	0
Manufacturing	1	12
Types of diversification	0	0
Market diversification	1	16
Product diversification	1	7
Diversification within the energy sector	1	7
Industrial diversification	1	11
Diversifying single-industry towns	1	1

Appendix 4 c) Violent crime, Canada

Nodes



Name	Files	References
Cause and effect	0	0
Causes	1	10
Effects	1	4
Key actors	0	0
Government	1	23
Police agencies	1	7
The Public and NGOs	1	14
Aboriginal communities	1	3
Media	1	2
Academia	1	1
Types of violent crime	0	0
Domestic and family violence	1	4
Violence against women	1	9
Alcohol-fuelled violence	0	0
Drug-fuelled violence	1	3
Physical violence	1	18
Youth violence	1	13
Guns and firearms	1	9
Murder and homicide	1	12
Violence against the elderly	1	3
Gang violence	1	2

Appendix 4 d) Violent crime, Australia

Nodes



Name	Files	References
Cause and effect	0	0
Causes	1	46
Effects	1	8
Key actors	0	0
Government	1	26
Police agencies	1	8
The Public & NGOs	1	33
Aboriginal communities	1	10
Academia & scholars	1	6
Media and entertainment (films)	1	5
Think tanks (government-affiliated)	1	6
Types of violent crime (policy sub-areas)	0	0
Immigration & border control	1	6
Family & domestic violence	1	14
Violence against women	1	8
Gang violence	1	5
Drug-fuelled violence	1	12
Guns & firearms	1	10
Alcohol-fuelled violence	1	9
Physical violence	1	13
Violence against the elderly	1	2
Kidnapping and abduction	1	2
Abuse of children	1	3
Ethnic violence	1	1

Appendix 5 NVivo Content Analysis - Academia

a) Diversification, Canada

Nodes

Name	Files	References
Cause & effect	0	0
Causes	9	11
Effects	8	10
Key actors	0	0
The Government	12	15
The Public & NGOs	11	16
Aboriginal communities	2	2
Media	0	0
Academia	17	20
Think tanks	1	1
The private sector	8	9
Industries and sectors	0	0
Services	12	14
Transportation & logistics	2	2
Tourism	8	9
Advanced industries	11	15
Bio-energy & other processing	3	3
Technology	5	6
Renewable, alternative & green energy	4	5
The knowledge sector	1	1
Primary resource extraction	20	26
Agriculture, aquaculture & forestry	12	13
Mining, oil & other extraction sectors	11	13
Other	3	3
Manufacturing	3	3
Types of diversification	0	0
Market diversification	8	8
Industrial diversification	5	5
Product diversification	9	11
Diversification within the energy sector	6	6

Appendix 5 b) Diversification, Australia

Nodes

Name	Files	Reference
Cause & effect	0	0
Causes	16	19
Effects	13	19
Key actors	0	0
Academia	17	23
The Government	16	20
The private sector	19	22
Media	0	0
The Public & NGOs	10	13
Aboriginal communities	3	3
Think tanks	0	0
Industries & sectors	0	0
Services	18	29
Transportation & logistics	1	1
Tourism	13	17
Primary resource extraction	28	38
Mining & other resourse extraction industries	14	17
Agriculture & aquaculture	19	21
Advanced industries	8	10
Renewable, alternative & green energy	2	3
Technology	4	4
Biofuels and other processing sectors	3	3
Other	7	7
Manufacturing	5	5
Construction & building sectors	2	2
Types of diversification	0	0
Industry diversification	17	20
Market diversification	6	8
Product diversification	14	15
Diversifying within the energy sector	2	2

Appendix 5 c) Violent crime, Canada

Nodes



Name	Files	References
Cause & effect	0	0
Causes	48	63
Effects	6	7
Key actors	0	0
Academia	50	55
The Government	18	23
Police agencies	8	9
The Public & NGOs	19	25
Aboriginal communities	5	6
Think tanks	1	1
Media	4	10
Types of violent crime	0	0
Alcohol-fueled violence	7	7
Drug-fueled violence	11	14
Domestic & family violence	3	4
Murder & homicide	13	15
Violence against women	15	15
Youth & child violence	16	18
Gun violence	4	4
Physical violence, e.g. assaults	9	9
Ethnic (race) violence	7	8
Gang violence	2	4
Workplace violence	2	2

Appendix 5 d) Violent crime, Australia

Nodes



Name	Files	References
Cause & effect	0	0
Causes	49	69
Effects	6	7
Key actors	0	0
Academia	32	35
Media	12	19
The government	20	27
Police agencies	9	11
The public & NGOs	24	33
Aboriginal communities	7	8
Think tanks	0	0
The private sector	5	7
Types of violent crime	0	0
Alcohol-fueled violence	19	24
Drug-fueled violence	19	19
Murder & homicide	14	14
Gun violence	6	8
Gang violence	2	2
Physical violence, e.g. assaults	14	15
Violence against women	15	15
Youth & child violence	8	9
Domestic violence	8	8
Ethnic (race) violence	3	5

Appendix 6 NVivo Content Analysis - Think tanks

a) Diversification, Canada

Nodes

Name	Files	Reference
Cause & effect	0	0
Causes	11	11
Effects	11	12
Key actors	0	0
Academia	2	2
The Government	24	33
The Private sector	20	26
The Public & NGOs	10	17
Aboriginal communities	4	5
Media	1	1
Think tanks	9	11
Industries and sectors	0	0
Services	18	24
Tourism	3	3
Transportation & logistics	10	10
Manufacturing	9	10
Primary resource extraction	34	54
Mining & other resource extraction	28	38
Agriculture & aquaculture	15	16
Forestry	8	9
Advanced industries	19	28
Technology	9	10
The knowledge sector	7	9
Renewable, alternative & green energy	8	9
Types of diversification	0	0
Market diversification	29	37
Industry diversification	11	12
Product diversification	15	18
Diversifying within the energy sector	7	8

Appendix 6 b) Diversification, Australia

Nodes



Name	Files	Reference
Cause & effect	0	0
Causes	12	12
Effects	9	11
Key actors	0	0
Academia	11	13
Media	2	2
The Government	22	37
The Public & NGOs	17	27
Aboriginal communities	5	9
The private sector	28	37
Think tanks	21	28
International organizations	3	4
Industries & sectors	0	0
Services	23	45
Transportation & logistics	3	3
Tourism	14	17
Primary resource extraction	34	79
Agriculture & aquaculture	19	31
Forestry	4	6
Mining & other primary resource sectors	31	48
Advanced industries	28	46
Renewable, alternative & green energy	5	5
Technology	9	11
The knowledge sector	18	24
Processing, e.g. bio-fuels, refineries	5	6
Other	17	23
Defense & security	7	8
Manufacturing	11	15
Types of diversification	0	0
Product diversification	9	9
Market diversification	16	22
Industry diversification	22	35
Diversifying within the energy sector	4	5

Appendix 6 c) Violent crime, Canada

Nodes

Name	Files	References
Cause & effect	0	0
Causes	12	16
Effects	2	2
Key actors	0	0
Academia	8	10
Media	4	5
The Government	22	43
Police agencies	10	15
The Public	17	24
Aboriginal communities	5	6
Think tanks	12	12
Types of violent crime	0	0
Alcohol-fueled violence	1	2
Drug-fueled violence	3	3
Gun violence	4	6
Murders and homicide	14	17
Domestic and family violence	2	2
Violence against women	5	7
Physical violence	7	8
Gang violence	6	6
Prison violence	2	3
Youth violence	5	6

Appendix 6 d) Violent crime, Australia

Nodes

Name	Files	References
Cause & effect	0	0
Causes	41	64
Effects	9	11
Key actors	0	0
Academia	15	18
Media	17	22
The Government	38	50
Police agencies	16	17
The Public	41	52
Aboriginal communities	18	21
Think tanks	53	63
Government-affiliated think tanks	36	40
The private sector	2	2
Types of violent crime	0	0
Alcohol-fueled violence	24	29
Drug-fueled violence	20	22
Domestic & family violence	30	35
Murder & homicide	29	33
Violence against women	21	23
Youth & child violence (abuse)	18	21
Gun violence	11	14
Gang violence	4	5
Human trafficking	3	6
Prison violence	8	10
Physical violence (assaults)	40	49
Robbery	23	25
Ethnic violence	6	9